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Pension system reforms are an important topic on the political agenda of most western
countries nowadays. The main reason is that the maintenance of pension systems has
become increasingly difficult from a fmancial point of view, primazily because of the
ageing of the populatíon.' Old-age security systems have been enacted in most western
countries. According to Sala-i-Martin, 130 countries had some kind of old-age social
security programme in 1989 (Sala-i-Martin, 1994). Several azguments can be given to
explain the establishment of public pension schemes. The most common azguments include
market failure and~or the imperfection of financial markets, the idea of a paternalistic
government (which has to ensure that (irrational) people have enough income when they
retire) and the political power of the old generation. A different viewpoint is put forwazd
by Sala-i-Martin, who claims that old-age social security is just a way to buy the elderly
out of their jobs. I will not go into more detail here. For the evolution of public pension
schemes, see Verbon (1988).
This thesis asks why and to what extent old-age state pension systems and, more
generally, intergenerational transfer systems aze supported. What factors bring about that
support? An associated issue is the more general question of what kind of voluntary
intergenerational transfer systems can be established and what factors contribute or
counteract the development of these systems. These questions will be answered in an
empirical way, using data from the Netherlands. The interest for the subject stems from
the observation that in spite of the increasing contribution rates, the Dutch old-age public
pension system still enjoys large popular support from almost the whole Dutch
population.z This may imply that not only financial motives play a role, but also
considerations of altruism, fairness, and so on. Although theoretical studies sometimes
incorporate these notions, empirical analyses generally do not.
' The financial problems have been caused not only by the fact that the ageing process leads to a relative
decline of the number of economically active individuals and a relative increase in the number of aged
persons in the (near) future. In several countries, the average retirement age has also significantly decreased
during the last decades (see, e.g., Fabel, 1994). This aspect is often forgotten.
Z This was, for instance, found in a recent report by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Bureau
(SCP, Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau, 1992).
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Contrary to most empirical studies in this field, this study quantifies the effects of
altruism and fairness. That is, the present study will derive elasticities with respect to
altruism and fairness ( among other things). Quantifying these psychological considerations
is one of the main contributions of the dissertation. Before turning to the contents of the
thesis, I will briefly discuss why public pension schemes have come under pressure.
In most welfaze states the pension system consists of two elements: a public pension
scheme and a private pension scheme. Public pension systems aze collective, compulsory
programmes, usually financed by means of a Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) system: the pension
contributions paid by the present taxpayers aze immediately spent on the pensions received
by the current group of elderly. PAYG systems aze actually based on implicit contracts
between generations. Implicit here is that the present taxpayers will also receive a pension
payment when they are old. Private pension schemes, on the other hand, aze commonly
financed by a Capital-Reserve (CR) or fully funded system. CR systems aze based on
explicit contracts: when pensioned, people receive the pension contributions they paid
themselves when young plus a certain interest rate (roughly speaking). The structure of a
PAYG scheme generates íntergenerational transfers, i.e., transfers between generations,
which do not occur in CR schemes.3 On the other hand, intragenerational transfers occur
in both schemes. Nevertheless, redistributions within a generation are strongest in public
pension schemes because these schemes usually impose defined benefits.' A last
difference between both pension systems is that politicians lazgely determine the public
pension schemes, whereas the rules for the private schemes are set mainly during
negotiations between labour unions and employee organisations.s
Before turning to the aims of the study, I will provide some background information
about the Dutch pension system. The Dutch public pension system was founded in 1957.
Every individual aged 65 or older is eligible to receive a public pension benefit (AOV1~.
The public pension, basically, depends only on one's mazital status. Public pension
benefits aze paid on an individual basis. The total public pension payment for a married
' Theoretically, this is correct, but in practice it is not. Because of fluctuations in the interest rate and so-
called back service liabilities of CR schemes, some redistribution between generations occurs in these
schemes, too.
' Related to this is the issue of actuarial fairness. Although interesting, this complicated point is beyond
the scope of the present study. It will, therefore, not be discussed here. See, for instance, Fabel (1994) for an
analysis in this field.
5 It should be noted that despite these differences both schemes do not operate independently from each
other. Theoretical economic analyses show that the relationship between public and private pension schemes
is determined by several factors including political factors, the relationship between generations (altruism),
and demographic factors such as the growth rate of the population (Verbon, 1988 and 1990).
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(or cohabiting) couple if both persons aze older than 65 is equal to 1000~0 of the legal
minimum wage; each person receives SOo~o. If only one person of a married couple is older
than 65, just that person receives SOo~o. However, an additional payment (up to a maximum
of another SOo~o) can be received if the income of the younger partner is low. A single
person older than 65 receives a public pension that amounts to 700~0 of the minimum wage.
Scheme 1.1: Public and private pension schemes in the Netherlands'1
public oension scheme (AOW)
financing method Pay-As-You-Go
retirement age 65
contribution rate 14"~0 of taxable income with a maximum of t f500,- per monthb
average contribution t J300,- per month
public pension for a couple gross j987,-, net f885,- per person per month
public pension for a single gross f1428,-, net J1232,- per month
~ivate oension scheme
fmancing method Capital-Reserve
retirement age 65 ( in general)
contribution rate varying per scheme and pension fund
private pension at most 70"~0 of the last gross wage ( including public pension)
") The scheme describes the situation at the end of 1993
The most common private pension scheme in the Netherlands is a programme in which the
private pension benefit depends on the last-earned yeazly wage and the number of yeazs of
participation (the so-called eindloonstelsen. In this scheme, which is joined by about 800~0
of the employees who aze eligible for a private pension, the maximum pension benefit of
700~0 of the last gross wage is received if one has 40 years of insurance coverage;
deductions aze made if the 40 years of coverage are not reached.' An important and
somewhat uncommon feature in this respect is that the public pension benefit is included
in this amount. Employees joining this kind of private pension scheme thus receive the
` When this thesis was written at the end of 1995, J 1(one Dutch Guilder) was about S 0.65.
' The maximum net pension benefit is more than 70"~0 of the last net wage, since retired people are
exempted from paying certain taxes and premiums, such as public pension contributions.
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public pension benefit and on top of that a private pension benefit up to a total of 70"~0 of
their last gross wage. A last chazacteristic of the Dutch pension system is that variable
retirement schemes aze not available, which contrasts with the situation in most other
western countries.g In Canada, for example, people can retire between the age of 60 and
70. The full benefit age is 65. Every month of early (delayed) withdrawal gives a
reduction (an increment) of O.So~o in the pension benefit. A similaz procedure exists in the
US: retirement before the age of 65 gives a pension reduction of 5~90~o per month, whereas
delaying retirement yields a pension increment of 0.250~o per month. More complicated
variable retirement possibilities exist, for instance, in France and Germany (see Fabel,
1994). Scheme 1.1 summazises the main features of public and private pension systems in
the Netherlands.
As said, the age structure of the population will change in the future in most western
countries. The ageing of the population has come about by the increase in individuals' life-
expectations and by the decrease in the fertility rates during the postwar period. The
ageing process of a population leads to a relative decline of the number of economically
active individuals and a relative increase in the number of aged persons in the (neaz)
future. Consequently, the old-age dependency ratios, defined by the number of persons of
age 65 and older per 100 persons aged 15-64, will increase drastically. Table 1.2 presents
the dependency ratios for a selection of OECD countries.
The picture azising from the table is similaz for the eight countries: all countries face a
considerable rise in the dependency ratio between 1980 and 2030. The average ratio for
the OECD countries is expected to increase from almost 19 in 1980 to almost 23 in 2010,
an then to about 33 in 2030. Except for Japan, the dependency ratios in the selected
countries will increase only slightly in the period up to 2010; these countries aze projected
to have sharply rising dependency ratios after 2010. The reason for this is the baby boom;
the lazge generations born after the Second World Waz will retire azound 2020. Regarding
the development of the ratios in the total time span between 1980 and 2030, the smallest
increase can be observed for the United Kingdom. Consequently, their situation in 2030 is
among the most favourable ones (in spite of their current high ratio). Almost the opposite
occurs in Canada: their situation deteriorates rapidly and they will end up with a relatively
high dependency ratio in 2030. The position of the Netherlands is about midway.
B Eazly retirement is possible in the Netherlands, though. However, in case of eazly retirement the public
pension benefit (AOV~ is not received until one has reached the age of 65. Many people retire at the age of
about 60 as part ofa voluntary retirement programme (VUT), established by collective bazgaining at the firm
or sectoral level. In that case one receives a fixed income, linked to the last wage.
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2000 2010 2020 2030
Canada 14.1 19.0 21.4 28.9 37.3
France 21.9 23.3 24.5 30.6 35.8
Germany 23.4 25.4 30.6 33.5 43.6
Italy 20.8 22.6 25.7 29.3 35.3
Japan 13.5 22.6 29.5 33.6 31.9
UK 23.2 22.3 22.3 25.5 31.1
USA 17.1 18.2 18.8 25.0 31.7
average of the above 19.1 21.9 24.7 29.5 35.2
OECD average 18.9 20.8 22.9 27.6 33.3
Netherlands 17.4 19.7 22.1 28.9 37.8
1) (Population 65f I population 15-54) x 100. Figures for 2000 to 2030 are projected ratios
Source: OECD (1988, p. 32)
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Dependency ratios can, for example, be used to calculate the future financial burden of
the public pension schemes. This kind of calculation for Gennany shows that if the benefit
structure remains unchanged the contribution rates should increase from about 190~o now to
about 400~o towazds 2030 (Bi)rsch-Supan, 1991). Similaz estimates for the US show that the
contribution rate will almost double to about 250~o in 2040 (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1984).
In the Netherlands, contribution rates of more than 250~o should be imposed azound 2030 to
maintain the current level of public pension benefits (versus 140~o right now).
Because of the ageing of the population, the state pension systems in their current
forms will not be feasible in the future. Hence, severe changes in elements of the pension
systems, such as the contribution rate or the pension benefit, or an adjustment of the total
pension scheme will be necessazy. Several proposals have been made in this respect.
Populaz proposals vary from an increase in the retirement age, an increase in the pension
contributions, a decline of the pension benefit or a pension benefit freeze to more radical
reform plans such as a transition to a CR scheme. It becomes increasingly cleaz to
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politicians and political parties that they have to be careful with their policy plans, as
people appeaz to have strong feelings about public pension systems.9 In the Netherlands,
for instance, a recent suggestion by the Christian Democratic Party (CDA) to freeze public
pension benefits in the future was faced by large opposition. Experts ascribe the recent
disastrous election results of this party in part to this proposal and the fuss sunounding it.
The above illustrates that pension systems aze a politically sensitive topic and that
politicians should consider voters' opinions. Until recently, however, the Netherlands has
paid little attention to pension systems and to the approaching financial difficulties, let
alone to public opinion about these issues. During the last year or so more attention was
paid to pension systems and the development of possible reform plans.'o In this respect I
already mentioned the plans of the Christian Democratic Party. Furthermore, just recently
the Dutch Social Democratic Party (PvdA) proposed several changes in the system. Their
plans include the introduction of a so-called schommelfonds (a kind of temporary buffer
fund") and the introduction of public pension contributions for retired individuals with a
substantial occupational pension about 20 years from now. Apparently, the Social
Democratic Party has learned from the Christian Democratic experience, as they
extensively probed the opinions of their grassroots support before presenting their
proposals.
I claim that public opinion is even more important than thus faz sketched because the
public's judgements of pension systems are not completely determined by financial
aspects. On the contrary, aside from financial issues, non-monetary feelings such as
solidarity, altruism and fairness could also affect someone's feelings with respect to
pension systems. For instance, if the working generation feels highly altruistic towazds or
responsible for the retired generation, younger individuals could, for instance, simply
9 A recent study by one of the Dutch labour unions (FNV) revealed that a majority of the population
(about 75"~0) consider the public pension system (AOW) the most important element of the Dutch social
security system (see, e.g., De Volkskrant (a Dutch newspaper), January 9, 1996).
'o The reason that politicians paid little attention to problems concerning pension systems is probably
twofold. First, politicians may realise that pensions are a sensitive topic and thus they do not want to burn
their fmgers on the problems. Second, for a long time, the general idea was that the real problem would only
occur one to two decades from now, so present politicians did not need to worry too much (see, e.g., a report
by the Committee Financing Provisions for Old Age (Commissie Financiering Oudedags-voorziening), 1987)
However, people have recently gradually realised that it is probably better and necessary to deal with the
problems before they actually occur.
" The idea behind the fund is as follows. By a gradual increase of the pension contribution rate before
the ageing problems really occur and by maintaining a constant rate after that, the government receives extra
money, which will be kept in this temporary buffer fund. When the financial problems become larger (in
about 2010) the money of the fund can be used to fmance the public pensions. Essentially, this proposal
implies a kind of tax-smoothing.
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accept or support an increase in the public pension contribution to maintain the present
level of pension benefits.
Right now, the Dutch public pension system still seems to enjoy lazge populaz support.
From both a theoretical and a political perspective, it would be useful to know more about
opinions concerning the system. Why do people support the system? Will the young
people be willing to maintain the PAYG scheme although the intergenerational
redistributions engendered by the system will hurt their lifetime incomes? Will the elderly
people consent to decreasing their pension benefit in order to protect the young generation
against the mentioned negative effect on their lifetime income? What is a fair rate of
return on the PAYG scheme for vazious generations?
This thesis deals with precisely these kinds of questions. To answer them, I must first
answer some basic questions as to how people evaluate the existing public pension system.
Furthermore, how are changes in pension systems valued? I want to know in pazticular to
what extent these evaluations aze determined by pecuniary motives and to what extent
social psychological feelings like altruism and fairness play a role. Related to this is the
more general question of what feasible intergenerational transfer systems are. What kind of
pension system or, more generally, intergenerational transfer system can and will be
established or supported? Delving into these issues, the thesis will stress the possible
impact of altruism, fairness and especially reciprocity.
The data needed for the research were obtained in two ways. First, a lazge-scale survey
among a representative sample of the Dutch population was conducted. The questionnaire
addressed several pension scheme scenazios. The survey results shed light on what people
think of vazious realistic pension situations. Simpler and more abstract questions and issues
are studied by means of the second method: economic experiments. Although the designs
of the experiments are rather abstract, they mimic some important features of the public
pension system. These features include a PAYG structure and intergenerational aspects.
The simple structures used in the experiments have enabled me to study several basic
questions concerning why and how intergenerational transfer systems aze established. For
instance, I investigate whether providing information about the history of the system or
introducing a kind of private pension system affects the level of (voluntary) transfers.
The analyses of the two types of data provide insights into the questions and issues
addressed above. As far as I know, empirical studies in the field of pension systems, which
also consider altruism and fairness, aze scarce. This thesis contributes to the literature by
showing that these non-monetary considerations may have a substantial impact on lifetime
utility. Part I of the thesis, moreover, quantifies these effects. Furthermore, the
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experimental part of the thesis contributes to the rapidly expanding literature on economic
experiments. The novel feature here is the use of an overlapping-generations design to
study the development of a voluntary transfer system, which can also be interpreted as a
public pension system.
The lazgest part of the thesis describes the results obtained from the data. Thus, the
remainder of the dissertation is organised according to the two ways of gathering data. The
organisation and the outline of the thesis aze described in the next section.
1.2 Contents of the thesis
Suggested by the two data collection methods, the thesis is divided in two main parts. Part
I(Chapter 3 and Chapter 4) describes the survey results, whereas Part II (Chapter 5 and
Chapter 6) presents the experimental results. These four main chapters aze preceded by
another introductory chapter, Chapter 2. The survey and experimental results of the two
parts aze summarised and compared in the last chapter, Chapter 7.
Chapter 2 presents a survey of the relevant literature and attempts to situate the
position of the study. The first part of the chapter discusses and motivates the data
collection methods used in Parts I and II. The corresponding methods aze the survey
method and economic laboratory experiments, respectively. The first type of inethod
applies the Factorial Survey Approach, which is able to confront respondents with
hypothetical situations.12 Next, the chapter describes the experimental method, used in
Part II. As the use of laboratory experiments to gather data is fairly new in economics, the
method is extensively described. The second part of Chapter 2 elaborates on non-monetary
issues, such as altruism and fairness. Although incorporating these kinds of considerations
in economic reseazch is not standazd, particulazly not in empirical reseazch, these aspects
are relevant to the present reseazch for reasons already mentioned above. As social
motivations play an important role throughout the thesis, it is useful to discuss the notions
of altruism and fairness in some detail and to present several empirical and experimental
findings concerning these notions. The review of the literature in this field shows that the
opinions concerning the importance of these psychological notions aze mixed. In particulaz,
opinions concerning the predictive role of game theory and the role of strategic versus
12 In the questionnaire, respondents were asked to evaluate the existing public pension system and four
hypothetical pension scheme scenarios.
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social motivations differ widely. The ambiguous results of economic experiments have led
to a lazge debate about this. The thesis tries to contribute something to the discussion in
this field, too. Finally, Chapter 2 discusses some ways to model altruism and fairness.
After having explained the building blocks of the reseazch in Chapter 2, Part I will
look at the results of the lazge-scale survey. Part I consists of two chapters, Chapter 3 and
Chapter 4. Chapter 3 is a kind of introduction to the main survey results. Its primary
purpose is to describe details about the questionnaire and the sample. Furthermore, it
summarises the answers to the more general questions of the questionnaire. The topics of
these questions include the Dutch social security system, (elements) of the Dutch public
pension system, and the income positions of the respondents themselves and of inembers
of other generations. One striking outcome obtained in Chapter 3 is that people appear to
know little about public and private pension systems. Moreover, most people think that the
pension benefit is low, but that the contribution rate is normal or high. The purpose of the
questionnaire is not limited to better understanding the respondents' opinions concerning
the present system. I am also interested in opinions concerning possible changes in the
system and especially in the extent to which considerations of altruism and fairness
influence these opinions. To that end, I introduced four hypothetical pension scheme
scenarios in the questionnaire by changing the contribution rate, the pension benefit or
both. Respondents were asked to evaluate each scenario (including the present one) by
assigning a grade to the situation. Chapter 3 compazes the evaluations in a simple way.
Among the findings is that people turn out to be quite satisfied with the existing situation.
Furthermore, modifications in the system are not appreciated. The results suggest in
pazticulaz that people reject a decrease in the public pension benefits.
The evaluations of the pension scheme scenazios are analysed more systematically in
Chapter 4. For that purpose, I develop and then estimate a model by means of the survey
data. One assumption of the model is that people not only derive utility from their own
income but also from the (average) income of inembers of other generations (altruism).
The model assumes, moreover, that considerations of fairness affect utility. The model
takes fairness into consideration by incorporating the ratio of public pension benefits to
public pension contributions in the utility function. Three generations are distinguished: the
young, the middle-aged, and the old. Per generation a utility function is estimated. The
estimation results support the assumptions; for all generations considerations of altruism
and fairness appeaz to play a role. Furthermore, the oldest generation seems less altruistic
than the working generations. The results offer also the opporhznity to compute the rates of
return of the pension system desired by each generation. The optimal ratios turn out to be
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remazkably robust, both for one's own generation and for other generations. They aze,
moreover, for the most part close to the actual current rates of return.
Part II (Chapters 5 and 6) contains the experimental part of the reseazch. Chapter 5
discusses the results of the baseline experiment. The experiment is based on a two
overlapping-generations model, which ímplies that players live for two periods. When
young, a player can make a transfer to the old player. When old, one may receive a
transfer from the (next) young player. The Pazeto-efficient solution (defined as the
outcome that maximises group earnings) is obtained if all players transfer a certain fixed
aznount. On the other hand, the dominant Nash strategy for each player is to transfer
nothing. This simple experimental design captures some features of a PAYG pension
system such as the 'intergenerational' aspect. The experiment can first of all be used to
investigate the development of a voluntazy transfer system. Furthermore, by vazying the
information condition of the game, I was able to generate two experimental treatments.
These treatments can be used to examine more precisely under what circumstances a
(voluntary) transfer system may be established and what the possible impact of reciprocity
ís. In one treatment a player knows what the current 'old' player has transferred when she
was 'young', while in the other treatment such information was not given. Providing
information creates a monitoring device and thus the possibility of reciprocity. Based on
eazlier findings in the literature one might expect that information, reciprocity and~or
altruism have an impact on the level of the transfers. In pazticular, higher average transfers
could be expected in the treatment with information. The general finding in the baseline
experiment is that the average transfer is quite high; it is between the Pazeto-efficient
outcome and the Nash solution. Furthermore, contrary to the expectations, the level and
the development of the transfers aze not significantly different in the two treatments.
Finally, considerations of reciprocity aze hardly observed.
The results of the basic experiments have given rise to (four) additional experiments,
which are presented in Chapter 6. T'he designs of the additional experiments deviate
slightly from the baseline design. Two extensions were conducted mainly to test the
robustness of the results of Chapter 5; one of these extensions limits the strategy set of the
players, whereas the other experiment vazies the structure and the division of the rounds.
The results of these first two alternative experiments lazgely confirm the fmdings of the
basic design. A third extension aims at testing the impact of the structural design imposed
in the basic experiment. Hence, two experimental treatments aze presented that use a
bilateral matching structure instead of an overlapping-generations structure. Unexpectedly,
it is found that transfers aze for the most part higher in the sessions with the overlapping-
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generations structure. It will be azgued that the findings may be explained by the public-
good feature of the OLG design. Reciprocal forces seem completely absent in the
experiments with the bilateral matching structure. A last experimental extension considered
in the chapter is the introduction of a savings opportunity. If players can also save
privately (when young), along with making a transfer, it turns out that most players choose
for the private saving system. The transfer system is thus in a sense undermined by the
savings option. The overall efficiency, i.e. the pay-off, in the sessions with savings is not
higher than in those without savings, however. It will be azgued that the results may be
explained by either a decrease in the solidarity or trust in each other or a risk-averse
attitude of the players.
The results of the survey and the experiments are summarised and compared in the last
chapter, Chapter 7. In addition to a pure compazison, I discuss the value of the results in a
broader context. Moreover, I attempt to extend and translate the results in order to draw
some policy implications. A suggestion to policymakers could be that people ought to be
better informed about pension systems. Although people have strong ideas and feelings
about pension systems they also appeaz to have little knowledge about them. Clearly, these
attitudes clash. More information might bridge part of this knowledge gap and reduce the
strong reactions voters have to pension scheme reform proposals. The survey results
suggest furthermore that social psychological considerations affect individuals' decisions.
The experimental results suggest that transfer systems, such as a PAYG system, can be
established and supported under certain circumstances. In this respect, stressing feelings of
solidarity, fairness etc. may be helpful. I will azgue that PAYG systems possibly may not
need to be completely abandoned if policymakers make appeal to these very aspects. The
dissertation concludes by putting its contribution into perspective and by mentioning




This chapter aims to give a further introduction to the core of the thesis. Before presenting
the main results in Parts I and II, the present chapter dwells on some building blocks of
the reseazch. In particulaz, the chapter describes the methods used to collect data and
elaborates on some (psychological) notions that have a central role in the thesis.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. The next section considers the
two methods of data collection applied in the research: the stated preference method and
economic experiments. The meaning of altruism and fairness and some classical views on
these notions aze discussed in Section 2.3. Section 2.4 discusses empirical results
concerning altruism and fairness, whereas Section 2.5 addresses the issue of how to model
these notions. The last section of the chapter contains a brief summary.
2.2 Methods for data collection
Recall that the main aim of the study is to investigate the possible role of altruism and
fairness on the decisions that individuals make, especially those in the azea of pension
systems. Suitable data to shed light on these issues aze scarce, however. One reason is that
standazd methods such as revealed preference methods aze not applicable. Individual
preferences regarding consumer goods (for example) can often be derived by observing
individual purchases of these goods. Observing pension decisions is more complicated,
however. In most European countries, employees aze linked to mandatory private pension
plans, which leave hazdly any freedom of choice. The same holds for public pension plans.
Individuals aze thus usually unable to reveal directly their preferences regazding these
pension plans. Furthermore, possible time-series data yield little information for at least
two (institutional) reasons. First, hazdly any changes in the state pension system have
occurred in the past decades, whereas some additional pension schemes have been in
existence for a relatively short time. In addition, deriving (revealed) preferences regazding
altruism, fairness etc. is also more complicated than it is for consumer goods, as direct
observations of people's behaviour conceming feelings of altruism and faimess aze hard to
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find." Revealed preference methods, thus, yield no appropriate data for answering the
type of research questions considered here. Data were therefore gathered by applying two
other methods: a survey method (a stated preference method) and economic experiments.
The next two subsections describe both methods.
2.2.1 Stated preJerence methods
The first method used to gather data for the reseazch is the stated preference method (see,
e.g., Kroes and Sheldon, 1988). In a stated preference method, respondents do not reveal
their (real) preferences but they state their preferences, or rather their opinions, about
something, e.g., about their income position. Essentially, two possible approaches aze used
to ask people about their feelings: the Factorial Survey Approach and the Evaluation
Question Approach (see Van der Sar and Van Praag, 1993). In the Factorial Survey
Approach (FSA) (described by, e.g., Rossi and Nock, 1982), people aze asked to evaluate
certain situations, the so-called vignettes. People can, for example, be asked to judge
household incomes of f 2000,-, f 3000,-, f 4000,- as very good, good, normal, bad or
very bad. The judgements obtained for each vignette aze the components of the evaluating
response vector. Just the opposite occurs in the Evaluation Question Approach (EQA):
certain evaluations aze given and people are asked to specify a situation that corresponds to
an evaluation. The application of EQA to income attitudes, called the Income Evaluation
Question (IEQ) or the welfaze function of income approach, is well known. This method,
developed by Van Praag (see Van Praag 1968 and 1971) and widely applied since then,
estimates the so-called individual welfaze function of income (WFI). In the WFI approach
(or the Leyden approach after the name of Van Praag's university) respondents aze asked
to associate amounts of income to verbal labels. That is, people have to state what level of
household income would be excellent, good, normal, bad, and very bad. The answers can
be used to derive individual income utility functions (see, e.g., Van Herwaazden and
Kapteyn, 1981 and Van Praag, 1971)." It would lead us too faz aside to discuss both
methods extensively here. For a comparison between the FSA and the EQA, see Van de
Sar and Van Praag (1993).
" Note in this respect that (in general) utility can also only be observed or derived indirectly, in contrast
with, e.g., the above-mentioned consumer goods.
" Although the WFI approach is broadly employed, the value of its results is still subject to a lot of
discussion. The method was recently criticised by Seidl (1994) after which Van Praag and Kapteyn (1994)
defendedthe approach.
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As will become clear in Chapter 3, the Factorial Survey Approach is most appropriate
in this case, as ít can handle hypothetical situations in a quite straightforwazd way. The
survey addressed several hypothetical pension scheme scenazios, the results of which will
be described in Chapters 3 and 4(Part I). Respondents were asked to evaluate the existing
pension scheme, as well as four alternative pension scheme scenarios. The evaluations
constitute an important part of the data set. Among other things, these data aze used to
estimate a model. The estimation results can then be used to investigate (indirectly) the
impact of considerations of fairness and altruism.
The common critique on questionnaires and stated preference methods is that the
answers suggest behaviour that does not necessarily coincide with people's behaviour in
reality. In other words, the concern is to what extent the survey evokes responses similaz
to what would be evoked by the "real world".15 This criticism also applies to the results
of the questionnaire presented in this dissertation. To meet part of this objection, I took
caze that the internal consistency of the questionnaire was as high as possible and built in
several checks on the consistency of the answers. At least three aspects aze worth
mentioning. First, the (hypothetical) pension situations presented in the questionnaire were
quite detailed and as plausible and consistent as possible. For example, in one of the
scenazios an increase in the public pension contribution rate was accompanied by higher
pension benefits for the elderly people. Second, regazding the evaluation questions,
respondents first had to give a verbal answer and then they had to assign a grade (see
Chapters 3 and 4). Third, some questions were included to check the consistency of the
answers (see also Chapters 3 and 4). Although the above-mentioned problem cannot be
excluded, the way of questioning and the consistency checks will at least reduce the
chance of its occurrence and will thus probably increase the credibility of the survey
results. I will briefly come back to this issue in Chapter 7.
2.2.2 Experimental methods
The risk that people do not behave in accordance with their words is much less in the
second data collection method, economic experiments. Most economic experiments
immediately confront individuals with the consequences of their decisions. Unlike other
sciences, economics did not use experiments until a few decades ago. That is, for a long
15 Rossi and Nocks (1982) argued that there is a remarkable congruence between both groups of
responses (see in particular Liker, 1982).
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time, people simply believed that economics was not an experimental science. Recently,
however, experimental research has become more accepted in economics and it has found
its way to many economic journals and books.1ó Because of the relative unfamiliarity of
most economists with experimentation, I first provide a brief overview of some general
ideas on and features of experimental economics. Next, I describe two examples of populaz
experiments, the ultimatum game experiment and the public-good experiment. Specific
experimental results concerning altruism and fairness aze discussed at some length in
Section 2.4.2.
The use of experimental methods in economics stazted about 50 years ago. In the late
1940s and the eazly 1950s several economists became awaze that (laboratory) experiments
could also be useful in economics. Davis and Holt (1993) point out that three directions of
research interests can be distinguished in these early experiments. The first class can be
referred to as market experiments. These experiments focused on the predictions of
neoclassical price theory on natural mazkets (see, e.g., Chamberlin, 1948). The aim of the
second category of experiments was mainly to test the behavioural implications of non-
cooperative game theory. Experiments in this group, which may be called game
experiments, used simpler and more abstract designs compazed with those in the first class.
The last group consisted of individual decision-making experiments. Most experimental
designs in this group were simple. The focus was on investigating individual decisions
under uncertainty and testing the axioms of expected utility theory.
Experimental methods, I think, should be seen as a method to generate or to collect
data for a specific purpose. Like any other method, experiments have advantages and
disadvantages. The primary advantages are replicability and control. Replicability means
that other reseazchers can repeat the experiment and thus verify the experimental findings.
Control means that the experimental circumstances can be determined and manipulated, at
least to some extent. By varying the condition(s), one can test alternative theories and
policies. As one can choose the most appropriate environment, laboratory experiments can
at least provide a minimal test of a theory. One might object that real conditions are much
more complex than experimental circumstances. The standard azgument against this is that
it is not very plausible that a theory will work under other circumstances if it does not
work under the most favourable conditions.
16 Several (hand)books of experimental economics have appeared lately. These books include Roth
(1987), Smith (1990), Hey (1991), Davis and Holt (1993), Friedman and Sunder (1994) and Kagel and Roth
(1995).
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Although experimental economics is quite widely applied nowadays, many persons still
have reservations against it. Among the common sceptical remazks are the following. It is
often claimed that the subjects usually participating in experiments, namely students,
behave differently than other individuals would do. Although this azgument may have
some validity, more professional or sophisticated decision-makers usually turn out to make
decisions similaz to those made by students." However, one must continue to be awaze of
possible subject pool effects. The second reservation is that experimental designs aze often
(too) simple. As azgued above, this concern is not always completely correct; usually at
least a minimal test of a theory can be obtained. It must, however, be realised that
experimental methods cannot be applied to all aspects of economic reseazch. For example,
it is relatively difficult to study macroeconomic problems by means of experimentation or,
the other way round, to translate experimental results to (macroeconomic) policy
implications. It is much easier to investigate individual behaviour towazds, e.g., risk.18
In spite of these reservations, economic experiments can yield interesting results and
provide useful insights. Davis and Holt ascribe three main alternative objectives to
experimentation: tests of behavioural hypotheses, sensitivity tests and documentation of
empirical regulazities. I will briefly consider these aims.19 The first type of experiment
concerns tests of behavioural hypotheses or theory falsifications. By designing an
environmental environment that satisfies as many structural assumptions of a theory as
possible, experimenters can examine the behavioural implications of the theory. Once
again, if the theoretical predictions are not obtained under the most favourable conditions,
the predictive power of a theory seems minor. The second type of experiment can be
called theory stress tests. Essentially, these experiments involve tests of the robustness of a
theory to its simplifying assumptions. The designs of the experiments within this category
are usually slightly more complex than the designs of experiments testing behavioural
hypotheses. An example of this type is an experiment designed to test the sensitivity of the
experimental results to the assumption of complete information. Compazison of the results
obtained with different amounts of information could indicate the impact of the
" Some experiments have established that economists behave differently, though (see, e.g., Marwell and
Ames, 1981). The experiments reported in this thesis have used students as subjects, because they could be
recruited most easily. If one mainly compares the results of experiments under different conditions or with
different treatments, the effect of using students is probably small.
1e In spite of this, the experiments presented in Part II (eventually) try to study a macroeconomic
phenomenon, namely pensions. Data are, however, obtained on a micro level. Actually, the main problem is
the aggregation of the (micro) results to the macro level.
" It is perhaps better to talk about goals that may be achieved by using data from experiments.
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assumption.20 The last group involves experiments used to discover and document
empirical regularitíes or stylised facts. For example, the regulaz observation of voluntary
transfers in gift experiments has stimulated a lazge debate on the role of considerations of
altruism, fairness, and distributional equity.
It should be noted that most experiments do not belong to just one category. The
experiments that will be presented in Part II of this dissertation mainly test behavioural
hypotheses and the robustness of the theory and the experimental results. The experiments
aze, for instance, concerned with the hypothesis that information about past behaviour
influences the support for a pension scheme. In addition, Part II examines what the impact
is of changes in the experimental design.
Because experimental economics is a still relatively unknown field, I want to conclude
this section on experimental methods by considering two examples of experiments that
have received much attention in the economic literature. These examples merely try to
illustrate the (non)possibilities of experimental methods in economics. The examples aze
chosen because they show some similazities with the present experiments, as will become
cleaz in Chapters 5 and 6. The results of both types of experiments and their possible
explanations aze further discussed in Section 2.4.2.
Example 1: ultimatum game experiments
Among the most conducted and discussed experiments are ultimatum game experiments.
The popularity of these experiments may be ascribed to the fact that they aze simple and
easy to run. An ultimatum game experiment anonymously matches a group of
experimental subjects in pairs of two players. In its simplest form, this bazgaining game
has one single round in which one player (per pair) proposes a split of a"cake". The
standard size of the cake is á5 or ~ 10. The proposed split is an ultimatum offer, in the
sense that the other player (the recipient) must decide to accept or reject the offer, after
which the game is over. The game-theoretic subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction of this
game is that the proposer offers the smallest possible monetary amount to the recipient,
who should accept that offer. Many papers have presented results of ultimatum game
experiments, and most of them report substantial offers.Z' The general observation is that
the modal offer is about half the cake, while the average offer is about 350~0 of the cake.
Section 2.4.2 discusses these results in more detail and considers some related experiments.
20 In the experiments presented in this thesis, the role of information is crucial (see Chapters 5 and 6).
" See GUth et al. (1982) and Kahnemann er al. (1986b), among others. See, e.g., Thaler (1988), Ochs
and Roth (1989), GUth and Tietz (1990) and Roth (1995) for an overview of ultimatum game experiments.
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Here I suffice by mentioning that basically two explanations aze common. The first
explanation is that people are sensitive to considerations of fairness and altruism, while the
second explanation states that subjects merely behave strategically.
Example 2: Public-good experiments
The second example concerns experiments on the voluntary provision of public goods. The
basic voluntary contribution mechanism used in these experiments is as follows. A group
of subjects participate in the experiment. Players are endowed with a number of tokens,
which can be used to make either a private or a group investment. Privately invested
tokens are converted to cash at a constant rate. Publicly invested tokens aze converted to
(private) cash at a lower rate, but they also yield an additional return to each player in the
group. The Pareto-dominant welfare maximising solution of this game is that all players
ínvest solely in the public good. The unique Nash equilibrium, however, is that all players
invest purely privately. That ís, the dominant strategy for each player is to free ride, with
no public investments as a result. The main question to be answered by means of these
experiments is whether the strong free-rider hypothesis, which says that nobody will
contribute to the public good, or the weak free-rider hypothesis, which predicts that some
people will free ride while others will not, holds. Although the results of the public-good
experiments vary considerably, the contribution rate in one-shot games typically is about
40 to 60 percent (see, e.g., Marwell and Ames, 1981). In other words, in most treatments
with a single-period game, players contribute on average between 40 and 60 percent of
their endowment to the public good. Obviously, neither the Pareto-efficient solution nor
the Nash equilibrium is obtained; most data seem to favour the weak free rider hypotheses.
However, the contribution rates turn out to decay considerably across the periods when
more repetitions of the game are run. Possible explanations for these results and their
sensitivity to procedural changes aze further discussed in Section 2.4.2.
This section has discussed the two methods used to collect data. Both survey methods and
experimental methods have advantages and disadvantages. While questionnaires can
approach real-life situations more accurately, experiments benefit from the fact that
individuals have to do what they say. The results of both methods should be handled with
caze, however. For instance, although experimental methods seem to provide a powerful
tool, even in very simple experiments the behaviour and the motivations of the players aze,
until now, not completely cleaz and game-theoretic predictions are ofren not fulfilled. In
the present research I have tried to circumvent the disadvantages as much as possible by
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applying both methods. Chapter 7 will reflect on the two methods and compare the survey
and the experimental results. The next section discusses notions of altruism and fairness
and Section 2.4 focuses on empirical evidence concerning these notions.
2.3 On the notions of altruism and fairness
Recently, unselfish aspects such as altruism and fairness seem to receive more attention in
the economic literature. The increased interest in these considerations may be connected to
the use of economic experiments, as experimental results often suggest that non-monetary
motivations affect decisions. This section discusses the notions of altruism and fairness;
after some introductory remarks it reviews the opinions of some classical authors.
2.3.1 Introduction
One of the most universal assumptions of economics concerns that of self-interested
individuals. Or, as Edgeworth formulates it: "The first principle of Economics is that every
agent is actuated only by self-interest".22 Most economists past and present have
supported this view. However, recently both theoretical and empirical economic literature
has paid more attention to unselfish aspects such as altruism and fairness (see, e.g., Palfrey
and Rosenthal, 1988, and Bolton, 1991). This kind of research had usually been confined
to the psychological literature.23 The lively interest that current literature has shown for
these social motivations made me consider the role these feelings played in earlier
literature. Several historical writers examined motivations other than selfishness. Here, I
will present the views of some of them - especially the views of Spencer and
Edgeworth.Z4
Some expressions occur rather frequently throughout this section and the remainder of
the thesis. I will first explain these notions to ensure that their meaning is clear. According
to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, altrt,ism means "regazd for others as a principle of
action; unselfishness". Another common definition of altruism is "to attach a positive value
22 See Mathematica! Psychics ( 1881), p. 16.
Z' Of course, people considered unselfish issues before. See, e.g., Sen (1976-7), the social welfaze
function of Harsanyi (1977), and Hochman and Rodgers ( 1969). See Section 2.5 for possible ways to make
operational the notions of altruism and fairness.
24 The contributions of these two authors are stressed because their thoughts on altruism aze interesting
but also fairly unknown.
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to pay-offs to others (Becker, 1981).25 Egoism, on the other hand, is defined (in the
Oxford Concise Dictionary) as: "ethical theory that treats self-interest as foundation of
morality; systematic selfishness", where consequently selfish means: "deficient in
considerations for others, thinking chiefly of one's own personal profit or pleasure,
actuated by self-interest". For comparison, I will explain the term utilitarianism.Zb
Utilitarianism means "doctrine that greatest happiness of greatest number should be the
guiding principle of conduct".2' Finally, the word fairness is often used. Being fair means
"treating each person, side etc. equally and according to law, rules etc." (The Oxford
Guide to the English Language). Although an unequivocal economic definition of fairness
is hard to find, most people have a kind of reciprocal norm in mind.ZS Or as Rabin
(1993) formulates it: "If somebody is being nice to you, fairness dictates that you be nice
to him. If somebody is being mean to you, fairness allows - and vindictiveness dictates -
that you be mean to him".
2.3.2 Classical views on altruism
Before shifting the attention to Spencer and Edgeworth, this section will briefly describe
the opinions of several other authors in order to show how non-selfishness as a topic has
evolved in the literature over time.29
In the 18th century, vazious philosophers and economists questioned whether the
assumption of egoistic or altruistic conduct is correct. The answers differed lazgely,
however. Hume, for instance, refuted the assumption of self-interested individuals: "So far
from thinking that men have no affection for anything beyond themselves, I am of
opinion, that though it be raze to meet one, who loves any single person better than
Zs There are many other possible definitions and classifications of altruism. For example, the distinction
between pure and impure altruism is often made. As these aspects are beyond the scope of the study, I will
not discuss them here, but refer the interested reader to Andreoni (1990), for instance.Z6 T'he notion of utilitarianism was already developed by J. Bentham at the end of the 18th century
(Bentham, 1789). The Benthamite tradition still plays a role in modern economics, however.
27 Not all writers are pleased with this definition. Both Edgeworth and Spencer criticised the definition,
particularly the part of the greatest number. Sidgwick's definition reads: greatest possible product of number
x average happiness (Sidgwick, 1874). Edgeworth supported but Spencer challenged the idea of
utilitarianism. See also footnote 32 for Sidgwick's ideas.
28 In my view, expressions like altruism, fairness, equity, reciprocal altruism etc. are often used
promiscuously and for the same phenomena (at least in experimental economics). See, e.g., the Handbook of
Experimenta! Economres by Kagel and Roth (1995), where "altruism" occurs in the subject index, but it
refers the readerjust to "fairness".
Z' The only goal of this section is to give a brief overview of several ideas; no distinction is made
between normative and positive views.
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himself; yet 'tis raze to meet with one in whom all the kind affections taken together, do
not overbalance all the selfishness".'o Concerning Smith, most people think that he
endorsed another viewpoint, that is to say, that he advocated egoism. In later work he did
indeed (although also not completely31), but his conviction had not always been so
strong. The next two quotations illustrate this changed view. In his eazlier work he gave
unselfishness some room, as can be observed in the opening sentence of The Theory of
Moral Sentiments: "How selfish soever man may be supposed, there aze evidently some
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their
happiness necessazy to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of
seeing it".32 The following famous passage illustrates that in later work he was convinced
that the public interest is rather unimportant: "he intends only his own gain, and he is in
this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand, to promote an end which was no
part of his intention".33
Also in the 19th century were many papers about egoism and altruism written. J.S.
Mill, for example, had strong ideas about utilitazianism and altruism. He stated, among
other things, that people should have a certain degree of altruism. Along with others, for
instance Spencer, he clearly believed in the progress of society. He thought that this
progress would make the individual behave according to the required altruism: "Mankind
are capable of a faz greater amount of public spirit the present age is accustomed to
suppose possible".34 J.N. Keynes remarked that the "economic man" ought not to be
described as a pure egoist.35 He believed that people were mainly influenced by a desire
for wealth,3ó although non-pecuniary motives could have an impact, too. Finally, in The
Methods of Ethics (1874), Sidgwick stated that the ultimate end of utilitarianism should be
the aim of the greatest sum of (general) happiness. Obviously, he considered altruism to be
important.
In his volume The Principle of Ethics (1897), Spencer paid a lot of attention to egoism
and altruism. In four consecutive chapters he develops and discusses his idea of due
egoism. To describe his line of reasoning, I will devote some words to each of them. The
first chapter, Egoism versus Altruism, states that egoism has to come before altruism. The
'o See Hume (1736), p. 487. The quotations of Hume, Mill and Smith are taken from Collazd (1978).
11 See, e.g., Skinners' 1986 introduction to The Wealth of Nations.
32 Smith (1759), p. 47.
33 See Smith (1776).
34 See Mill (1848).
's See Keynes (1891).
16 This is not necessarily one's own wealth, however.
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reason is that a creature must live before it can act. Although Spencer's view here clearly
favours egoism, he already made a first refinement in the direction of due egoism by
remarking, "Diminutions of general happiness are produced by inadequate egoism in
several ways"." The next chapter, entitled Altruism versus Egoism, stazts by recognising
that egoism is not more important than altruism: "If we define altruism as being all action
which in the usual course of things, benefits others instead of benefiting self, .., altruism
has been no less essential than egoism".38 It is azgued that the well-being of each is
related to the well-being of all. In the next chapter, Trial and Comprise, Spencer tried to
judge which of the two, pure egoism or pure altruism, is correct. He claims that neither of
the two is correct; only a compromise is possible. This claim he proves in an indirect way,
which will be not discussed here.39 The last relevant chapter, entitled Conciliation,
stresses the effects of the progress of civilisation on the compromise between egoism and
altruism. According to Spencer, the society would move to a state in which people prefer
higher instead of lower egoistic satisfactions. These higher satisfactions are reached by
altruistic activities in which the others' happiness is taken into account. He, moreover,
expected that the opposition between claims for oneself and claims for others would
disappeaz. On page 284 he described it so clearly that it is worth quoting at length: "The
conciliation will be such that the individual will not have to balance between self-
regazding impulses and other-regarding impulses; but, instead, those satisfactions of other-
regazding impulses which involve self-sacrifice, becoming rare and much prized, will be so
unhesitatingly preferred that the competition of self-regazding impulses with them will
scazcely be felt". Here, Spencer advocates explicitly his ideas about due egoism and a
rational utilitazian moral theory. The passage proceeds: "Though each, no longer needing
to maintain his egoistic claims, will tend rather when occasion offers to surrender them,
yet others, similarly natured, will not permit him in any large measure to do this; and that
fulfilment of personal desires required for completion of his life will thus be secured to
him: though not now egoistic in the ordinary sense, yet the effects of due egoism will be
achieved". Regarding the adjustment process Spencer, distinguished several stages: the
process would go via a stage with egoistic competition to a final stage with altruistic




" See Van der Heijden ( 1994) for a more extensive survey.
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Although Edgeworth is mainly known for his application of mathematics to economics,
particulazly in the field of contract and exchange theory,'o his thoughts about egoism and
altruism are quite explicit. Edgeworth's discussion of altruism in his Mathematical
Psychics ( 1881) starts when the Calculus of Pleasure is introduced. This calculus can be
subdivided into two fields: Economical Calculus and Utilitarian Calculus. The first pazt,
Economical Calculus, investigates the equilibrium of a system of hedonic forces, each
tending to maximum individual utility. This agrees with the standard economic theory of
utility maximising individuals and profit maximising firms. Nevertheless, Edgeworth did
not agree with the principle of a self-interested man. Even in Economical Calculus, which
should be aimed at individual utility," he does not support the assumption of economic
agents: "if we suppose our contractors to be .. not economic agents, but actuated .. by a
sympathy with each others' interests .. , we might suppose that the object which X'Z
(whose own utility is P), tends - in a calm, effective moment - to maximise, is not P but P
f 7,, II; where ~, is a coe~cient of effective sympathy".43 Appazently, in Edgeworth's
view, Economical Calculus leads almost automatically to (a form of) Utilitazian Calculus.
The degree of utilitazianism depends on ~.; when the altruistic coefficient increases,
utilitarianism changes from an impure form towazds a more pure one. The Utilitarian
Calculus investigates the equilibrium of a system in which each and all tend to maximum
universal utility. Edgeworth roughly agreed with the distinction between (pure) egoism and
(pure) utilitazianism made by Sidgwick.~ However, he believed that an addition to
Sidgwick had to be made, as done in the following passage:45 "But it has not been
observed that between these two extremes, between the frozen pole of egoism and the
tropical expanse of utilitarianism, there has been granted to imperfectly-evolved mortals an
intermediate temperate region; the position of one for whom in a calm moment his
neighbour's happiness as compazed with his own neither counts for nothing, nor yet
'counts for one,' but counts for a fraction".~ " Notice that Edgeworth does not state
eo Every economist has heard of the Edgeworth-box.
" At least, according to Edgeworth's own introduction of Economical Calculus versus Utilitarian
Calculus.
" The "economy" consists of two agents, X and Y, and II represents the utility of agent Y.
" P. 53.
~ Sidgwick stated that "we should aim at Happiness generally as our ultimate end, and so consider the
happiness of any one individua] as equally important with the general happiness of any others, as an element
of this total: and should distribute our kindness so as to make this total as geat as possible".
45 Appendix IV, p. 102.
46 I.e., )l~l.
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that each individual should always behave altruistically, nor that it is necessary that one is
always conscious of the altruism and the pursuit of the general good. No, the judgement
can only be given by observing the behaviour of an individual in a calm or cool moment
and examining whether one is prepazed to sacrifice happiness to that of others at that
particulaz moment. Edgeworth believed that the 19th century man was for the most part an
impure egoist, a mixed utilitarian. With respect to the future, he suggested that mixed
utilitazianism could be transformed to pure utilitarianism, or in other words, ~,-~ 1.
At first sight, there seems to be a lazge difference between the ideas of Edgeworth and
Spencer. For instance, as Spencer put it, he had tried the utilitazianism of Sidgwick and
condemned it.48 Edgeworth, on the other hand, roughly agreed with Sidgwick. However,
the actual differences might not be so lazge as they seem at first sight. I think that
Edgeworth was more in favour of altruism than Spencer, but Spencer did not agree with
the assumption of self-interested, egoistic man, either. He supported a world consisting of
humanistic egoists, in which some space was kept for altruistic actions. His theory might
be captured by the expression 'rational utilitarianism': actions should reap benefits, but
they can do so only if rationally guided. Edgeworth, on the other hand, was convinced that
individuals are impure egoists or mixed utilitarians. He believed that altruistic feelings and
corresponding behaviour were necessary to attain the greatest general happiness.
2.4 Empirical results on altruism and fairness
This section will discuss several empirical results concerning altruism and fairness. Section
2.4.1 considers survey results, whereas Section 2.4.2 overviews results obtained from
economic experiments. Section 2.5 discusses various models that try to incorporate aspects
of fairness, distributional concerns, and so on. Some of these models have been motivated
directly by experimental results.
"' In Appendix IV, Edgeworth emphasised his confidence in the argument by indicating how the idea
should be incorporated in the mathematical framework: "We must modify the utilitarian integral as defined
above by multipiying each pleasure, except the pleasures of the agent himself, by a fraction - a factor
doubtless diminishing with what may be called the social distance between the individual agent and those of
whose pleasures he takes account".
" See footnote 32 for Sidgwick's ideas. However, as Edgeworth correctly remarked, Spencer particularly
rejected the idea of general happiness of the ereatest number but that has not been contained in the definition
given by Sidgwick.
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2.4.1 Survey results on altruism and fairness
Although one of the standazd assumptions of economics is that people aze rational and
pursue only their self-interest, people's actions do not always seem compatible with selfish
behaviour. For instance, many people donate blood or give away substantial amounts to
chazity while the direct benefit people might get from these actions is uncleaz. Similarly,
the maintenance of public pension plans might also be explained by the existence of
altruism among generations (see Chapter 4). The possible impact of altruism is often
indicated in the psychological and economic literature.49 The literature has noted that
besides altruism, a sense of social justice or fairness might also play a role as a possible
reason for non-egoistic behaviour. Several papers have presented empirical results on the
impact of notions of fairness on people's behaviour. Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler
(1986a) conducted a lazge-scale survey to investigate the opinion of citizens on fairness.
They derived several community standards of fairness from their household survey and
found, for instance, that people do not regazd it as fair that firms increase the price of
snow shovels when is has snowed. Two general rules can be derived from their survey (p.
S296). First, it is unfair for a firm to exploit an increase in its mazket power to alter the
terms of the reference transaction at the direct expense of a customer, tenant, or employee.
Second, it is acceptable for a firm to maintain its profit at the reference level by raising
prices or rents or by cutting wages as necessary. The findings of Kahneman et al. (1986a)
have been confirmed and extended in many other studies, such as Piron and Fernandez
(1995), and Frey and Pommerehne (1993). The central message of all these papers is that
fairness can constrain profit seeking in a market environment.
2.4.2 Altruism andfairness in economic experiments
This section concentrates on considerations of altruism and fairness in some specific kinds
of experiments, namely alternating bazgaining game experiments and, more briefly, public-
good experiments. At the end of the section, I will also mention some other experiments.
Although increasingly more experimental papers appear, the interpretation of the
experimental results presented in the papers is not always similaz. On the contrary,
surprisingly little consensus can be found among experimental economists on how to
interpret the (same) data. Relevant in this respect is the ongoing debate about the
49 See, among others, Collard ( 1978) and Margolis (1982).
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predictive role of game theory. Essentially, the main issue of this debate is whether the
observed deviations from game theoretical predictions are due to considerations like
altruism and fairness or due to strategic considerations. This section touches on some
aspects of the debate.
Bargaining games
The first class of experiments discussed here aze bargaining experiments. This section will
first review some ultimatum game experiments that have contributed significantly to the
above-mentioned debate. After that will be considered the results of some related
experiments, which were conducted to shed light on the dispute.
One of the first and most often cited economic experiments about bargaining is a study
by Guth, Schmittberger and Schwazz ( I982) on ultimatum games. Recall that in the
ultimatum game one player (the proposer) has to split a cake of size c between herself and
another player (the recipient). The recipient can accept or reject the offer x. If the offer is
rejected, both players receive nothing. Guth et al. (1982) found that the modal offer was a
50 percent split of the cake and that the mean offer was 0.37c. Furthermore, they found
that several positive offers were rejected.so These results are not in line with game-
theoretic predictions; the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium is that the proposer should
offer (almost) nothing and recipients should accept all positive offers. Although somewhat
less generous offers were observed when the authors repeated the experiment one week
later with the same subjects, most offers were still positive; the mean offer of the
"experienced" subjects was 0.32c. Guth et al. conclude that "... subjects often rely on what
they consider a fair or justified result" and that game theory is "of little help in explaining
bargaining behaviour".
Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1985) tried to refute the supposed minor predictive role
of game theory by conducting a two-period alternating bazgaining game experiment. In the
first period of the game, player 1 offers xt (~c) to player 2, keeping c-zt for herself. If the
offer is accepted, this is the result. If the offer is rejected, the game moves to period two
and the size of the cake is reduced to Sc, where S denotes a kind of discount factor. If the
second period is reached, a simple ultimatum game is played with player 2 as the
proposer. The proposer offers an amount x1 (~Sc). If player 1 accepts that offer, this is the
result; otherwise, both players receive nothing. Binmore et al. (1985) used an equal
discount factor for both players (5-0.25) and a cake size of 100 pence. The subgame-
Sa Similar results were found in Kahneman et at. (1986a).
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perfect equilibrium of this game, to be derived by backwazd induction, is that player 1
should offer an amount between 24 and 26 pence.s' After the subjects played the game
once, each player 2 was invited to play the same game again, but now as player 1. In the
first period of the first game the modal offer was 50 pence, and only 10 percent of the
offers were in the equilibrium interval 24-26 pence. Furthermore, 15 percent of the first-
period offers were rejected. In the second game players behaved more in line with game
theory. The modal offer was just below 25 pence while almost 40 percent of the offers
were in the equilibrium interval. The authors conclude that considerations of strategic
behaviour dominate fairness considerations in case of experienced subjects who aze fully
aware of the game structure.
The results of Binmore et al. (1985) have motivated various researchers to conduct
similar experiments.sZ First, Neelin, Sonnenschein and Spiegel (1988) varied both the
number of periods T in the alternating bazgaining games (with T is 2, 3 or 5) and the
discount factors. The equilibrium offer in the first period was always ~1.25. The general
impression obtained from their results is that in all games player 1 seems to offer the value
of the second-period cake to player 2.53 As only in case of T-2 this offer corresponds to
the game-theoretic prediction, this prediction does not perform well. Neelin et al.
conjecture that the inaccuracy of the perfect-equilibrium prediction primazily occurs
because players fail to do backward induction.
Another response to Binmore et al. (1985) is a paper by Ochs and Roth (1989). Ochs
and Roth systematically vazied both the discount factor and the number of periods of the
game in a comprehensive study. They also found considerable discrepancies between the
predicted subgame-perfect equilibrium offer and the observed behaviour.54 So, Ochs and
Roth's results suggest that other, non-monetary motives play an important part, too.
s' If the second period is reached, player 2 can offer player 1 just a(i.e., a penny), leaving 0.25c-a (-24
pence) for himself. As player 2 will not accept less than 0.25c-a in the first period, player 1 should offer
0.25c. As offers had to be integers, the subgame-perfect equilibrium for the opening ofier is the range 24-26
pence.
s2 One reason is the peculiarities in the design of Binmore et at. (1985). The criticism is not discussed
here. Moreover, I do not intend to give an exhaustive overview of alternating bargaining experiments here.
See, for instance, Thaler ( ]988) for a brief but clear overview and Roth ( 1995) for an extensive survey.
s' This can be illustrated by the results for T-S. In the 5-period game c was á5 and á 1.70 in the First
and second period, respectively. The mean and moderate first-period offer were both 0.34c-~1.70, which
equals the value of the cake in the second period.
s" For example, they obtained a high frequency of disadvantageous counterproposals, which should not
occur if people were motivated only by self-interest.
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Finally, Guth and Tietz (1990) examined similar two-period games as did Binmore et
al. (1985) but with other discount factors, namely 5-0.9 and 5-0.1.55 Unlike Binmore et
al., Giith and Tietz observed offers that do not coincide with the game-theoretic
predictions, not even for experienced subjects. Giith and Tietz azgue that the behaviour of
the experienced subjects in Binmore et al. merely occurs because 5-0.25 yields relatively
moderate equilibrium pay-offs. They further claim that game theory has little predictive
power in case of more extreme pay-offs.
This overview of some ultimatum game results suggests that game theory has little
predictive power. However, the claim that people aze mainly motivated by fairness would
seem also to be not (completely) true. More insights on this dispute can be gained by
examining the results of some related experiments. To that end I will consider the results
of dictator game experiments, mazket experiments and best-shot games.
The first kind of experiments, which aze particularly useful in this respect, are dictator
game experiments. A dictator game is similaz to an ultimatum game, with the exception
that now the receiver cannot reject the offer made by the proposer (or rather the dictator).
Whereas disentangling strategic and fairness considerations is difficult in the ultimatum
game, doing so in dictator game experiments is much easier. For if people offer positive
amounts purely because of fairness considerations, the offers in both games should be the
same. Precisely this argument was investigated in a paper by Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin
and Sefton (1994). The authors found that the proposals in both classes of games were not
identical, so that the findings in ultimatum games can at least not fully be explained by a
taste for fairness. However, motivations of fairness cannot fully be denied, either, as
numerous positive dictator offers were obtained. The authors suggest that incomplete
information should affect the outcomes in ultimatum games.
Roth, Prasnikaz, Okuno-Fujiwaza and Zamir (1991) related the outcomes of an
ultimatum game experiment to those in market game experiments (simple auctions).
Although the subgame-perfect equilibrium prediction is the same for both games (namely
that one player receives all the wealthsb), the outcomes were mazkedly different; for
example, unlike the ultimatum offers, the market outcomes converged quickly to the
perfect equilibrium. The authors suggest two possible explanations for these differences,
First, ".. bazgaining behaviour is dominated by concerns about fairness which aze context
dependent and do not arise in the market-environment". The other is that "whatever non-
ss These discount factors imply first-period equilibrium offers of 0.9c and O.lc respectively.36 Ap~ from a possible deviation of the smallest possible monetary amount.
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monetary concerns enter bargainers preferences do so in both environments, but the
competitive pressure towazds equilibrium in the market overwhelms any such factors in
players' preferences".S'
Finally, Prasnikar and Roth (1992) compared the results of ultimatum game
experiments with yet another type of related experiment, the best-shot games (first
conducted by Hazrison and Hirshleifer, 1989).5B From a theoretical point of view, both
types of games have again the same equilibrium. However, Prasnikaz and Roth show that
both under full and under partial information ( as in Harrison and Hirshleifer) the quantities
in the best-shot games approach the equilibrium prediction, whereas the results in the
ultimatum games do not. They summarise their results as follows (p. 886-7): "... results in
the experimental literature indicate that ideas about fairness may play an important role in
subjects' preferences or expectations and that this may have significant consequences for
the outcome of a game". And: "... descriptive theories of observable behavior in strategic
situations will retain a clear game-theoretic chazacter, even though players' motivations
may be more complex than simple income maximization".
To conclude, the above illustrates (part of) the debate about the descriptive role of
game theory in bargaining games and the degree to which considerations of fairness should
be taken into account. Obviously, the conclusions drawn from the (same) experimental
data vazy widely. Basically one group of reseazchers attributes the observed non-
equilibrium behaviour to considerations of fairness, altruism etc., whereas another group
attributes it to inexperience. I will conclude the overview of bargaining experiments with
three remazks. First, since a cleaz unambiguous verdict on the correct explanation cannot
yet be given, further experimental research in this field is needed. Second, somewhat
related to the first point, many authors conjecture that ultimatum games aze a specific class
s' P. 1093. T'he first explanation contrasts with the findings of Kahneman et al. (1986a and 19866),
which argue that feelings of fairness also play a role in market behaviour. However, Roth et al. (199]) used
market in a very narrow sense, namely more like an auction as a market mechanism.
se ~e best-shot game of Harrison and Hirshleifer (1989) is as follows. Several players participate in a
public-good-like experiment, which lasts for 18 periods. In every period a subject plays against an
anonymous opponent, who changes from period to period. Player 1 has to state a quantity q„ after which
player 2 has to state a quantity qZ. Player 2 is informed about q,. 7'he amount of public good provided is
detennined by the maximum of q, and q,. Each level of public good implies a redemption value; the total
redemption value of all units is given in a table. Each player r receives a pay-off corresponding to the
redemption value of the quantity of public good minus 50.82 times q;. The subgame-perfect equilibrium of
this game is q,-0 and q24. As the redemption value of 4 units is 53.70, this yields pay-offs of á3.70 for
player 1 and á0.42 for player 2.
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of games, of which the results cannot easily be generalised.59 Finally, the experimental
results have led several scholars to consider the way of modelling altruism and fairness.
Section 2.5 presents some of these recent attempts.
PubGc-good games
The question of why and how people cooperate is often addressed in experiments with a
public-goods fraznework.~ As mentioned in Example 2 in Section 2.2.2, in a public-good
game subjects have to decide whether they invest (some of) their money in a private or in
a public good. Public-good experiments aze mainly used to test the validity of the free-
rider hypothesis suggested by the theory. Marwell and Ames (1981) aze among the first
(economists) that have investigated individuals' behaviour in a public-good experiment.
They studied behaviour under several conditions and found in their single-period game
that, under almost all conditions, people voluntazily contributed substantial amounts to the
provision of the public good, usually between 40 and 60 percent.b' Their data obviously
contradicts the strong free-rider hypotheses; the weak free-rider hypothesis, which says that
some people will free ride while others will not, is supported, however. In one of their
attempts to explain the results, Marwell and Ames linked some background information
with the decisions. Apparently, people that contributed most were those who indicated that
they were concerned with fairness and that they regazded high investment in the public
good as fair.
These initial results encouraged several other researchers to design extensions of the
public-good experiment and to test the sensitivity of the results (see, e.g., Isaac, McCue
and Plott, 1985 and Isaac and Walker, 1988). The most common extension is that multiple
trials of the game are played within one experimental session. In each repetition, people
have to decide on their contribution to the public good. Isaac et al. (1985) found that the
average contribution in the first period was as usual, namely on average 38 percent of the
optimum quantity. The contribution rates decayed substantially when the gazne was
repeated, though. In their view the data could be interpreted as follows. "It seems as
though individuals begin to cooperate as might be expected in a'tit-for-tat' strategy".
About the behaviour in later periods they remazk: "Subsequent periods can then be
described as an effort to learn about the other participants and see if others will fail to
s' This is relevant because the experiments presented in this thesis indeed resemble ultimatum game
experiments, but they are not real ultimatum game experiments, as we will see in Part II.
~ See Ledyard (1995) for an exhaustive survey of public-good experiments.
61 As mentioned before, the only exception was a group of economics students.
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retaliate when faced with defection". Apart from strategic repeated-game considerations,
experience may be a determining factor. Isaac, Walker and Thomas (1984), for instance,
found that the average contributions in a(second) session with experienced subjects were
significantly lower than with inexperienced subjects.ó2 Isaac and Walker (1988) found
that the group size and the rate of return on the public-good investment influenced the
contributions. However, their results do not support the common theoretical claim that a
higher number of people in the group leads to a higher degree of free-riding.
How can one explain these results? In particulaz, why do most people not free ride
completely as predicted by game theory? First, players may behave differently because
they do not pursue free-rider behaviour but instead play tit-for-tat strategies, as was
already mentioned above (see, e.g., Dawes and Thaler, 1988). Tit-for-tat strategies can be
established either by reciprocal altruism, rational strategic cooperation in the sense of
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts and Wilson (1982) or by social norms of cooperation.ó3 In a
two-player situation, tit-for-tat strategies imply that players start by cooperating and then
choose the same action as their opponent made in the previous period. However, tit-for-tat
behaviour out of altruistic or strategic considerations is for the most pazt contradicted by
experimental evidence. For instance, although cooperating in a single-period game or in
the last period of a game is not useful, substantial contributions aze observed in these
periods.
Another populaz explanation for the results in public-goods games is the hypothesis of
leazning. The leazning hypothesis basically states that subjects need time (thus multiple
trials) to leam how to play the game. Andreoni (1988) tried to separate the strategic tit-
for-tat hypothesis from the leazning hypothesis. His public-good design has two treatments:
In one treatment (called partners) people were in the same group in each repetition of the
game, while in the other treatment (called strangers) players were in different groups all
the time. Note that cooperation because of strategic motives is impossible in the latter
case. Unexpectedly, Andreoni obtained higher cooperation when people were rematched
with strangers.~ He azgues that neither strategies nor learning can be supported as an
explanation for the decay of the contributions in public-goods experiments.
`~ On the other hand, the contribution rates in the first periods of the second session were higher than in
the !ast periods with inexperienced subjects when the rates of retum were high. Also Andreoni (1988) found
high levels of contribution in the first periods after a so-called restart. These findings show that contribution
rates do not simply decrease monotonically when players become experienced.
63 Kreps et al. (1982) show that under certain conditions it may be rational to cooperate, even in the
early stages ofa finite game.
~ I will come back to these results in Chapter 6.
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Andreoni, and others, suggest that theories of non-standazd behaviour aze needed to
explain the findings of public-good experiments. Alternative theories in this field include
regret theory and (pure and impure) altruism. Regret theory is concerned with the
observation that results usually do not have a symmetric effect on subjects. In particulaz, in
the light of the public-good games, people are likely to choose the same action if they
were successful, whereas they will probably decrease their contribution if they did worse
than expected. Impure altruism or so-called warm glow givingbs refers to the fact that,
possibly, people just like to do the right thing, give away money, etc. In this respect,
another paper by Andreoni may be relevant (Andreoni, 1995). In this paper, Andreoni
systematically tried to separate the hypothesis that cooperation is due to kindness, altruism
or wazm glow from the hypothesis that cooperation is simply the result of errors or
confusion. To that end he conducted a public-goods experiment with three treatments. His
results reveal that (on average) about half of the contributing subjects are cooperative out
of kindness and that the other half aze confused about incentives.
The above exposition suggests that both strategic considerations and non-monetary
aspects play a role in public-goods experiments. At least a number of experimental
subjects seem sensitive to social motives.
So, the results from both bargaining experiments and public-good experiments show that
social feelings can be important. Furthermore, numerous other psychological and economic
experimental studies have established that norms of fairness can affect mazket outcomes.
De Vries (1991), for instance, azgued that many people believe that certain norms of social
justice determine the boundazies for tolerable behaviour. Furthermore, he claimed that
people maximise their own well-being within these boundazies (see De Vries, p. 58).
Several other authors (e.g., Fehr et al., 1993b, Kahneman et al., 1986b, and Burrows and
Loomes, 1994) have argued that people value fairness. Therefore, both strategic
considerations and non-monetary motivations will be considered in the experiments
presented in Part II.
65 See Andreoni (1989 and 1990).
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2.5 Modelling altruism and fairness
Unlike altruism, which was first formally modelled a long time ago (see, e.g., Edgeworth,
1881, and Hochman and Rodgers, 1969), the formal economic modelling of fairness has
started just recently. In my view, the rise of experimental economics and its results, which
aze often against standazd economic theory, have contributed to the increased attention for
the development of formal models that include considerations of altruism and fairness.
This section briefly considers several ways to model these social motivations. The
discussion stazts with various general approaches to model altruism and then turns to the
consequences for a specific class of models, namely overlapping-generations models. After
that, I examine two specific models that incorporate fairness. Finally, the section presents
some of the critique on these approaches and an alternative way to deal with these
concepts, as proposed by (among others) Giith and Tietz.
2.S.1 Modelling altruism
Most economic definitions of altruism are in the spirit of Becker's definition: "to attach a
positive value to pay-offs to others" (Becker, 1981). A common way to formalise and
implement this idea is to include the well-being of others in someone's own utility
function. It is, however, uncleaz how this well-being should be defined. Put differently, it
is not cleaz whether one should consider the others' consumption, utility, income, etc.~
For instance, in their paper on optimal income redistribution, Hochman and Rodgers
(1969) use income. They consider utility interdependence and model the utility functions
of two individuals, Mutt and Jeff, as follows
UM -ÏM( `M, I ,~)
(2.1)
U~ - f~(~M~ ~ (2.2)
where UM and I'oM ( Uo and 1~) aze the initial values of Mutt's (Jeff s) utility index and
income, respectively. The alternative assumption that consumption is the determining
factor would lead to a small adjustment in the utility functions. Another alternative
specification is obtained if it is assumed that one's utility is affected by the other's utility
~ Collazd (1978) talks about utility-related and commodity-related approaches in this context.
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instead of by his income or consumption. In that case, Mutt's utility function would be
modified tob'
0 { 0 0~
UM -J,y(YM~ UjJ
(2.3)
As faz as I know, no general unambiguous opinion exists on how to model altruism.
Furthermore, the correct model, if any, also depends on the nature and the aim of the
study. Theoretical models usually incorporate utility or consumption. These notions,
however, aze hazd to implement in empirical reseazch. How should one, for instance,
measure utility or welfare? Hence, empirical models often use consumption or income.ó8 I
will not pursue this general issue in more detail here; for a further discussion, see, e.g.,
Collard (1978).
The following section focuses on the modelling of altruism in overlapping-generations
(OLG) models.ó9 The reason for doing so is that OLG models aze the basis for all models
used in this thesis, as we will see in the following chapters. In an overlapping-generations
model with two periods, generations live for two periods, or alternatively, two generations
are alive at the same time. For sake of simplicity, I assume here that each generation
consists of only one player. Subsequent generations aze denoted by A, B, C, etc. The OLG
structure implies that in the first period of her life agent B lives together with her mother,
agent A, while in the second period of her life she lives together with her daughter, agent
C. It is assumed that the instantaneous utility function is additive sepazable and, for the
moment, that agents aze non-altruistic. The utility function of agent B, born at time t(U,),
can then be specified as
U~ - U(ctt, c~.t) - u(ct~) t(1 t g)-t u(c~}t) (2.4)
where A is the rate of time preference, or the subjective discount rate. Furthermore,ctr
and c~,t denote the consumption of agent B in the first and second period of her life,
respectively.
Before altruism can be incorporated, one must specify the type of altruism, i.e. whether
the consumption or the utility of others is incorporated.'o In addition, it must be specified
67 Of course, the expression for U~ can be substituted in (2.3) which again yields a specification in 1~
and i~. Generally, it could be that (2.1) and (2.3) are equal. Whether this is the case or not depends on the
functional forms of the specifications.6e It may be argued that not consumption in itself but the consumption possibilities are important. In that
case, income can be used as a proxy for these consumption possibilities.
69 ~is discussion follows Blanchard and Fisher (1989).
'o As mentioned above, other altemative specifications are possible. However, as the use of utility or
consumption seems to be most sensible and most frequent, just these possibilities are considered here.
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whether altruism is one-sided or two-sided. One-sided altruism implies that an agent is
either altruistic towards her mother or towards her child. Although I believe this kind of
altruism to be peculiar, it is frequently applied. If it is assumed that an agent is altruistic
towazds her child and therefore considers the child's consumption, utility function (2.4) is
modified to
Vr - U(ctr, cu,t ~ ctr.t) - u(ctr) t(1 t g)-t
u(c~4t) }( 1 tR)-t u(ctr.t)
or, using (2.4),
Vr-Urt(1 tjj)-lu(Ctrtt) (2.5')
with ctr,t the first-period consumption of the child and (1 t~-t the weight the pazent
places on the utility of her child." Alternatively, it can be assumed that the agent
considers the lifetime utility of the child (see, e.g., Blanchazd and Fisher, 1989). The
utility function of the one-sided altruistic parent B then reads
Wr-U(ctr, c~,t, Wr,t)-u(ctr)t(ltg)-tu(cu.t)}(I}~-tyyr.t (2.6)
or
Wr - Ur t(1 t n)-t yyr.t (2.6')
with Wr,t the (lifetime) utility of the child.'Z Blanchazd and Fisher derive that under
certain conditions utility function (2.6') can be solved recursively to
yy~-~ (1 t~-t Ur ~
(2.7)
~so
From (2.7) it follows that not only the utility of the child but also the utility of the
grandchild and further descendants, or more generally future generations, enter the pazent's
utility function.
Two-sided altruism can be modelled analogously. Imposing this kind of altruism
implies that an agent is altruistic both towazds her mother and towards her child. The
specification with consumption, corresponding to (2.5), then becomes
" Note that it is assumed here that only the consumption of the child counts when the parent is still
alive.
'Z In this OLG framework (and with these specific utility functions) the difference between incorporating
consumption and incorporating utility boils down to the issue of incorporating the utility of other individuals
who live at the same time as the agent or including the total lifetime utility of others.
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Y,-U(ci~~ cu.i~ cir.i~ cu)-u(cit)}(1}8)-'u(cu.i)t(1}~-~u(ci~.i)t(lt~)-'u(cu)
(2.8)
- U~ t(1 t I~ -'u(c~r. i) t(1 t ~)-' u(czr)
with c~ the second-period consumption of the mother and (1 ttp)-~ the weight the pazent
places on the utility of her mother. Incorporating lifetime utilities of both the mother and
the child results in
w~-U(clj, cu.l~ wr.i, w,-I)-u(cir)}(1}e)-lu(cu.l)t(ltl~-'wr.i}(lt~)-'wr-i (2.9)
-u~t(it~-'w~,,t(it~)w~-~
Again, it is hazd to say which of the above specifications, if any, is correct. The choice of
the specification is lazgely determined by the problem one wants to investigate. For
instance, life-cycle models that consider bequests motives usually apply models with one-
sided altruism. On the other hand, more general models on gift behaviour mainly assume
two-sided altruism. Finally, note that extensions to more than two generations are possible
and straightforward. The utility function estimated in Chapter 4 is in the spirit of equation
(2.8).
2.5.2 Modelling jairness
The explicit modelling of fairness has received less attention than the modelling of
altruism. I am aware of only two papers that deal with the issue of modelling fairness,
namely Rabin (1993) and Bolton (1991).
Rabin (1993) tries to model fairness, or more generally emotions, in a formal way. He
has developed a game-theoretic framework in order to incorporate such emotions into a
broad range of economic models. The framework is based on three stylised facts (see
Rabin, 1993, p. 1282): first, people are willing to sacrifice their own material well-being
to help those who aze being kind; second, people aze willing to sacrifice their own material
well-being to punish those who aze being unkind; fmally, both motivations have a greater
effect on behaviour as the material cost of sacrificing becomes smaller. Rabin argues that
to model fairness it is necessary to consider not only players' actions but also their
beliefs.73 I will not discuss his paper at full length here, but merely describe the model
Rabin develops for two agents, agent i and agent j. Rabin's model assumes that the utility
" Although not exactly defined by Rabin, the expression beliefs in this context should be interpreted as
the expectations about actions by others and the expectations about the beliefs held by other players.
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of player i depends on three aspects: (i) his strategy or action (a;), (ii) his beliefs about
player j's strategy choice (b~) and (iii) his beliefs about player j's beliefs about his own
(i.e. player i's) strategy (cJ."
As a first step Rabin defines a kindness function f;(a;,bi) , which measures how kind
player i is to player j. To that end, he defines aj(6i) and ~s~{bi) as, respectively, player j's
highest and lowest pay-offs among the points that aze Pazeto-efficient. Furthermore, the
"equitable pay-off' is defined by nj(bi) -[n~(bi) t n~bi)]~2 , and the worst possible pay-off
for player j is denoted by n~(bi). Given b~, player i then chooses the strategy a; and
thereby the pay-off pair (a;(a;,bi), ai(b~,a;)).75 Next, the kindness function of player i to
player j can be derived from the pay-offs. This kindness function is defined by
~i(bi' a~) - ~i (bi) 2 10.f(a;, bi) - n ~a ( ~ )ni (bi) - ai (bi)
where f;(a;,bi) - 0 if nj(bi) - n~(bi) . Function (2.10) states how much more or less than
player j's equitable pay-off n~(bi) player i believes he is giving to player j.76 Before the
utility function can be specified, player i's belief about how kind player j is being to him
has to be specified. This specification is similar to (2.10) and reads
rz ~(c~' bi) - ~ ~ (ci) 2 11b,c;- (~ )fi( ~ ) ~h(c')-~~(c`)
h min
Again, fi(b~, c;) - 0 if n; (c;) - n; (c;) .
Now we aze ready to specify the expected utility U;(a;, b~, c;) player i tries to maximise
by choosing a;. U,{.) incorporates both player i's material well-being and the players'
shazed notions of fairness
U;(a;, bi, ci) - a;(a;, bi) } fi(b~, c;) [1 t f(a;, bj)l (2.12)
This function captures the stylised facts. If fi(.)~0, player i will choose an action a; such
that f;(.) is negative or low. Put differently, if player i believes that player j is being
unkind to him, he will treat player j badly. On the other hand, if player j is treating player
" The (mixed) strategy set and the pure strategy set for player i aze denoted by S; and A;, respectively,
whereas a;:S;xSj- 8t denotes player i's material pay-offs. Notions for player j are analogous.
75 Formally, player i chooses the pay-off pair from the set of all feasible pay-offs, given b~:
II(b.)z{(n;(a,b~, n~(bpa))~aES;).
ib Kindness is expressed here as a fraction of the ~maximum) difference nj(bJ-n~(b~ so that
f.(.) e[-1, 2]. Other specifications of the denominator like n~(b,-n~b~ and n~(b~ -nj((1 would have been
possible.
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i kindly, f~(.) will be positive and player i will treat player j kindly by choosing a; such
that f~(.) is high. Finally, utility function (2.12) reflects player i's trade-off between his
preference for fairness and his material pay-off.
So, in this way, Rabin has developed a fonnal model that incorporates fairness and
that captures the stylised facts." The model and the related solution concept have some
nice implications. For instance, the outcomes (cooperate, cooperate) and (defect, defect) in
a prisoner's dilemma game aze both consistent with the model, while the outcome (opera,
boxing) can be an equilibrium in the battle-of-the-sexes game. Furthermore, as a final
illustration, cooperation by workers and firms in an Akerlof-type of model can be
explained by Rabin's model.'a Fair behaviour of this kind is often observed in economic
experiments (see, e.g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993a and 1993b).
A similaz direction has been followed by Bolton (1991). Bolton developed and tested a
compazative model of bazgaining in which distributional concerns aze incorporated in a
utility function.79 The model basically says that bargainers behave as if they are
negotiating over both absolute money, measured by monetary pay-offs, and relative money
(fairness), measured by the disparity between the absolute measures. The model is
developed for the class of alternating bargaining games. The motivation behind Bolton's
model is the observation that there aze many discrepancies between experimental data and
(gazne) theoretical predictions. Following Ochs and Roth (1989), Bolton enumerates five
regularities:
i) There is a consistent first-mover advantage.
ii) Observed mean opening offers deviate from the subgame-perfect equilibrium in the
direction of equal money division.
iii) A substantial proportion of first-period offers aze rejected.
iv) A substantial proportion of rejected first-period offers are followed by dis-
advantageous counteroffers.
v) The value of player 1's discount factor influences the outcomes (whereas from a
theoretical point of view this should not be the case).
A somewhat simplified version of Bolton's model for a two-period alternating bargaining
game can now be described as follows. There aze two players, player 1(the first-period
" He also derives an equilibrium concept, namely a so-called fairness equilibrium. Although this is very
interesting, it would lead us too faz aside to discuss it here. The main purpose of this section is to indicate
how altruism and fairness can be modelled.
7e Akerlof (1982) develops a model in which a worker chooses an effort level and a firm simultaneously
determines the worker's wage rate.
79 This model was suggested by Ochs and Roth (1989).
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proposer) and player 2(the second-period proposer). Let the size of the cake be 1 in the
first period, and let S, and SZ denote the discount factor for players 1 and 2, respectively.
Furthermore, an offer by player 1 is denoted by x,. The crucial assumption, then, is that
players receive utility from the amount of money agreed upon and from a relative
comparison of the money eaznings. For player 1 this relative comparison is defined by the
following proportional index:
1 if xt -x2-0
r-tit~(xl) - 8t xl
orherwise
(2.13)
where t E(1,2 } is the period of the agreement. The situationxt -x2 -0 refers to the
situation in which no agreement is reached. Players 1 and 2 derive utility from an
agreement in period t that reads: Ut(8~ txt,it~) and UZ(óZ t(1-xt),i2~).~ The
specifications and the assumptions imply, among other things, that player 1 can obtain at
least utility level U~(0,1) by rejecting the second-period offer of player 2.
In this manner has Bolton developed a subgame-perfect equilibrium model in which
money and fairness are incorporated into players' utility functions as substitutable goals.
He azgues that this way of modelling captures most of the observed regularities. His theory
can, for example, explain disadvantageous counteroffers, which are usually hard to explain
but aze nevertheless often observed in economic experiments. Moreover, the predictions of
his comparative model aze consistent with many other experimental findings. For example,
the effect of changes in the discount factor in Ochs and Roth (1989) and Giith and Tietz
(1990) is correctly predicted by the model.
Although the (overlapping-generations) model in Chapter 4 has no bilateral structure,
the way in which fairness will be modelled shows some similazities with the approaches
considered here. The absence of a direct link between individuals in the model of Chapter
4 precludes mutual "giving". A bilateral relation enables Bolton and Rabin to use a kind of
interpersonal, relative measure of fairness. Chapter 4 will also model fairness as a relative
measure, but only in a personal sense. To be more specific, a certain fairness measure (r)
is defined by the ratio of discounted pension benefits to discounted pension costs
82 t(1-xt)
'" Bolton assumes that the specified utility functions have certain features, e.g., U, and U, are continuous
and right-differentiable in both arguments and the derivatives with respect to both arguments are positive (if
ik~l k-1,2). He then shows that a unique subgame-perfect-equilibrium allocation x~ exists if0~bi,áz~1
(Proposition I, p. I111).
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(contributions). This ratio actually states the rate of return on the public pension system.
Note that the definition of the fairness ratio shows some resemblance with expression
(2.13) when S(-S,-SZ) is seen as the (personal) discount factor, x, as the pension benefits
and 1-x, as the pension contributions. The idea behind this way of modelling fairness is
that it is expected that people have some idea about the optimal rate of return r' of the
pension system. Moreover, deviations from this optimal rate of return aze not appreciated.
This idea is formalised by including the expression (r - r')Z in the utility function of the
respondent. In addition to this expression for the respondent himself, similaz expressions
aze included for the members of the other generations, where the rates of return then refer
to the ratio of benefits and costs for them. Finally, note that the fairness measures will be
incorporated in the utility functions, as in Bolton's and Rabin's approach.
2.5.3 Discussion
All approaches discussed thus far essentially model altruism or fairness by incorporating
these considerations as additional arguments in the utility function. Not all scholazs support
this approach, however. Guth and Tietz (1990), for instance, state: "We strictly reject the
idea to include results of analyzing a social decision problem into the utility functions of
the interacting agents". In a similaz vein, Guth (1995) calls the approach "a neoclassical
repair shop". He states, moreover: "In my view, additional azguments of utility functions,
like a desire for fairness, altruism, or envy, as well as specific forms of incorporating
information offer no really satisfying explanation, but shift only the problem to another
level of reseazch questions, namely why people have such utility functions and~or beliefs".
Instead of the utility approach, Guth, and others, propose an integral approach to model
and explore the dynamic reasoning process of individuals and to develop a behavioural
theory.
Although I agree for the most part with the ideas put forward by Guth and others, and
although I believe the behavioural theory approach to be promising, in Part I of the thesis
I still estimate augmented utility functions. The reason behind applying the utility approach
is simply that for the time being this is the only sensible method for questionnaires to
induce empirical results on altruism, fairness and public pensions; no appropriate,
unequivocal behavioural theory is at our disposal right now.
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2.6 Concluding remarks
This chapter had two purposes. First, it described the two methods used to collect
appropriate data for the reseazch. The results of the first method, a survey based on the
Factorial Survey Approach, are discussed in Part I(Chapters 3 and 4). Part II is concerned
with the results of several economic experiments. The brief introduction to experimental
economics and the examples described in this chapter aze then useful to clarify the position
of these experiments. Second, the chapter discussed the meaning and the importance of
notions of altruism and fairness by reviewing ideas of numerous historical authors on these
concepts and exposing some empirical results obtained from surveys and economic
experiments.
The next four chapters present the main results of the study. Each chapter pays special
attention to considerations of altruism and fairness, of which the possible impact was




Opinions concerning Pension Systems'
3.1 Introduction
Politicians in the Netherlands used to pay little attention to public opinion concerning
pension systems. Recently, however, politicians have become more awaze of the future
financial difficulties regazding pensions, which aze caused by the ageing of the population.
Therefore, the topic of pension schemes (reforms) is subject to much debate nowadays.
Recent experience has learned that public opinion (and thus voters who determine the
outcome of the elections) is sensitive to proposed adjustments in the pension system.
Consequently, political parties try to involve people more in the discussion about pension
scheme reforms. However, apart from the general remazk that the public pension system
still enjoys broad populaz support, in fact not too much is known about what people really
think of the Dutch pension system.
This part of the thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) tries to contribute to the scarce literature in
this field. In pazticular, I want to examine whether opinions concerning pension schemes
aze only or primarily determined by financial aspects or whether social psychological
considerations such as altruism and fairness also play a role. For that purpose, a lazge-scale
survey was conducted among a representative sample of the Dutch population. The data of
the survey, obtained by means of a direct method of questioning, are presented in the
chapters of this pazt.
Chapter 3 presents some general information about the survey. It mainly serves as an
introduction to Chapter 4, which is the main chapter of part I. Chapter 3 discusses the
answers to various general questions about the Dutch social security system. The issues
addressed in the questionnaire include questions about the Dutch public pension system
and about opinions concerning the income situation of the respondents and the income
positions of inembers of other generations. In addition, respondents were asked to evaluate
several hypothetical pension scheme scenarios.
The outcomes of the scenario questions aze used in Chapter 4 to estimate a model. In
that model the standard economic assumption of selfish behaviour is relaxed. More
specific, per generation a utility function is specified in which it is assumed that utility is
affected by considerations of altruism and fairness. The information and the findings of
' This chapter is a modified version of Van der Heijden (1995).
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Chapter 3 aze needed for a better understanding of the analyses and the results of Chapter
4.
The organisation of the present chapter lazgely follows from the order of the questions
in the questionnaire. The questions start very simple but they gradually become more
complicated when the pension scheme scenarios are addressed. Section 3.2 and Appendix
3A provide general information about the sample. Section 3.3. describes the questionnaire.
By doing so, the attention will be focused on the description of the pension scheme
scenarios. Respondents' opinions concerning the social security system and vazious income
positions are discussed in Section 3.4. While Section 3.4 considers the distinct elements of
a public pension scheme, Section 3.5 analyses the total evaluations of five pension scheme
scenazios. The scenarios are basically described by a combination of all sepazate elements
of the public pension scheme. Furthermore, in Section 3.5 the evaluations of the various
scenazios are compared both between and within generations. The last section summarises
and concludes the chapter.
3.2 The sample
The sample used in the survey is an existing panel, the so-called Telepanel. A Dutch
organisation called Stichting Telepanel (STP) has composed the Telepanel in 1989.Z STP
uses a computer-based method to collect data. All participating households have the use of
a computer terminal, which is connected to a central computer. Members of the panel fill
out a questionnaire about weekly.'
For the survey underlying this part of the thesis only part of the panel was needed.
The survey excludes people younger than 25 because they do not contribute to all pension
schemes.4 Three generations are distinguished in the questionnaire: the older (age 65 or
more), the middle-aged (age from 45 up to and including 64) and the younger generation
(age under 45).
2 See Appendix 3A for further information.
' A large body of psychological literature has studied the incentives of respondents in a panel and the
meaning of their answers (see, e.g., Rossi and Nock, 1982 and Nunnally, 1978). Most respondents in the
Telepanel simply seem to like joining the panel. Previous research that has used the panel reported sensible
and reliable data.
' To be more precise, people between 15 and 25 years old do contribute to the public pension scheme
but they generally do not contribute to collective private pension schemes. In addition, the income situation
of people within this age category is usually very unstable.
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Several remazks have to be made regazding the survey procedures. First of all, a
distinction in three generations instead of the more commonly used distinction in two
generations is suggested by the features of the public pension system and the ageing
process. The claim here is that changes in the public pension system do not influence the
income position of young and middle-aged individuals in the same way. For instance,
consider a permanent decrease in the pensíon benefits and contributions. Such a decrease
would yield more money for people during their working ages. If such a decrease occurs,
young people on average still have 30 years to invest the extra money, whereas middle-
aged individuals just have 10 yeazs to take steps. Since the young individuals can better
prepaze themselves for the new situation, they can be expected to evaluate the situation
differently. Such possible differences in opinion can only be observed if three generations
are distinguished. A second remark concerns the number of interviewed persons. In
principle, it was sufficient to interview only one person per household, because questions
about income, pension claims etc., were also asked for a possible partner. Thus, if the
household members belonged to the youngest two generations, just one member was
interviewed. However, because of the relative scazcity of the older households, two
persons were interviewed in those households, if possible. Finally, the head of the
household usually answered the questions, although this was not required nor necessazy.
The resulting sample consists of 1103 respondents: 278 of them aze old, 362 middle-
aged and 463 young. After cleaning the data 988 respondents remain: 269 old, 314
middle-aged, and 405 young respondents. The overall response rate of the panel including
technical non-response is 700~0.5 Adjustment for technical non-response results in a
response rate of 830~0, which is high. The age structure of the sample corresponds well to
that of the Dutch population. Women, however, aze under-represented in the sample (see
Appendix 3A).
This section is concluded by some general information about the sample. Table 3.1
presents the distribution of the gross monthly income of the participating households in
terms of percentages. Note that income refers to household income, i.e., the income of a
possible partner is also included; on the other hand, the possible income of the children is
not concluded. Although most respondents (about 63oIo) aze males (see also Appendix 3A),
who usually have a higher income, household incomes seem relatively high.b
5 Technical non-response refers to non-response because of technical problems or holidays.
` Of course, the fact that a majority of the respondents are male only affects the incomes of the single
households. Appendix 3A shows that most of the respondents (about 700~0) have a partner and that they are
head of the household (80a~o). The presence of relatively many 'rich' households could bias the results.
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7 ~ 12 ~ 7 ~ 3
14 ~ 20 ~ I1 ~ 13
17 ~ 18 ~ 15 ~ 19
20 ~ 12 ~ 22 ~ 23
24 ~ 19 ~ 28 ~ 24




(988) ~ (269) ~ (314) ~ (405)
') Unless reported otherwise, all figures in the tables aze percentages, except for those in the last
row, which show the number of respondents ((n)-). Income of possible children is not included
here.
Only considering couples, Table 3.2 shows that most households have a double income.
One might be surprised at the lazge number of older double-income households. The
reason for this is simple, though. In the Netherlands, public pension benefits are provided
individually. Consequently, older respondents with an older partner both have an income.
The fact that yet in 200~0 of the elderly couples no double income is reported can be due to
two reasons. First, if the partner of an individual of age 65 or more is younger than 65, it
could be the case that the partner has no income. Second, people can simply be mistaken.
For instance, they míght think that they receive the full public pension benefit whereas
their partner receives nothing.
Section 3.5 shows that the impact of income is moderate, however. Furthermore, the level of the income is
explicitly incorporated in the analyses of Chapter 4.
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3.3 The questionnaire
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At the beginning of the questionnaire, respondents were extensively informed and
questioned about the public pension system, the possibilities of private savings, the rate of
return on savings etc. Providing information on these issues reduces the possibility of
people having different opinions just because of a difference in knowledge. After that, the
questionnaire continued with the most important questions, which might look complicated
at first sight. When the details of these questions aze described, one should keep in mind
that the main aim of the questionnaire was to collect data in order to estimate utility
functions for three generations. As explained in the previous chapter, in survey methods
there aze essentially two approaches to ask people about their feelings: the Factorial
Survey Approach and the Evaluation Question Approach. I have opted for the first
approach because introducing hypothetical situations is much easier in that approach.
The main questions of the survey concern the evaluations of five pension scheme
scenarios (the vignettes in terms of the FSA).' One scenazio corresponds to the existing
situation, whereas four situations aze hypothetical. People were asked to evaluate each
scenazio by assigning a grade between 1.00 (lowest) and 10.00 (highest). Before describing
the five pension schemes scenazios in more detail, a few remazks have to be made. First,
in the questionnaire each situation was described by a list of thirteen numbers (see
Appendix 3B for an example). The numbers provide information about four types of
vaziables: (i) the contribution rate and the contribution, (ii) the public pension benefit, (iii)
the so-called rate of return of the public pension system and (iv) the return on private
savings.
' In the following both scenario and situation will be used to indicate the pension scheme scenarios. The
scenario-part of the questionnaire may also be called a choice questionnaire, see Neijens (1986).
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Some explanatory remazks may be useful here. First, the rate of return of the public
pension system is defined as the ratio of total public pension benefits to total pension
contributions. Average rates of return were calculated for every age category of five
yeazs.8 As the Dutch public pension system was founded in 1957, current old individuals
have not contributed to the pension system during their entire life. The average rate of
return on their contributions is thus high, namely 3.5, which implies that old individuals
receive on average total pension benefits that are 3.5 times the total sum of their public
pension contributions. The ratios for an average middle-aged person (of age 55) and for an
average young person (of age 35) aze respectively 2.4 and 1.2. Second, besides the
consequences for themselves, the consequences for the representative members of the other
two generations were shown to the respondents.9 Third, note that in each situation just the
respondent's contribution could depend on his or her own income; if he or she had no
income, the average contribution for that situation was used. Finally, the situations may
seem complicated and hard to evaluate. Note, however, that the questions in the
questionnaire were ordered in such a way that respondents already stated their opinions
about the sepazate vaziables before they had to evaluate the scenazios. This set-up and the
way of presentation probably improved the respondents' understanding of the scenazios.
Table 3.3 summarises the five pension scheme scenarios. The first three scenarios (BS
(basic situation), LC (lower contribution) and HC (higher contribution)) do not take the
ageing process into account. That is, in these schemes the composition of the population is
assumed to remain unchanged in the future. Strictly speaking, the first three scenarios aze
not feasible. They are, however, useful to examine how people rank the alternative
scenarios LC and HC compared with the existing, status quo, situation BS. This
compazison clazifies the position of the existing situation as a benchmazk case. In LC the
contribution rate and the public pension benefit aze decreased, while they are increased in
HC. The last two scenarios (LB (lower benefit) and EB (equal benefit)) are in a way more
realistic. In these scenazios the financial consequences of the ageing process aze explicitly
taken into account. Two alternative scenarios were considered: in EB the contribution rate
B The rates of returns were been taken from Nelissen (1994). He assumed a real discount rate of 2"~o and
a real growth rate of the economy of 2"Io per head. The public pension benefits were moreover assumed to
be inflation-proof. Obviously, the rates of return further depend on income and marital status. In order to
calculate an individual rate of return, the total history of income is needed. This information was, however,
not available. Therefore, an average rate of retum for each five years age-category and an average rate of
return for each generation were used.
9 Representative individuals have the same marital status and gender as the respondent and they are 35,
55 or 70 years old when they are representative for the young, middle-aged or old generation respectively.
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was increased, while in LB the benefit was decreased.'o People had to evaluate each
situation by assigning a grade between 1.00 (lowest) and 10.00 (highest). In the following
the situations are described in more detail.
Table 3.3: An overview of the pension scheme scenarios and their codes
situation code description of the situation
BS basic situation (without ageing)
LC altetnative situation with lower contribution rates and lower public pension
benefits (without ageing)
HC altemative situation with higher contribution rates and higher public pension
benefits (without ageing)
LB alternative situation with equal contribution rates and lower public pension
benefits (with ageing)
EB alternative situation with higher contribution rates and equal public pension
benefits (with ageing)
The basic situation (BS)
The first pension scheme scenario concerns the present situation, which is also called the
basic situation (BS). BS assumes that the existing public pension system will be
maintained in the future. Possible consequences of the ageing process are not taken into
account. In other words, the current situation is assumed to be the steady-state situation.
This assumption implies for the existing situation that the contribution rate remains 140~0
and that the gross public pension benefit for a married couple and a single person is f1974
and f 1428, respectively.
Situations with lower or higber contributiou rates and lower or óigher pensions (LC, HC)
The first two alternative scenarios do not incorporate the consequences of the ageing
process, too. However, in these hypothetical scenarios a once-and-for-all shock in the
contribution rate produces a change in the existing situation. Respondents judged either the
situation with lower contribution rates (LC) or the situation with higher contribution rates
(HC). Owing to the PAYG system, public pension benefits are then also correspondingly
'o The calculations of the contribution rate and the pension benefit in the altemative situations are based
on Van Dalen (1991).
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lower or higher. In the questionnaire the new contribution rate was randomly determined
in steps of lo~o; in LC the new contribution rate was chosen between 70~o and 120~o and in
HC between 160~o and 210~0. By doing so, more variation in the data is generated. Note that
an intertemporal decision-making problem occurs in both of these alternative scenarios as
people have to make a trade off between cunent and future consumption possibilíties. In
addition to the alternative levels of the contribution rate and the public pension benefit,
respondents were informed about the consumption possibilities of the average young,
middle-aged and old individuals. The consequences of the changes per situation can be
summarised as follows.
In LC, young and middle-aged individuals can, in principle, spend more because of the
lower contribution rates. It was assumed, however, that the difference between the
contributions paid in BS and LC is saved. The idea behind this is that in reality probably
most younger people will take measures to counterbalance the lower public pension
benefit. They can, for instance, invest in private pension funds or put money into a savings
account. When retired, people can use the savings plus the interest as a supplement to the
lower public pension benefit. Note that the once-and-for-all shock in the contribution rate
and in the pension benefit infers that the income position of the cutrent old individuals
always deteriorates in LC. What happens to the lifetime incomes of inembers of the young
and middle-aged generation is ambiguous. Various aspects, such as the level of the new
contribution rate, income and age determine the ultimate effect on their lifetime income.
The lifetime incomes of very young individuals with high incomes and thus high
contributions, for example, probably increase because of the large drop in contributions. At
any rate, in LC younger and middle-aged individuals have to trade off their present income
position and their own future income position against the income positions of the present
old individuals.
In HC, the shock is just the reverse. In that situation young and middle-aged
individuals can spend less because of higher contribution rates. It was assumed that the
extra contributions are at the expense of the savings account." As a result, in situation
HC current consumption possibilities of young and middle-aged respondents remain the
same, their amount of old-age savings decreases but, on the other hand, the public pension
benefit increases. The once-and-for-all shock always results in higher incomes for
" Additionally, respondents were told that if they had no savings account, they had to borrow the
money.
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members of the old generation. Analogously to the previous scenario, the total effects on
lifetime incomes of young and middle-aged respondents aze not univocal in scenario HC.
Situations with ageing eflects and eitber lower benefits or higher contributions (LB, EB)
The last two scenarios aze situations that do consider the consequences of the ageing
process. Two (extreme) hypothetical situations were presented in the questionnaire. The
fourth scenazio, lower benefits (LB), describes a situation in which the present contribution
rates are maintained, but in which the ageing process results in a gradual decline of the
public pension benefits. This scenario assumes that young and middle-aged persons save
money to counterbalance future lower public pension benefits. It is true that savings reduce
the present consumption possibilities of the young and middle-aged respondents but, on the
other hand, their future pension incomes aze the same as in BS. In LB, the declining
public pension benefit makes the income positions of the elderly people worse.
Essentially, the last scenario, equal benefits (EB) describes the opposite case: the
present level of public pension benefits is maintained, but the contribution rate gradually
increases. Consequently, the income position of the elderly does not change. In principle,
the current income position of young and middle-aged persons gets worse owing to the
higher contributions. It was, however, assumed that young and middle-aged individuals
maintain their present income levels at the cost of lower levels of old-age savings.
Table 3.4 summarises all effects on the pension, the pension contribution and the rate of
return on pension contributions. In the table, f refers to an increase (compazed with the
basic situation), - to a decrease, 0 to no effect and ? to an unknown or ambiguous effect.
The data obtained by these questions can be analysed in several ways. As mentioned in
the introduction to this chapter, the data aze used in Chapter 4 to estimate utility functions
per generation. Section 3.5 analyses the evaluations by means of t-tests. However, before
discussing the results of that analysis, it is useful to examine the opinions concerning the
separate elements of the pension scheme scenarios. To that end, the next section presents
the answers to several questions about the respondents' views on the existing pension
scheme and the existing income positions.
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Table 3.4 Summary of the effects of the four alternative scenarios per generation
old middle-aged young
code .agemg
T~-------- -----, T-~~~~~-T~~---~-------- , ~ T--~~~~T~-------- -----~ ~
pension ; ratio pension ; contr. ; ratio pension ; contr. i ratio
LC no - ' -I ?~ ' - ' -I I ?~ ' - '
-IO..
I I
HC no t ~ fI
?' ~ t ~ f
I I






- ' 0 ' -I I
, ,
- ' 0 ' -I I
EB yes ; 00 0 ; ~ i - 0 i i. i -
') The average effect cannot be detetTrtined. Recall that it was assumed that the difference in
contributions between LC (HC) and BS is saved (dissaved) in favour (at the expense) of the total
pension. Total pension here means the public pension benefit plus (minus) the change in old-age
savings (dissavings).
~') This effect depends also on the age of the individual. For individuals of about 25 years old the
ratio hardly changes as they face the higher or lower contribution rate during their entire life and
they receive a correspondingly higher or lower pension.
3.4 Opinions concerning the social security system and income situations
As said before, public pensions in the Netherlands aze financed by a Pay-As-You-Go
(PAYG) scheme. Among other things, this means that the present young and middle-aged
individuals pay pension contributions and that the govertunent uses these contributions to
pay the pension benefits of the present old individuals. An implication of the PAYG
scheme is thus that one's pension payment is independent of one's own contributions.1z
Another implication is that the rate of retum of public pension schemes is determined by
the growth rates of both population and income.
The remainder of this section discusses opinions concerning several aspects of the
Dutch social security system. Of course, the attention is focused on the public pension
system. First, opinions concerning the social security systems in its entirety aze discussed.
"[n spite of this, it is often conjectured that most (older) people regazd their public pension as an
acquired right. As we will see below, the results support this claim. Furthermore, the public pension
entitlement dces depend on one's own contributions in some way. Basically, in each year of age between 15
and 65 an individual builds up 2"~0 of the entitlement to a full (100'~0) benefit. If one stays abroad for a while
and does not pay the pension premium, a reduction of the 100aIo public pension benefit is made. Note,
finally, that at a certain point in time two individuals with the same marital status (who have not been
abroad) always receive the same public pension even though one individual might have paid three times as
much.
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Then, opinions concerning the separate elements of the public pension system, namely the
pension benefit, the pension contribution and the ratio of these two are examined. This
ratio can be seen as a measure for the rate of return of the pension system. After that, the
results of the income evaluation questions are described.
3.4.1 Opinions concerning the social security system
Table 3.5 shows the respondents' opinions concerning the total Dutch social security
system. As my main interest lies in potential differences and similazities among
generations, these and following results aze presented per generation. For sake of
completeness, the overall results for the sample aze also shown. The question on which
Table 3.5 is based is whether one thought that the existing social security system should be
reduced, extended, or remain unchanged.







sample ~ old ~ middle-aged i young---- If-------------a--------------~--------------f----------~ ~ ~
]6 ~ 19 ~ 14 ~ 17
21 ~ 19 ~ 22 ~ 21
54 ~ 52 ~ 58 ~ 52
9 ~ 10 ~ 6 ~ 10f-------------f-------------f-------------f--------------
(988) ! (269) ; (314) ! (405)
The answers of the respondents are remazkably similaz and age-independent: more than
half of each generation think that the system should not be changed, at most l00~o favour
an extension and about 200~o prefer a reduction of the system. The findings show a
resemblance with the outcomes of the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP)
survey.13 For instance, in the 1992 SCP survey the following question was asked "Do you
agree with the statement that living with less social security in the future will be
necessary"?. SCP found that 320~0 of their sample supported this view, 570~o did not and the
remaining l lo~o had no opinion (SCP, 1992).
" Every two years the SCP carries out a large-scale survey, in which a broad range of topics is covered.
Although a small part of the SCP survey concems questions about income situations and social security, the
data do not contain sufficient infortnation to answer the questions addressed in this research.
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After the general question about social security, the questionnaire under consideration
shifted the attention to the public pension system. First, respondents were asked whether
they knew the levels of the public pension benefit for singles and couples.'" About half
the respondents said they knew the level of the pension benefit. Knowledge increases with
age, obviously. Most elderly subjects (950~0), more than one third of the middle-aged
respondents and about a quarter of the young respondents answered that they knew the
level of the pension. When more precise amounts were asked, the actual knowledge of the
respondents appeazed to be lower, though. From the old individuals who indicated that
they knew the level of the pension benefit, about 800~o stated an amount that deviated less
than So~o from the actual amount. For the middle-aged and young individuals this
percentage was much lower, namely a bit above SOo~o for both generations. Obviously,
only few respondents aze well up in public pension matters. To decrease the possible effect
of the difference in knowledge among respondents, the actual amounts of the pension
benefits for singles and couples were presented. Respondents had to judge these amounts,
see Table 3.6.
Table 3.6: Opinions on the level of the public pension benefits for couples and singles
pension for couples pension for singles
-----------
sample ' old ' middle ~ young-------~------~-------~------- sample ~ old ' middle ~--------4-------~--------~- young-------
no opinion 4 ~ 7 ~ 2 ~ 4 4 ~ 7 ~ 1 ~ 3
very low 6.5 ~ 5.5 ~ 6.5 ~ 7 14 ~ 8 ~ 15 ~ 18
low 47 ~ 33I
~ 52 ~
I I
52 50.5 ~ 40 ~ 57 ~I I I
54
normal 40 ~ 54 ~ 37 ~ 34 30 ~ 44 ~ 25 ~ 23
high 2 ~ 0 ~ 2 ~ 3 1 ~ 0.5 ~ 1 ~ 1.5
very high 0.5 ~ 0.5 ~ 0.5 ~ 0 0.5 ~ 0.5 ~ 1 ~-~4 0.5------------------ -------f------f-------f------- --- - ---------~------
(n~ (988) ~ (269) ~ (314) ~ (405) (988) ~ (269) ~ (314) ~ (405)
The table shows some remarkable facts. For all generations, merely a small group of
respondents are of opinion that the public pension benefit is high or very high. About 600~0
of the middle-aged and young persons think that the pension for couples is low or very
low, while just 400~0 of the elderly persons think so. As for the public pension benefit for
" See Chapter 1 for the levels of the public pension benefit and the contribution rate.
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singles, these percentages aze about 700~o and SOo~o, respectively. The younger and old
generations differ significantly in opiníon at a confidence level of 990~0. An explanation for
this difference might be that most middle-aged and young persons are used to an income
that is higher than the pension. Receiving (just) a public pension benefit would imply a
lazge drop in income for them. Younger people might even think that the pension is hardly
enough to make ends meet. On the other hand, the elderly subjects receive the pension so
that they aze more familiaz with the amounts; in other words, older individuals might
regazd the pension as normal almost by definition.15
SCP (1992) found similaz results, which could be taken as a further indication that the
quality of the data under consideration is good. In the SCP survey, people were asked
whether they thought that the publíc pension benefit was not sufficient. In 1991, 470~0 of
the people agreed with this statement, while in 1989, 1985 and 1980 this was respectively
520~0, 370~o and 250~0. From the table it can be observed that a comparable percentage,
namely about 540~0 of the subjects in the present sample considered the pension to be low
or very low.1ó A last clear result from the table is that the pension for singles is often
considered low compazed with that for couples, which seems consistent with public
opinion.
To gaín more insight in the opinions, one can relate some background characteristics
of the respondents to their opinions. It could, for instance, be conjectured that being or not
being entitled to an additional private pension scheme could bias the answers of the
respondents in the panel. I have therefore examined the possible effect of prívate pensions
claims. On average, younger and older individuals without additional pension rights give a
slightly worse evaluation of the public pension benefit for both couples and singles. The
difference with their contemporaries with an additional pension is quite small, however,
and only significant for the young individuals' evaluation of the singles' benefit. A reason
for the difference might be that people with additional pension rights unconsciously
consider these rights in their judgements. Surprisingly, the tendency for the middle-aged is
just the reverse: the data suggest that on average the middle-aged individuals with
additional pension rights consider the pension benefits lower than their contemporazies
15 T'his phenomenon, which could be seen as a kind of habit formation, is well known in poverty
research. Another explanation for the difierence in opinions might be that the opinions of the elderly are
biased because they may unconsciously include their private pension income and consider this total income
as being normal.
16 [t should be noticed that this does not necessarily mean that these people thought that the pension was
not sufficient.
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without additional pension entitlements." The difference is not significant, however.
Overall, the effect of an additional pension turns out to be very moderate. Furthermore, no
cleaz relations between opinions and other personal characteristics can be found.
Essentially, merely marital status turns out to play a role. Singles regard both the pension
benefit for singles and that for couples lower than do couples.
Judgements of the public pension contribution rate aze shown in Table 3.7. Recall that
the contribution rate amounts to 140~0 of the taxable income; this yields an average
monthly premium of f300 and a maximum monthly premium of f 500. It emerges from the
table that the opinions concerning the contribution rate hazdly differ among generations:
between SSo~o and 650~0 of the respondents think that the contribution rate is normal, while
200~o to 250~o believe it is high or very high. Marital status and enrolment in a private
pension scheme do not affect these judgements.






- sample.-- ~ old ~ middle-aged ~ young~- t-------------t-------------i---------------
11 ~ 17 ~ 7 ~ 10
1 ~ 0 ~ 0.5 ~ 2
7 ~ 6 ~ 8 ~ 7
58 ~ 56 ~ 63 ~ 55.5
22 ~ 20 ~ 21 ~ 24
1 ~ 1 ~ OS ~ 1.5very highr ------
I (n)--
~-------------F--------------f-------------f--------------~
(988) ; (269) ; (314) ; (405)
Note that there is a kind of clash of opinions here. Many people think that the pension
benefit is low, but, on average, people aze also of opinion that the contribution rate is
rather too high than too low. Within the framework of a PAYG system this 'problem'
cannot be solved.'B It might, however, be useful to look at the relationship between these
two elements. To that end, respondents were questioned about the 'rate of return' of the
" It could be the case that mainly relatively poor people have no additional pension rights. Moreover, for
poorer people the pension benefit would imply a smaller drop in living standards than for wealthier people.
However, as we wilt see in the next section most people have additional pension rights. The remaining group
is too small to perform sensible analyses.
18 All these aspects are included in the pension scheme scenarios. The grades assigned to the situations
thus give a kind of overall evaluation.
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public pension system, defined as the ratio of total public pension benefits to total pension
contributions. For every age category of five years the average ratio between public
pension benefits and contributions was calculated (see also footnote 9). In addition, the
average ratios per generation were derived. These rates of return for an average old (of age
70), middle-aged (of age 55) or young person (of age 35) are 3.5, 2.4 and 1.2,
respectively. People were asked to judge both the rate of return for themselves and the
average rates of return for the representative members of the other generations. Table 3.8
presents the results.
Table 3.8: Opinions concerning the rates of return'~
rate of return of -~ old (3.5) middle-aged (2.4) young (1.2)
opinion by -~------------------- o ~ m ~ y-----~-----4------- o ~ m ~ y------f-----f------ o ~ m ~ y-------1-------~-------
too low 4 ~ 4 ~ 6 7 ~ 5 ~ 13 19 ~ 31 ~ 22
reasonablé'~ 82 ~ 84 ~ 78 84 ~ 83 ~ 75 78 ~ 66 ~ 69
too high 14 ~ 12 ~ 16 9 ~ 12 ~ 12 3 ~ 3 ~ 9------------------- -----f-----f------ ------f------F------ ------f------f------
(n)- (269) ~ (314) ~ (405) (269) ~ (314) ~ (405) (269) ~ (314) ~ (405)
') y is young, m is middle-aged and o is old.
") In the questionnaire this was referred to as not too high or too low.
For all generations and all rates of return the answer 'not too high or too low' is most
frequent. Although the average rate of return of the elderly is the highest, the table shows
that still most respondents believe that the ratio of 3.5 for the elderly is reasonable
(columns 2-4). Few differences within the generations thus seem to exist regazding this
ratio. Furthermore, a majority of all generations regazd the average rate of return for the
middle-aged as reasonable, including the middle-aged themselves (columns 5-7). For the
young and old generations the remaining part is about equally divided between too low
and too high, whereas for the middle-aged respondents the answer 'too high' is more
frequent. The remaining group is the largest in case of the young generation. Finally,
several individuals of each generation think that the average rate of return for the young is
too low (last three columns), whereas only a few subjects think that the ratio of 1.2 is too
high. The young themselves aze more positive about their own rate of the return than the
middle-aged are about the ratio of the young generation. In all, the differences between the
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generations' opinions on the ratios of others and themselves aze small. The rates of return
aze mostly considered reasonable.
As a last element of the pension system, expectations about the future public pension
system are discussed. Two questions were asked in the survey "What do you think what
will happen to the public pension benefit in the future?" and "What do you think what will
happen to the contribution rate in the future?". Three answers were possible: it will
decrease, increase, or remain unchanged. Concerning the public pension benefit, it was
found that elderly people expect a significantly higher pension than do young and middle-
aged individuals. The average expectation of the middle-aged individuals is significantly
more positive than that of the young individuals. Part of the reason could be that these
generations have a different time horizon. Regazding the contribution rate, the expectations
aze similar among all generations: more than half of the respondents believe that the
contribution rates will increase in the future. This question closed the block of questions
about the social security system. After that, the attention was shifted to questions about
income. The next section discusses the answers to these questions.
3.4.2 Opinions concerning the income situations
Essentially, the second part of the questionnaire consisted of the evaluations of vazious
income situations. Both the respondent's own income situation and the income situations
of other generations were discussed. The main idea behind the income evaluation questions
was that I wanted individuals to think about their own and others' income positions. For
that purpose, people were first asked to give an absolute and a relative evaluation of one's
own household income situation. The corresponding questions were "What do you think of
the income situation of your household?" and "What do you think of the income situation
of your household compared with the situations of other people of your generation?".
Table 3.9 displays a summary of the answers.
Surprisingly, the answers are extraordinarily similaz among the generations: at most
l00~0 of the respondents believe that their absolute income situation is bad or very bad,
about SSo~o think that it is good or very good, and the remaining 350~o think that it is
reasonablelnormal. Although on average all generations regazd the relative income
situation as worse than the absolute situation, differences between both evaluations are
small.
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Table 3.9: Absolute and relative evaluations of the household's income situation
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absolute evaluation relative evaluation
------------------ sample ~ old ~ middle ~ young---------~-----4---------4--------~ ~ ~
sample ~ old ~ middle ~ youn
---------f-----f--------f---- g





very bad 1 I 1 I 1 I 2 1 I 1 I 1 I 2
bad 7 ~ 5 ~ 8 I 8 9 I 7 I 10 I 11
reasonablelnormal 35 ~ 35 ~ 35 ~ 35 35 ~ 33 ~ 35 ~ 37
good 44 ~ 44 ~ 43 ~ 45 40 ~ 39 ~ 42 ~ 38
very good 12 ~ 14 ~ 13 ~ 10 10 ~ 14 ~ 9 ~ 7------------------ .. ---f-----f--------f------- ---------f-----a---------f------
(n}- (988) ~ (269) ~ (314) ~ (405) (988) ~ (269) ~ (314) ~ (405)
') Answering 'no opinion' was not possible (n.a, not applicable) for the absolute evaluation.
Again, these answers aze similar to the outcomes of the SCP survey. In their 1992 survey,
for instance, SCP found that 460~0 of the interviewed people were satisfied with their
income, 390~o were rather satisfied and 150~o were not satisfied. Similaz percentages were
found for other yeazs (SCP, 1992). SCP also asked what people thought of their own
income situation relative to the total income distribution. Just like in the present panel,
people in the SCP panel seemed to believe they were lucky: 570~o were of opinion that
their relative income situation was (very) good, 120~o that is was (very) bad and 310~o that
it was reasonable.
Table 3.10: Opinions concerning the income situations of other generations
opinion by ~ old middle-aged young
income of ~------------------ middle ~ young--------~-------- - old ~ young- --f------- old ~ middle--------~----------
no opinion 7 ~ 4 4 ~ 5 3 ~ 3
very bad 1 ~ 1 3 ~ - 2 ~ 0
bad 22 ~ 14 31 ~ 12 34 ~ 15
reasonable~normal 58 ~ 52 54 ~ 47 48 ~ 59
good 12 ~ 25 8 ~ 33 11 ~ 21
very good------------------ -.- 1---- ~ 4f-------- 1 ~ 3--------f------- 1 ~ 1--------f---------
(n~ (269) ~ (269) (314) ~ (314) (405) ~ (405)
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Similaz questions were asked about the income positions of inembers of other generations
(see Table 3.10). Before answering these questions, information was given about the
income distribution of inembers of the other generations. Clearly, for all generations the
opinion 'reasonablelnormal' is most frequent. Many young and middle-aged respondents
indicate that the income position of the elderly is bad while only IOa~o indicate that it is
good. The income position of the young generation is most positively evaluated: about
300~0 of the old and middle-aged individuals consider it good. Apparently, although overall
the income distribution of the middle-aged individuals is most favourable, respondents
agree that the income situation of the young generation is the best, whereas that of the old
generation is the worst.
All previous questions concerned the existing, current situation. However, when
assigning grades to the various pension scheme scenario (see the next section for results)
respondents were asked to consider the total income situation. In this respect 'total' refers
not only to the positions of other generations but also to future income positions. For that
purpose information about the expected future income of the middle-aged and young
respondents was needed. It may be expected that the income expectations of the younger
persons are better compazed with those of the middle-aged persons since members of the
youngest generations are more likely to have private pension claims. Yet, the expectations
about the income situation in old age hazdly differ between the youngest two
genérations.19 For both generations about 400~0 of the people think that their income
situation in old age will be worse than their current situation while a similaz percentage
think that it will remain the same. About half of people in the remaining group expect the
income situation to be better when old and the other half expect it to be much worse.
Besides their expected income in old age, young individuals indicated their expected
income situation in middle age. Most young respondents (460~0) believe that their future
income situation will remain about the same as their current situation. Furthermore, an
important group of young respondents (350~0) expect that their income situation will
improve in the (near) future and almost 200~o anticipate a worsening. On average, young
persons believe that their income in middle age will be somewhat higher than their current
income, which corresponds to reality.
19 One has to be careful here, however. The question related present income to future income. Obviously,
the present income situation of the young and middle-aged respondents is not the same. This existing
difference could hamper a fair comparison.
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Table 3.11: Entitlement to occupational pensions
no
sample ~ old ~ middle-aged ~ young-F--------------f-------------f------------~-------------
19 ~ 37 ~ 13 ~ 11
74 ~ 62.5 ~ 77 ~ 80
7 ~ 0.5 ~ 10 ~ 9i--------------~--------------~------------a--------------~ ~ ~(988) ! (269) ! (314) ! (405)
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A last factor that could affect opinions concerning pension schemes is the private pension
arrangement, already briefly considered before. Intuitively, the entitlement to an
occupational private pension seems an important variable for both opinions concerning
public pension schemes and concerning future income expectations. Table 3.11 shows that
most persons in the sample aze entitled to a private pension scheme. Being entitled has an
ambiguous effect on income expectations, however. For the young respondents the effect is
negligibly small, whereas a significant but counterintuitive impact can be found for
middle-aged people. Apparently, middle-aged individuals with private pension claims
expect a worse future income situation than do middle-aged individuals without private
pension claims.ZO It should be noted, however, that about 700~0 of the middle-aged and
850~0 of the young individuals have no idea about the size of their pension claims. This
fact is illustrated in Table 3.12. When conections aze made for this 'bias', middle-aged
persons who know their pension claims turn out to have a more optimistic view than have
the ones who do not know their pension claims.
Table 3.12 Knowledge of the level of the complementary pension payments
respondent's pension partner's pension
--------- sample ~ old ~ middle ~ young---------1---------f---------~-------~
sample ~ old ~ middle ~ youn-------f-------f--------f------g-
known 38 ~ ~ ~95 ~ 30 ~ 15 ~37 ~ ~ ~82 ~ 35 ~ ]0
unknown 62 ~ 5 ~ 70 ~ 85 63 ~ 18 ~ 65 ~ 90--------- --------~---------f--------~------- --------F-------f---------1----------
(n)- (744) ~ (173) ~ (247) ~ (324) (320) ~ (83) ~ (102) ~ (135)
'-o This might have something to do with a relationship between income and pension claims; see also
footnote 17.
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3.5 Analysis of the evaluations
Essentially, all the above questions served as an introduction to the most important part of
the survey, namely the evaluation of the five pension scheme scenarios discussed in
Section 3.3. Because of time constraints, respondents had to evaluate four out of five
situations: two situations without ageing effects (BS and LC or BS and HC), and two with
ageing effects (LB and EB). Respondents first had to judge the basic, existing, situation
BS by assigning a grade between 1.00 and 10.00. After that, either the alternative situation
with lower contributions and lower pensions (LC) or the alternative situation with higher
contributions and higher pensions (HC) was compared with BS, and people had to evaluate
the alternative situation. Appendix 3B shows an example of this comparison. Finally,
respondents were asked to evaluate the situation with lower pension benefits and
unchanged contributions (LB) and the situation with unchanged pensions and higher
contributions (EB).21










all ' old ' middle ' young-----f-----~-------~--------}~ ~ ~
6.25 ~ 6.35 ~ 6.23 ~ 6.20
4.46 ~ 4.30 ~ 4.34 ~ 4.66
5.75 ~ 5.48 ~ 6.22 ~ 5.55
4.29 ~ 4.56 ~ 4.23 ~ 4.16




old vs young ' old vs middle ' middle vs young--------------f-------------~----------------~ ~
1.86 ' ~ 1.39 ~ 0.43
-1.84 ~` ~ -0.24 ~ -1.69 '
-0.38 ~ -4.10 '~`~` ~ 4.29 "'
3.23 "~" ~ 2.61 " ~ 0.63
4.85 "~` ~ -0.98 ~ 5.94 ~.r
1) ~ indicates that the difference is significant at a 0.10-level, " at a 0.05-level and'~' at a 0.01-
level.
The left panel of Table 3.13 gives a first impression about the average grades assigned to
the situations. A distinction is made between the sample and each sepazate generation.
Before discussing the results, I want to stress that in my view the answers can be taken
seriously because of several reasons. The first reason is that the data were cleaned. That is,
respondents who gave strange answers (e.g., four times a 1.11) were removed from the
21 The order of these vaziants was randomly determined.
Opinions concerning Pension Systems 65
original sample as were those people who made cleaz that they did not answer the
questions serious1y.22 Second, it looks as if most respondents in the remaining sample
have answered consistently.Z' Probably, the fact that respondents had several opportunities
to conect their evaluations during the questionnaire has improved consistency. Overall, the
claim that the grades are a good reflection of the opinions seems reasonable.
Although the analysis to be presented in this chapter is very simple, the results provide
some useful insights. Among other things, information about the ranking of the situations
as well as information about possible differences in the ranking among generations is
obtained. Standazd neoclassical economic theory tells us that non-altruistic people should
rank situations that result in higher household income above situations that result in lower
income. So, for instance, members of the old generation should prefer situation HC to
situation BS as HC yields a higher pension benefit. The correspondence between
theoretical predictions and actual preferences is examined by compazing the evaluations in
two ways. First, the between-subject approach is applied, which investigates whether
members of different generations evaluate particulaz situations similazly (Section 3.5.1).24
Second, the within-subject approach is employed, which investigates whether members of
a particular generation evaluate two alternative situations equally or not (Section 3.5.2).25
3.5.1 Comparisons between generations
In the between-subjects approach, evaluations of a particulaz situation, as perceived by
members of different generations, are analysed. The left panel of Table 3.13 shows per
generation the average evaluations of the five situations. Comparisons among generations
Z' Remazks could be made at the end of the questionnaire.
2J The consistency of the answers was checked in two ways. First, people had to state whether they
found a situation better or worse than the basic situation. After that, they had to assign a grade to the
alternative situation. In general, respondents' verbal judgements and the grades are similaz. Second, situations
LB and EB were also directly compared in the questionnaire and people were asked to indicate which
situation they preferred. The answers to this question correspond very well to the preferences and ranks
derived from the evaluations of the situations LB and EB separately.
'" Assuming that the evaluations follow a normal distribution, a t-test for differences of ineans for
independent samples can be applied (see, e.g., Van der Genugten, 1986). The histograms of the grades (not
presented here) support the assumption of a nonnal distribution.ZS In this case, a t-test for differences of ineans for joint observations can be applied.
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are possible by looking at the rows of the table. T'he right panel presents the results of the
applicable t-test for these comparisons.Zb
Although the evaluations of the basic situation (BS) look similaz among the
generations, it turns out that the older generation evaluates BS significantly better than the
younger one does (at a 0.10-level).
The ranking of scenario LC is in line with the expectations. In this situation young
individuals can save for many yeazs and prepaze themselves for receiving the lower public
pension. In contrast, middle-aged individuals have fewer opportunities and old individuals
have no opportunities at all to compensate the lower pension. This possibly explains the
relatively good evaluation of this scenario by the young generation. Middle-aged people
classify the scenazio without ageing and with higher contributions and higher public
pension benefits (HC) highly; their evaluations aze even higher than those of the elderly
people. This does not necessazily infer altruism, as in HC middle-aged individuals might
also benefit from contributing more for a short period and receiving a much higher
pension when retired. Altruism towazds the elderly, however, could also play a role here.
The bad evaluation of HC by the elderly is unexpected, because they receive a higher
public pension benefit in that scenario. The evaluation of the present public pension
benefit could play a role here; as pointed out in Section 3.2, most elderly respondents
regazd the public pension benefit as reasonable or good. This observation in combination
with possible altruism towazds younger generations might explain why the elderly subjects
do not prefer HC to BS.
Lastly, scenarios LB and EB aze considered, which both include the ageing effects.
One might expect that of all people the old individuals assign the highest grades to these
situations as both situations mainly lead to changes in the future. In other words, the future
changes hardly hatm the income positions of the elderly and thus should hazdly affect their
grades. The results for scenazios LB and EB aze completely and almost in line with this
reasoning. In the latter situation the middle-aged and the old generation do not disagree.
The young, on the other hand, assign a low grade to both situations. The lazge difference
between their evaluation of EB and that of the other two generations could be explained
by the fact that the young suffer most from the rising contributions in that situation.
Summazising, although the generations often behave similazly, differences in ranking
occur in some situations. Obviously, all generations prefer higher benefits to lower
26 The standard deviations of the evaluations are similar among the generations. The smallest standard
deviations of the evaluations (about 1) are obtained in situation BS, whereas the standard deviations for the
evaluations of the other scenarios typically are in the range from 1.30 to 1.90.
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benefits, irrespective of ageing is included or not. The ranking within generations is
discussed in more detail in the next section. The possible effect of income on the results of
this section is discussed in Section 3.5.3, whereas the possible influence of altruism is
briefly considered in Section 3.6.
3.5.2 Comparisons within generations
Besides comparisons between generations, comparisons within generations can be made by
analysing the grades shown in Table 3.13 per column instead of per row.27 It appears that
the total sample and all sepazate generations evaluate the situation with lower contributions
and lower public pension benefits (LC) significantly worse than the basic situation (BS).
Because only the youngest persons can gain under vaziant LC, this result is not surprising.
Apparently, middle-aged respondents have few problems with situation HC, whereas this
situation is evaluated worse than the basic situation by the young and old generations.
Clearly, all generations prefer an increase in contributions to a decrease. This was
expected, as even among the young individuals probably more respondents gain under HC
compazed with LC. Another conclusion is that old individuals value future changes in the
pension more positively than analogous current changes, whereas for the young and
middle-aged just the opposite holds. This asymmetry may be related to the fact that future
changes mainly affect the younger generations.
From a policy point of view, a compazison between the two situations with ageing
effects (LB and EB) is interesting. All generations evaluate the situation with equal public
pension benefit and increasing contribution rates (EB) significantly better than the situation
with equal contribution rates but lower public pensions (LB). This also applies for the
youngest generation although they lose more under variant EB. Apart from the indirect
compazison between LB and EB, a direct measure was obtained by asking people to
compaze situations LB and EB directly.2B The results of the direct comparison aze quite
similaz to those of the indirect comparison: most people consider LB worse than EB. It
should be noted, however, that intergenerational and intragenerational effects could mix up
the comparison, especially for the younger generation. That is, by means of
intragenerational redistribution the lifetime income of young individuals with a low income
might increase in case of higher contributions. This fact might bias the above result in the
27 Appendix 3C presents the elaborated table with t-statistics.Za To avoid order effects, half of the respondents first evaluated LB and then EB, whereas the opposite
order was presented to the other half. The order effect turns out to be negligible.
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direction of more redistribution from the young to the old generation. I will briefly come
back to this issue in the next section.
Summarising, each generation evaluates the basic situation better than all other
situations. The only exception is the middle-aged individuals, who cannot discriminate
between situations HC and BS. The overwhelming support for the existing situation could
be due to a type of status-quo bias or due to prospect theory, which often applies to
surveys.29 Another strong result is that lowering pensions is uniformly evaluated as worse
than raising them. This ranking applies both to the situations that include and that exclude
ageing effects. This finding may be seen as support for the well-known statement that
people regazd public pensions as an important achievement of welfare states, which should
not be relinquished. The data suggest that most younger people even seem willing to invest
more in the system, if necessary.
3.5.3 The efject of income
The previous analyses concerned all old, middle-aged or young people. Implicitly, it was
assumed that generations consist of a homogeneous group of people. The size of the
changes in income in the alternative situations depends, however, lazgely on the current
income situations of the respondents.'o Considering some of the existing heterogeneity is
possible when the sample is divided into a'low-income' group (income ~ 43.000 Dutch
guilders) and a'high-income' group. For these income groups, the previous analyses were
repeated. Table 3.14 summazises the results. The text focuses on the major trends and
differences compared with the previous sections.
The results show that the richer members of the old and young generations evaluate
the basic situation and the situations with lower contributions better than do their poorer
contemporaries; the reverse applies to the situation with higher benefits. These results
come up with one's expectations. For instance, young people with a low income suffer less
from higher contribution rates. Rich old persons probably have a private pension benefit
on top of their public pension; so, on average, they suffer less from lower public pension
29 Both psychological and economic literature have established that people tend to favour status quo
situations (see, e.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988, and Kahneman,
Knetsch and Thaler, 1991). This could in part also explain why the answer 'reasonable' is observed so
frequently.
'o In LC and HC the size of the change also depends on the level of the new contribution rate, which
was randomly determined (e.g., between 16"~o and 210~o in HC). However, results from additional analyses
(not reported here) show that the size of the change in the contribution rate hardly plays a role.
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benefits. Differences between both income groups are lazger for the old and young
generation than they aze for the middle-aged generation.




all ~ old ~ middle ~ young
t-----f------f-------~-------~
6.41 ~ 6.66 ~ 6.33 ~ 6.39
4.62 ~ 4.63 ~ 4.35 ! 4.87
5.71 ~ 5.32 ~ 6.32 ~ 5.33
4.34 ~ 4.62 ~ 4.28 ! 4.29
5.68 ~ 5.74 ~ 6.08 ~ 5.30
low income
~~~~-~T~~-~~~-T~--~~~~T--~~~~
all ~ old ~ middle ~ young-------b--------F-------f ------
6.10 ; 6.22 ~ 6.10 ~ 5.98
4.30 ; 4.15 ~ 4.40 ~ 4.37
5.79 ; 5.54 ~ 6.09 ~ 5.84I I~ ~





Regazding the comparison between generations, is has to be noted that some of the
aforementioned differences become smaller when the income subgroups aze considered.
However, particularly in the high-income group, opinions concerning the situations without
ageing vary considerably. Two other remazks aze worthwhile. First, the wealthy elderly
respondents assign a high grade to BS. Second, both the poor and the rich middle-aged
individuals support the remarkably high evaluation of HC.
So, as expected, the present income position of the respondents affects the evaluations
of both the existing situation and the alternative schemes. The effects of income seem
moderate, however. Obviously, several other factors could influence the evaluations such
as the composition of the household, gender, age, and so on. The model of the next
chapter systematically examines the possible impact of these variables.
3.6 Conclusions and discussion
The main aim of this chapter was to introduce the questionnaire. In addition, by
summazising some results of the survey, it was tried to contribute to the scazce information
about public opinion concerning old-age pension systems. One conclusion is that many
people, in particulaz from younger generations, know little about public and private
pension schemes. In spite of this lack of knowledge, it was found that opinions concerning
public pensions and contribution rates aze similar among generations, although the old and
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the younger generation do not always agree. The main results follow from the analyses in
Section 3.5. Figure 3.1 graphically illustrates the results by showing the evaluations of the








Figure 3.1: Evatuations per generation
"" EB
The cleaz picture arising from the figure is that people obviously favour the existing
situation. Furthermore, mainly situations LC and LB aze evaluated very badly. This
observation supports the idea that people think that the public pension scheme is among
the most important achievements of the Dutch welfare state; lowering public pension
benefits is not appreciated by the respondents. More than that, respondents seem willing to
maintain the level of pensions, even when the ageing process requires lazge investments. In
particular, this prevails for the middle-aged generation. Income and the willingness to
contribute more, are somewhat related, however. Rich young people aze less prepazed to
pay more than poorer people, as presumably wealthy people suffer most from higher
contributions. In spite of this, rich people also prefer HC to LC (without ageing effects)
and EB to LB (with ageing effects).
Other variables that could influence the respondents' evaluations include altruism and
fairness. In the next chapter, it will be shown that the incomes of inembers of other
generations, i.e. altruism, affect one's own utility. Feelings of altruism might also explain
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some results derived in this chapter. One strong result is that although the old generation
does not suffer at all from scenazios with higher contributions (HC or EB), they evaluate
these situations significantly worse than the existing situation (BS). This feature could
point at some altruistic considerations among the members of the older generation.
However, status quo bias could also play a role. Also among the younger generations some
evidence for altruistic feelings may be observed. For instance, altruism towazds the older
generations could be part of the reason that the youngest generation estimate EB worse
than LB and LC worse than HC.
Although deriving policy implications from the analysis is not easy, I try to give some
possible implications." First, the results suggest that giving people more information
about public and private pension schemes may be a good idea. The main message to
politicians could be that people probably will not appreciate cuts in the pension benefits
right now. As mentioned in Chapter 1, some political parties in the Netherlands already
experienced that during the latest elections. Furthermore, as well known, adjustments to
the pension system will be necessazy in the future because of the consequences of the
ageing process. Politicians should realise in this respect that people seem to prefer a
situation with higher contributions and constant benefits to a situation with constant
contributions and lower benefits. So, if one had to choose between situations EB and LB,
situation EB seems the best choice.
The approach of this chapter is for the most part partial. In particular, the evaluations
of the pension scheme scenarios aze not linked to personal chazacteristics. In the next
chapter, a more systematic, integral approach will be followed. In that approach, the
effects of income, altruism, fairness and vazious personal characteristics aze considered
simultaneously.
" See Chapter 7 for further implications of the study.
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Appendix 3A Background information about the panel and the sample
The panel
When the Telepanel was founded in 1989, the organisation involved, Stichting Telepanel (STP),
tried to compose a representative sample. The Telepanel should deviate only little from the total
population with respect to the following background characteristics of the (members of the)
households: age, sex, urbanisation grade, region, living circumstances and labour status. The actual
composition of the panel took place in two steps. As a first step, 8000 phone numbers were drawn
randomly. If the selected phone number was a household, the household was asked to join a
survey-panel for some time. No detailed information was given. Of the 8000 households, 3583
were prepared to join the Telepanel. The background variables of these households were compared
with the average values of the Dutch population, as reported by the Dutch Central Bureau of
Statistics (CBS). Then, as a second step, 3000 out of these 3583 households were chosen to form a
panel that was as representative as possible. All these 3000 households were approached. At that
stage, STP provided more detailed information about the paneL The information included the
procedure with the computer, the purposes of the panel and the expected time per week it would
take to fill out the questionnaires. Eventually, about 2000 households (about 3000 persons of age
18 and older) tumed out to be willing to join the Telepanel. The reasons for nonparticipation were
mainly lack of time or frequent absence. When a household leaves the panel, a similar household
in the neighbourhood replaces it.
The households participating in the Telepanel are interviewed almost weekly. Thursday or
Friday, one or more questionnaires aze sent from the central computer to the households. One or
more members of the households answer the questionnaire during the weekend, anytime they
want.32 When finished, the answers aze sent back automatically to STP. The scope of the topics
of the questionnaires is very broad. Topics include the frequency of visiting a cafe, elections,
advertisements, and so on.
The questionnaire
The questionnaire was developed in some steps. Drafts of the questionnaire were tested several
times and resulted in many adjustments and improvements. The first draft version of the
questionnaire was developed on paper. This draft was presented to several critical colleagues. Their
comments were incorporated in the second draft. Twenty-five students were encouraged to give
comments when filling out this second draft. Besides testíng the questionnaire, the data from the
second draft were used to check whether the planned research method was feasible. This tumed out
to be the case. Next, STP translated the written questionnaire into a computer program. Both STP
'Z The households are always asked to respond before Monday but in any case they should respond
before Wednesday.
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and we tested the program on a modest scale. This testing resulted in further corrections and a
reduction of the number of questions. Finally, when the questions were understandable and
acceptable to all parties involved, the questionnaire was carried out.
The sample





. sample ~ old ~ middle-aged ~ young-----f----- ---f-------- ---t-------~ ~ ~37 ~ 42 ~ 34 ~ 35
~ ~ ~.--63---~ 58 ~ 66 ~ 65~-------f-----------f-------~ ~ ~
(988) ! (269) ~ (314) ~ (d05)
Obviously, more male than female respondents participated in the survey. In particular, women
were under-represented in the middle-aged and young households, in which only one member
answered the questions. Furthermore, most respondents had a partner (Table A.2) and they were
head of the household (Table A.3).
Table A.2: Presence of a partner
no partner
partner
sample ~ old ~ middle-aged ~ young1-------- f--------t-----------t-------
30 ~ 30 ~ 28 ~ 32
- 70 -- ~ 70 ~ 72 ~ 68
f- f--------~-----------~--------i i ~(988) ; (269) ~ (314) ; (405)
Table A.3: Position in the household
head of the household
partner (married)
partner (not married)~----------------------(n)-
sample ~ old ~ middle-aged ~ young1------- t------- t----------- f-------~ ~ ~80 ~ 78 ~ 82 ~ 79
17 ~ 21 ~ 17 ~ 14
3 ~ 1 ~ 1 ~ 7f------f-------~------------i--------
(988) ; (269) ! (314) ; (405)
" All numbers denote percentages; (n)- denotes the number of respondents.
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Table A.4 presents the distribution of the age of the respondents. Ages of the young and middle-
aged respondents are about uniformly distributed. On the other hand, half the elderly respondents
have an age between 65 and 70. Appazently, some very old respondents have participated in the
survey, too.
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Appendix 3B Example from the questionnaire
A part of the questionnaire is shown to íllustrate how respondents saw the information on their
screens. The question involved was the following: How would you evaluate the situation with
lower contribution rates and lower pension benefits? The (male) respondent was married and
belonged to the young generation.
basic situation sit. with lower contributions
contribution rate 140~0 90~0
own contribution f493 f317
average contribution f300 f193
own public pension f1974 f 1269
public pension for an old person f 1974 f 1269
public pension for a middle-aged person f1974 f1269
own ratio 1.2 1.15
ratio of a middle-aged person 2.4 1.9
ratio of an old person 3.5 2.9
own return on savings f0 f1022
return on savings for a míddle-aged person f0 f 101
own public pension ~- savings f1974 f2291
public pension t savings for a middle-aged person f 1974 f 1370
public pension t savings for an old person f 1974 f 1269
In this example the public pension contribution of the ( male) respondent in the basic situation (BS)
is f493, whereas it is f300 for an average person. The public pension for couples in the basic
situation is f1974. In the hypothetical situation with lower contributions (LC), the contribution rate
is determined to be 9"~0. So, the contribution of the respondent is reduced to f317 and that of an
average ( representative) person to f193. The pension benefit for couples is reduced to f 1269. The
rates of return ( i.e. the ratio of the total of received public pension benefits to the total of pension
contributions paid) decreased owing to the lower pensions. The largest decrease can be observed
for the old as for them only the nominator decreases. For the middle-aged and young both the
nominator and the denominator change. As it was assumed that differences between contributions
in BS and LC would be saved, the respondent in this example saves f176 per month in a savings
account. When retired, the account will pay him f1022 per month, whereas the representative male
middle-aged person will get f 101 per month by saving f 107 per month now. The large difference
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in the return on savings between the young respondent and the average middle-aged individual is
caused by differences in age and income. The total of the public pension benefit plus savings for
the respondent amounts to f2291 (which is higher than the current public pension), against only
f 1370 for the representative middle-aged person. Finally, the representative old person receives
only the public pension benefit for couples in the new situations, which is f1269.
Appendiz 3C The egtended version of Table 3.13
The following table presents the evaluations and the t-statistics on which the analysis in Section
3.5.2 has been based.
Table C.1: Comparisons of the evaluations within generations'~
code all t-statistic old t-statistic middle t-statistic young t-statistic
LC-BS -1.78 -21.72 ss' -1.97 -13.61 "s -1.96 - 14.67 ss' - 1.52 -10.95 sss
HC-BS - 0.51 -6.29 "' -0.95 -5.78 sss 0.06 0.43 -0.67 -5.51 sss
LB-BS -1.96 -37.82 "s -1.79 - 19.04 ss' -2.00 -22.61 's" -2.04 - 23.81 'ss
EB-BS - 0.51 -9.99 "' -0.43 -4.79 sss -0.20 -2.42 " -0.81 -9.32 's'
EB-LB 1.45 22.16 's' 1.37 11.53 srs 1.80 15.85 sss 1.23 11.84 sss
LC-LB 0.10 1.39 -0.42 -2.76 sss 0.03 0.26 0.48 4.32 'ss
LC-EB -1.34 -12.43 "ss -1.61 -8.70 sss -1.71 -9.08 's' -0.90 -5.09 s"
HC-LB 1.52 15.64 's' 1.06 5.83 s's 2.06 12.48 ""s 1.41 9.12 'ss
HC-EB 0.06 0.88 -0.47 -3.30 "' 0.20 1.67 s 0.33 3.02 s r s
1) s indicates that the difference is significant at a 0.10-level, s' at a 0.05-level and s's at a 0.01-level.
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Altruism and Fairness in a Public Pension System'
4.1 Introduction
The previous chapter has already discussed some results of the survey. The focus there
was on the more introductory questions of the questionnaire. Besides a summary of the
answers to those questions, five pension schemes scenarios were described and the
respondents' evaluations of the scenarios were presented and analysed. The analyses in
Chapter 3 were all partial. The first questions about the distinct elements of the public
pension system were actually ceteris paribus questions, e.g., the opinions concerning the
contribution rate and the pension benefits were asked separately. In a sense, the analyses of
the evaluations by means of t-tests were also partial; the effect of personal chazacteristics
was not considered. Furthermore, the impact of social motives was uncleaz and could not
be disentangled from other considerations.
In this chapter, the evaluations aze analysed in another way. In pazticular, a more
integral and systematic approach will be followed here, namely the development and
estimation of a model. By means of this analysis an attempt is made to answer the kinds
of questions mentioned in the introduction. Will the young people be willing to maintain
the PAYG system even though the intergenerational redistributions engendered by the
system will have a negative effect on their lifetime incomes? Wíll the elderly people
consent to decreasing their pension benefit to protect the young generation against the
mentioned negative effect on their lifetime income?
Obviously, also non-monetary considerations are relevant to these questions. Hence,
the roles of solidazity, altruism and fairness in the functioning of a public pension system
aze explored in particulaz.2 How do people evaluate their situation if the structure of the
scheme changes and, as a consequence, the extent of fairness and (required) solidarity
' This chapter is a slightly modified version of Van der Heijden, Nelissen, and Verbon (1995).
' The maintenance of public pension plans might be explained by the existence of altruism among
generations. In particular, younger generations might want to support such plans because the well-being of
the older generations is an argument in their utility functions (see also Chapter 2). As a result, young
individuals will invest part of their income in a PAYG-financed plan, even if alternative investment choices
generate higher rates of return. Altruism is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of
public pension plans. For instance, in motivating public pension plans, Verbon (1986) shows that political
power can be equivalent to altruism. Assuming altruism, Veall (1986) shows that if generations take future
decisions as given, intergenerational transfer systems are less likely than if future decisions are assumed to be
affected by current decisions. In the latter case, the old generation relies for their consumption on the
altruism of the younger generation.
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changes? What is a fair rate of return for various generations? Empirical answers to these
questions can be found by using a model that relaxes the standazd economic assumption of
selfishness. In this chapter such a model, or rather a utility function, is developed and
estimated. Apart from income and background vaziables, the individual's utility function is
assumed to be affected by the income of other generations (altruism) and by the ratio of
pension benefits to contributions (fairness) of both the own generation and other
generations. The statistical model permits testing whether the coefficients of altruism and
fairness are significantly different from zero. In order to assess the quantitative importance
of altruism versus fairness, the sensitivity of utility regazding changes in the measures of
altruism and fairness will be calculated.
The present survey fits in with household surveys such as Kahneman, Knetsch and
Thaler (1986a), Piron and Fernandez (1995), and Frey and Pommerehne (1993), which
were briefly reviewed in Chapter 2. The common element of those surveys and the present
study is that they all focus on notions of fairness under several scenarios. However, the
eazlier studies differ from the present survey in several ways. First, their surveys
considered effects of fairness in a firm-related context, whereas the present survey focuses
on fairness in the public sector.3 Second, in the panel under consideration respondents
were not explicitly asked to give judgements about fairness or altruism. Instead,
respondents evaluated the pension system in its entirety under various scenazios. Possible
feelings of altruism and faimess and their quantitative effects aze indirectly derived by
estimating a statistical model. Except for the one by Piron and Fernandez (1995), the other
papers mainly present qualitative results about fairness considerations.
Furthermore, in the empirical results obtained thus faz, the motive of altruism cannot
easily be sepazated from the motive of fairness. Essentially, the set-up of the present model
permits an independent estimation of both notions. Within the framework of pension
systems, it can thus empirically be verified whether notions of fairness and altruism have
any effect on the individuals' evaluations of the collective pension plan. As said, altruism
is taken into consideration by incorporating the income, or more generally the well-being,
of other individuals in the utility function. Fairness is considered by incorporating the rates
of return on pension contributions in the utility function. The rate of return is given by the
ratio of public pension benefits to public pension contributions. This set-up offers the
opportunity to test whether altruism and fairness have an independent role in shaping the
' Note further that although in these studies only questions about fairness were asked, motivations of
altruism could also play a role.
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evaluation of the public pension system. Altruism and fairness can lead to compazable
effects, but this need not be the case. For example, an increase in the pension benefits of a
generation having low incomes and low rates of return might be supported by other
generations for both altruistic and fairness considerations. If the generation happens to
have a high income, altruism and fairness might point in opposite directions, however.
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. First, Section 4.2 presents the
statistical model. The survey data aze used in Section 4.3 to estimate the model. Section
4.4 presents a summary of the main results and draws some concluding remazks.
4.2 The model
As argued in the previous chapter, it was natural to distinguish three generations in the
questionnaire, namely the young (25-44 years old), the middle-aged (45-64 years) and the
old generation (older than 65 years). In the model that will be estimated, this distinction is
maintained. The specification of the model is as follows. The utility or evaluation function
for an individual belonging to generation k(k-y, m, o) is supposed to be given by the
following logarithmic function:4
1nUk-aó}akYk}ak(YhtY`)} ~ (YBrg t88r8 Z) S,h,i,k-y,m,v, h~i~k (4.1)
s-r,~,o
where Uk denotes the utility of an individual belonging to generation k, Y~ denotes the
discounted lifetime income of the respondent, and YhtY' denotes the sum of the
discounted lifetime incomes of the representative individuals of the other two
generations.s Altruism plays a role if the income of the other generations affects an
individual's utility. Its effect is thus indicated by the pazameter (3k 6 The vaziabler8
" Specification (4.1) is more general than Veall's approach (Veall, 1986). Veall considered a model that
incorporated altruism from the young towards the old generation, whereas in the present model altruism can
be two-sided.
5 Recall that a representative individual is an individual of the same gender and with the same marital
status as the respondent. Representative individuals for the young, the middle-aged and the old generations
are 35, 55, and 70 years old, respectively.
` It follows from the specification that it is implicitly assumed here that the incomes of the other two
generations are weighted similazly. It should be noted that this assumption is not obvious. For instance,
younger people might feel affectionate towards the group of elderly but not towards the middle-aged
generation. However, as we will see in Section 4.3, because of multicollinearity problems the model could
hardly be estimated if the income variables were included separately.
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:
(r8 ) is the actual rate of return of the PAYG system for generation g(squazed). These
terms aze assumed to represent notions of fairness regazding the respondents themselves
and regazding representative members of other generations. It is conjectured that fairness
can be represented by a pazabolic function. The idea is that individuals aze expected to
dislike rates of return for members of other generations that are too high or too low
compazed with an'optimal' rate of return r8~(Ic-~g).'
The model permits testing the expected pazabolic fairness specification as the function
implies that yg should be positive, whereas Sg should be negative. The 'optimal' rate of
return for generation g as perceived by generation k( rg' ) can be calculated from the
estimated parameters as -y8~28g. Note that it is not excluded that feelings towazds one's
own ratio aze different from feelings towazds the ratios of others. For exaznple, altruistic
individuals might consider a relatively low rate of return for themselves as fair. Selfish
people, on the other hand, might believe that their own rate of retum is never too high. In
particulaz, they might regard the rate rk~ as a minimum instead of an optimum. Typically,
this would result in yk~0 and 8k-0.
Some additional remazks have to be made with respect to the specification of the
utility function.8 First, consider the variables Yk and YhtY', which denote lifetime
income of the respondent and the sum of the lifetime incomes of the representative
individuals of the other two generations. As discussed in Chapter 2, utility can be specified
in several ways. In the present context it seems most natural to incorporate consumption.
However, as data on consumption were not available and consumption possibilities can be
approached by income, income is used. So, the present consumption possibilities aze
supposed to be determined by the disposable income, which is defined as gross income
minus taxes and savings.
Furthermore, as the development of a person's income is not measured, the future
income and thus the future consumption of younger individuals is unknown. Here, it is
assumed that future income is affected just by changes in public pension benefits and
contributions. For young respondents it is thus assumed that their before-tax household
income in middle age (ym) is equal to their present household income (yy ).
' More specifically, it seems reasonable to assume that individuals' notions of faimess are determined by
the function (r8 -rá~)Z. By including rg and r8 2 se~a~ately in the regression equations, the 'optimal' rate
of return r8~ (k~g) can be calculated. Implicitly, the rs -part is contained in the constant ao. 1fie parabolic
specification of the fairness function is supported by the data (see Section 4.3).
' Note that the utility function shows some similarities with the OLG model with two-sided altruism
discussed in Section 2.5, equation (2.9). Apart from altruistic arguments, several arguments with regard to
fairness are incorporated in (4.1). These faimess elements are somewhat related to Bolton's (1991) idea.
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Another problem is the respondents' income in old age. In particulaz, in equation (4.1)
individuals' knowledge or uncertainty about their old-age income could play a role.
Typically, retirement incomes consist of a public pension payment supplemented with a
complementazy pension payment from a firm-related pension plan. Based on macro data, it
is known that more than 80"~0 of the employees can reach a pension income that is
approximately equal to 70"~0 of their last earned income. The data reveal, however, that
most respondents (except for the elderly people) have no idea about the size of their own
complementary pension or their partner's (see Table 3.12). As the respondents appeazed to
know little about their future retirement income, it was decided to use only the public
pension benefit as an indication for retirement income of the young and middle-age
respondents. Therefore, the old-age income of young individuals (yo ), which is part of
their lifetime income Yy, is equal to the public pension benefit. The same assumption is
made for the lifetime income of the middle-aged people Ym, which contains their old-age
income (yó). The definition of the lifetime income for a young individual thus reads as
follows:
Yy-lnyy tR-ithymtR-zthyó (4-2)
with R'' a(composed) discount factor over twenty years. Ym and Yo aze defined
analogously.
Finally, it has to be mentioned that some additional variables aze included when the
utility functions (4.1) are estimated. These additional variables aze the three background
characteristics: partner (0-no, 1-yes), gender (0-female, 1-male) and age.
4.3 Empirical results
4.3.1 Estimation results
A basic goal of the survey was to estimate whether altruism and fairness affect people's
utility. To be more specific, I wanted to test whether altruism and fairness play
independent roles in people's opinion about public pension systems. This can be done by
estimating the model specified in the previous section. The values of the variables in the
pension scheme scenarios and the evaluations are used as data. For each individual, four
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observations of the dependent and independent variables were obtained, i.e., in equation
(4.1) four evaluations and four sets of the variables' values aze available per individual.'
To compensate for individual-specific effects, first differences of the vaziables aze
used. To that end, for each variable the difference between the alternative situation and the
basic situation was calculated. This yields the equations to be estimated:
1nUk~-aó~takYk~tpk(Y~~tY'~)t ~ (YgrB `g8r8Z) 8,h,t,k-y,m,o, hsi~k (4.3)
s~r.m.o
where Uk~, Yk~, Yn~, Y`~, rg~ and r82~ aze first differences.'o By this operation, the
interpretation of the altruism and fairness coefficients does not change. One can still
measure whether altruism ((3k~0) and fairness (yk~0, Sk~O) are important in the
individuals' evaluations of the pension scheme scenarios.
Before estimating the coefficients of equation (4.3), two fmal remarks have to be
made. First, in Chapter 3 it was already remazked that the fraction of women and the age
distribution in the sample did not fully agree with the statistics according to the Dutch
Central Bureau of Statistics. These two deviations were taken into consideration by
applying weighted least squazes (WLS) regression with weighting factors for gender and
age. The weighting factors aze close to unity. Second, in fact a system of three
simultaneous equations per individual is obtained, whereby each equation is stated as a
deviation from the basic situation. These simultaneous equations are then aggregated in a
' Notwithstanding the variation in independent variables, several income variables and the rates of return
are plagued by multicollinearity problems. For example, a decline of the contribution rate moves the lifetime
incomes of the middle-aged and old generation into the same direction, which prevents detecting their
independent influence on the evaluation of the pension system. Furthermore, an increase in the pension
benefit, for instance, results in both higher incomes and higher rates of return for the old generation.
Multicollineariry problems are partly circumvented by including the sum of the lifetime incomes of inembers
of the other two generations as one explanatory variable. Because of the framework of pension schemes, it is
not possible to manipulate the lifetime incomes of the generations independently in a sensible and realistic
way. Multicollinearity problems can occur in the Factorial Survey Approach (see Rossi and Nocks, 1982).
'o Taking first differences resolves the following problems. First, one of the assumptions of OLS or WLS
is that the error terms are normally distributed, i.e., e;~N(0,o~). Here the disturbance terms reflect
background characteristics and some common unmeasurable or omitted factors, which aze probably
individual-dependent. As every individual is in fact included four times in the estimations, the above-
mentíoned assumption is presumably violated. The problem disappear~s by using first differences. Background
characteristics aze still assumed to play a role, through the tenns aó in equation (4.3). Second, taking first
differences also diminishes the possible effect of generational differences in the perception of grades. In
other words, the chance that an old person perceives a 7 differently than a young person does (and therefore
gives a 6 or an 8) is larger than the chance that a difference of 2 between two grades is perceived
differently. Third, note that the neglect of the occupational pension benefits hardly affects the results when
the model in first differences is estimated for those benefits aze almost constant across the pension scheme
scenarios.
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system of three similaz equations by assuming that the coefficients in equation (4.3) are
equal in each of the three simultaneous equations. This system can then be replaced by one
equation. Thus, one equation per generation is estimated in which the number of
observations used in the WLS regression is three times the number of respondents within
that generation."
By applying WLS regression, the impact of altruism and fairness on the evaluations of
the public pension system can be derived. For that purpose, different specifications of
equation (4.3) are estimated. Differences between specifications occur by the inclusion or
exclusion of the variables that aze supposed to represent altruism and fairness.
The young generation
Table 4.1 presents for nine variants the estimated coefficients for the young generation.
Obviously, lifetime income of the young respondents themselves (Yy) plays a key role in
the evaluation of the pension system. Its coefficient is significant and positive in all
variants considered. Further, it is rather robust over the specifications; its average value
being 1.38. The introduction of altruism, measured via the incomes of others, and fairness,
measured via the rates of return, improves the explanatory power of the equation. In
particulaz, adding altruism (variant 1) or altruism and the rate of return for the young
themselves (variant 3) doubles or triples the explanatory power. The generation's own
lifetime income gives a lazger contribution to utility than total income of the other
generations. Adding next rates of returns for other generations leads to problems regarding
the statistical significance of the vaziables and their signs (compaze, e.g., vaziant 3 and
variant 5). Incorporating both the fairness terms with respect to the elderly (ró and ró2)
and income of the other generations (YmtYa) results in a negative sign for the latter
variable. This result may be caused by the strong correlation between the rate of return for
the middle-aged generation, the rate of return for the old generation and Ym tYo.
" The assumption of identical coefficients was tested and in most cases it could not be rejected.
Furthermore, I have also estimated the system of three simultaneous equations by applying more advanced
techniques such as seemingly unrelated regression (SUR). As the results are very similar to the WLS results,
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Cleazly, the size and the significance of the variables measuring altruism and fairness
aze affected by the specification. When all rates of return are included (variant 4) fairness
is completely insignificant, which is probably due to multicollinearity problems. The same
problems make it empirically impossible to include all rates of return and the lifetime
incomes of the other generations simultaneously (variant 8). However, the fact that
discriminating between altruism and fairness is difficult also implies that individuals do not
clearly sepazate altruistic feelings from notions of fairness.
If only one rate of return is included in the regression equation, precise estimates for
the fairness vaziables can be obtained. For instance, the parabolic specification for the
individual's own rate of return (y~0, 8~0) is vindicated by variant 3. Analogously, other
variants suggest that subjects have some idea regazding the 'fair' rate of return for other
generations. I will come back to this issue later.
The coefficients of the background chazacteristics are rather robust in all specifications.
The coefficient for the presence of a partner is significantly negative. The presence of a
partner may be an indicator for the presence of children and thus for the size of the
household. This might explain why changes in the system lead to significantly lazger losses
and smaller gains when a partner is present. Age sometimes has a small negative effect.
One reason for this could be that older respondents have fewer opportunities than have
younger individuals to adjust to new situations. Finally, the intercept term is small and it is
most of the time insignificant.
The middle-aged generation
Table 4.2 presents the regression results for the middle-aged generation. What stands out
quite remazkably is the less robust effect of their own lifetime income (Ym). Again,
adding altruism and fairness improves the explanatory power. This is in particular true if
the rates of return of other generations are added; adding altruistic feelings increases the
explanatory power of the equation to a relatively small degree (RZ increases from 0.11 to
0.12; see variants 0 and 1).
Lifetime incomes of the middle-aged interfere with the notion of fairness, in particular
with the rate of return of the elderly (ró and róZ). Appazently, the coefficients of the
notions of fairness regazding one's own and other generations' contribution to the public
pension system cannot be established independently. In particulaz, when fairness with
respect to other generations is introduced, the coefficients of the rates of return of the
middle-aged themselves become statistically insignificant (compare variant 3 with the other
variants).
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In vaziants that do not include the rates of returns of other generations, the respondent's
own ratio affects utility. The parabolic specification for the respondent's own ratio clearly
holds. Analogous conclusions can be drawn regazding the rates of return for other
generations.
Estimating the equation without one's own ratio results on average in a higher
coefficient for one's own lifetime incomeYm.'Z This can be seen as an indication that
(egoistic) feelings about one's own situation influence both the coefficient of one's own
fairness ratio and the coefficient of one's own income; in other words, (egoistic) feelings
aze divided over these two variables.
Multicollinearity problems prevent me from getting precise and significant estimates
for the notions of fairness and altruism of the middle-aged generation. For example, the
income of other generations (Yy tYo) shows an interpretable effect only if the notions of
fairness with respect to the elderly people aze not included. This possibly means that
altruism and notions of faimess towazds the elderly cannot be disentangled. This is
consistent with the findings for the young generation.
Contrazy to what was found for that generation, however, background characteristics
hardly affect the utility of the middle-aged generation. The presence of a partner no longer
has a significant effect. The reason may be that for middle-aged people the presence of a
partner is less indicative for the size of the household since their children have for the
most part left the pazental home. Moreover, older people aze becoming more awaze of
their future (occupational) pension claims and these are generally higher for married
persons.13
The old generation
Table 4.3 shows that for the elderly their own actual income has a positive effect on the
evaluation of the pension system. The estimated coefficients for their own income aze
again robust. Altruistic feelings towazds other generations aze also present among the older
generation but they seem somewhat weaker than among the youngest generations; many
specifications yield estimated altruism coefficients that are not significantly different from
zero.
12 The estimations on which these results are based are not reported here.
" T'his is not due to institutional rules, but it is the consequence of differences in the working career
between married and unmarried persons.
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Introduction of fairness regazding other generations results in a considerably higher
RZ; it increases from 0.06 to at least 0.11. The measured effect of fairness turns out to
depend strongly on the specification. A significant effect for the fairness rates that refer to
the young is always found. The ones referring to the middle-aged are significant only if no
other fairness rates are included. This is caused by the high correlation between the ratios
of the representative middle-aged individual and the other two groups of ratios. The
coefficients of the individual's own rate of return are also hazd to estimate. When
additional elements are included, the estimations turn out to become insignificant.
The estimated coefficients for the background chazacteristics aze rather robust and
significant in almost all variants considered for the elderly generation. Partner and gender
have a significantly positive impact, whereas age has a significantly negative impact. The
presence of a partner thus results in higher evaluatíons of changes in the pension system.
The reason might be twofold. First, couples generally have better (occupational) pension
claims and, second, the basic state pension takes the economies-of-scale effects into
account. The former point also holds for men, which explains the significant result for the
variable gender. As the probability of having an occupational pension is higher the later
one is born, age has a negative significant effect." Finally, the intercept term is again not
significantly different from zero.
4.3.2 Some specific results with respect to altruism and Jairness
Several other results can be derived from the estimated coefficients. For example,
elasticities of altruism and fairness can be obtained, which aze useful to compare the size
of these social motivations. The elasticities of one's own income and of altruism, which
aze directly given by the estimated coefficients, are given in Table 4.4. The table also
displays the elasticities of fairness towards each of the other generations.15
" One might have expected the same effect for the middle-aged persons, but, as we have seen in Table
3.12, future pension claims are unknown to most persons in this group. This could explain why age does not
have a significant effect for the middle-aged generation.
15 When calculating the elasticities of altruism, only those variants are considered in which the rates of
return are not included. This is motivated by the fact that the rates of return have a strong effect on the
altruism variables (because of the multicollinearity).
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Table 4.4 Elasticities of own income, altruism and fairness
young middle-aged old
own income 1.38 1.30 0.58
altruism 0.28 0.25 0.10
0.0020 (middle) 0.0040 (young) 0.0008 (young)
faitness
0.0010 (old) 0.0025 (old) 0.0012 (middle)
From the above we see that for the young generation the elasticity of altruism is 0.28. This
means that the utility of a young individual would on average increase by 0.280~o if the
income of the other generations were to increase by 10~0 (ceteris pazibus). The elasticity of
fairness from the young towards the middle-aged generation is about 0.002 and towazds
the older generation about 0.001. An increase of lo~o in the actual rate of return for the
elderly people thus gives the young individuals on average O.OOIo~o more utility (ceteris
paribus).16 Notice that the elasticities of altruism and 'egoism' aze about equal for the
young and the middle-aged generation, while for the older generation both elasticities are
substantially lower. The ratios of the two elasticities, which might be called the 'degree of
egoism' are 4.9, 5.2 and 5.8, respectively. So, according to this criterion, the old
generation is the most egoistic generation, whereas the youngest generation is most
altruistic.
Finally, the rates of return preferred by each generation aze discussed. Recall that the
desired or 'o~timal' rate of return for generation g as perceived by generation k(r8 f) is
given by - Zák . Table 4.5 presents the optimal rates of return desired by each generation
and the avera~e actual rates of return per generation. Only significant pazameter estimates
are considered for the calculation of the table." The figures between pazentheses denote
the standard deviation of the optimal rate of return and the number of specifications of the
utility function used to calculate this rate.
16 Note, however, that the effects of an increase or a decline in the actual rate of return are not
symmetric. For instance, an increase in the actual rate of return of the elderly brings the value closer to the
rate desired by the young generation (see Table 4.5). This positive effect (elasticity) is smaller than the
negative effect that a decline in the actual rate would generate.
" The results use additional estimates not reported here.
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Table 4.5 Optimal rates of return
91
optimal rates of retum for
perceived by young middle-aged old
young 1.49 (0.16, n-6) 2.57 (0.01, n-2) 4.72 (0.75, n-5)
middle-aged 0.97 (0.03, n-6) 2.67 (0.00, n-2) 5.24 (0.50, n-6)
old 0.93 (0.02, n-4) 2.44 (0.08, n-3) 3.41 (0.32, n-3)
actual rate of retum 1.2 2.4 3.5
The calculations of the optimal rates of return yield robust estimates for all generations.
Clearly, young respondents take the status-quo rates of return as the preferable rates that
should not be amended too drastically (see the first row). It is remazkable that the young
generation would favour a rate of return higher than the present rate for the old generation
(although the latter rate is already fairly high). The optimal rates of return for the middle-
aged generation (second row) suggest that like the youngest individuals, middle-aged
individuals regazd it as fair that the rates of return for the older generations aze higher than
they are for the youngest generations. The elderly respondents prefer the rates of retum for
the middle-aged generation and for their own generation to be very close to the actual
rates (third row).
Overall, the estimates for the optimal rates of return for the youngest generations are
remazkably robust, whereas some more variation exists with respect to the estimates for
the older generation. Finally, the optimal fairness ratio for the youngest generation as
perceived by the middle-aged and older generation is about the same. Both generations
consider a small loss for the younger generation on the investments in the public pension
system as fair.
4.4 Concluding remarks
This chapter has discussed the possible effects of feelings of altruism and fairness on the
evaluation of the public pension system. Usually, it is assumed that the utility of
individuals is determined by their own current and (expected) future income. In addition to
this, it was supposed here that feelings of altruism, expressed by the incomes of inembers
of other generations, and senses of justice or fairness, represented by rates of return of the
PAYG pension system, could influence people's utility.
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The analysis shows that altruism, which in general is not included in empirical studies
in the field of pensions, can have a substantial impact on lifetime utility. This supports
theoretical models in which lifetime consumption or income of other generations is an
azgument of a generation's utility (as in Verbon, 1986 and Veall, 1986). Altruism towazds
other generations is present among all generations but seems to be strongest among the
working population (the young and middle-aged generation). Compared with the effects of
the income of the young and middle-aged generation themselves, the elasticity of altruism
amounts to about 200~0 of the elasticity of one's own income. For the old generation, this
proportion amounts to about 15o~o.'B The elderly thus appear slightly less altruistic.
Fairness determines a generation's utility as well, but its effect is rather small in terms of
elasticities. It is striking that the population of working age considers a relatively high rate
of return for the old generation to be fair.19
It also appeazs difficult to discriminate between altruistic feelings and fairness motives.
This can partly be ascribed to statistical reasons, but it is in part also due to the fact that
individuals themselves make no cleaz distinction between these concepts. Yet, it should be
noted that in studies showing fairness to be a determinant of behaviour (see, e.g.,
Kahneman et al., 1986b, Guth et al., 1982, and Roth, 1995, for results in experimental
settings), no cleaz distinction between altruism and fairness is usually made. In view of the
multicollinearity problems, it is striking that the optimal fairness ratios, as desired by the
vazious generations, have a very robust chazacter.
The sizes of the income coefficients imply that the average non-aged person is willing
to return 1 percent of his or her income if the situation of an aged person then increases
by at least 5.5 percent. In that case, lifetime utility does not decrease. In the current
situation in the Netherlands, a 1 percent increase in the contribution for the old-age state
pension results in an increase in the old-age pension benefit of 6.9 percent. This implies
that the current old-age state pension system is favourable for all generations. This may
explain the point that the system remains acceptable in the Netherlands although it does
not meet the Aaron-condition at the moment.
However, the foregoing also implies that the system will come under pressure when
demographic changes result in a lower rate of return. Given the current demographic
forecast this will occur in about 2015. An increase of the contribution rate by 1 percentage
point will then result in an increase of the pension benefit by less than 5.5 percent. The
1e Recall in this respect that for the old generation both the elasticity of one's own income and that of
altruism are relatively small.
" This may have something to do with the possible status quo bias mentioned previously.
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rather high dependency ratio in the Netherlands (more than 300~0, see Chapter 1) means
that increases in the old generation's income cannot compensate for the decrease in
lifetime income of the young and middle-aged themselves. Thus, the elderly's speculation
on altruism by the young (as in Veall, 1986) is a risky thing to do in the long run.
However, if the elderly claim that a continuation of the PAYG system is 'fair' (as
sometimes done in public discussions in the Netherlands), future elderly might still have a
good chance to find support for the system. At any rate, the dominant one-way transfers
from the young to the old generation in western welfaze states could be a result of this
specific form of intergenerational altruism and fairness considerations.
At the end of this part, I want to relate the results of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. A
compazison of the results shows that the conclusions aze roughly similaz. For example, the
estimation results of this chapter suggest that the current old-age pension system generates
almost maximal utility for all generations, even though the Aaron condition is not met at
the moment. This result is consistent with the finding in Chapter 3 that people favour the
present situation.20
Furthermore, Chapter 4 has shown that all generations are sensitive to non-monetary
considerations such as altrttism and fairness. Especially the young appeaz rather altruistic
towards the older generations. This could in part explain why younger respondents do not
support lower pension benefits. Put differently, although for young individuals scenario LB
is on average more favourable than scenario EB21, feelings of altruism and fairness
towazds other generations might adjust the individual's utility and induce that he or she
prefers EB.
Some differences can also be observed between the results of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.
For example, in this chapter it was derived that the rate of return for the young
generations desired by the other two generations was smaller than unity, i.e. lower than the
current ratio. In Chapter 3, on the other hand, it was found that most middle-aged and old
individuals considered the current ratio for the young reasonable while an important group
thought that it was too low. At least two explanations can be give for this. First, the
interpretation of the expression 'reasonable' may be ambiguous. One does not know the
range people have in mind in this respect. Second, the partial approach of Chapter 3 and
the finding of Chapter 4 that altruism and fairness are hazd to disentangle could bias the
Zo This may seem in contrast with the remark above that a small increase in the contribution rate could
be welfare enhancing. However, note that in the questiotmaire the average increase in the contribution rate
was 4.So~o, and that is too much. So, preferring BS does not contradict what was said before.
Z' If one assumes that utility is fully determined by one's own income.
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results. In other words, in Chapter 3 the rates of return had to be judged alone, whereas in
Chapter 4 the rate was part of a total scenazio, which could change the judgement.
Another difference is that the results of Chapter 3 suggest a higher degree of altruism
among the elderly than the results of Chapter 4. Again, this might be connected to
differences in the approaches. Besides, the appazent preference for the status-quo situation
by the elderly does not necessarily imply a high degree of altruism. For instance, it can
also be related to the fact that the elderly aze quite satisfied with what they have now; a
higher income is not required for their compazatively low consumption needs.
So, overall, the simple analysis in Chapter 3 has roughly led to similaz conclusions as
the more complicated analysis in Chapter 4. Even though this is encouraging, one might
argue that the value of the results is uncleaz. As mentioned previously, a familiaz critical
comment on questionnaires is that one will never find out whether people do what they
answered they would do, that is, whether they have stated their true preferences. This
applies in particulaz to hypothetical questions. But, as azgued in Chapter 2, preferences
concerning pension systems cannot be revealed as most systems aze mandatory. Therefore,
revealed preference methods could not be applied and I had to resort to other methods.
Part I has presented the results of the first method, namely the stated preference method.
Part II is concerned with the second method, economic experiments. One advantage of
experiments is that they overcome the problem mentioned above, as people immediately
face the consequences of their decisions. Another feature of experimental methods is that
they offer the opportunity to control situations, conditions, circumstances or scenazios to a
lazge extent. A disadvantage is, however, that one has to keep the experiment and the
design simple. Therefore, the models and the structures imposed in experiments aze usually
more remote from the situations in daily life. Part II (Chapters 5 and 6) presents the
results of vazious experiments that nevertheless try to mimic several features of pension




Transfers and Reciprocity in an
Overlapping-Generations Experiment'
5.1 Introduction
Part I has analysed data obtained from a large-scale survey. The analyses conducted in that
part provide some valuable insights in the possible role of altrtusm and fairness in the
support for pension systems. Among other things, it was found that apart from altruism,
the support for public pensíon schemes can also be motivated by feelings of fairness. For
example, it turns out that many people believe that older generations should receive a fair
rate of return on the pension contributions paid during their working lives. To gain a better
understanding of these results and of the empirical aspects of intergenerational transfer
systems, several economic experiments were conducted. The results of these laboratory
experiments aze presented in this pazt (Chapters 5 and 6).
The structure of the experimental design consists of a simplified version of a PAYG
pension system. That is, a PAYG pension scheme is represented by a two overlapping-
generations setting in which a young player can make a transfer (pension contribution) to
an old player. This experimental design is the basis for all experiments presented in this
part. Chapter 5 describes the results from the baseline experiment. Chapter 6 is concerned
with several extensions of the baseline experiment. The remainder of this section provides
some background information for the analyses conducted in this chapter and it briefly
discusses the general set-up of the experiments.
As said before, the populaz support for public pension systems does not seem to be
deteriorating dramatically. It is often argued that in this respect the perception by current
generations of the support the system will receive from future generations is a crucial
factor. A problem with the perception of the future support is that there is no guarantee
that today's decisions will not be overturned tomorrow. This temporal credibility problem
implies that decisions taken today must, in some way, be related to decisions to be taken
in the future. In other words, the system must be self-enforcing. Chapters 5 and 6 study
the presence and source of such self-enforcing mechanisms in an experimental
environment.
' This chapter is almost identical to Van der Heijden, Nelissen, Potters and Verbon (1995a).
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In part I, we have already seen that the establishment and the maintenance of public
pension systems may benefit from the existence of altruism and faimess. Another
mechanism that could explain a stable public pension system is the presence of a voluntary
"social contract" between successive generations. Even if generations aze not altruistic
towazds other generations, (implicit) social contracts with positive intergenerational
transfers can be supported as a Nash-equilibrium.Z To support such a contract, at least two
rules should be specified in the contract. First, if the elderly people have followed the
contract, younger people should be obliged to give the elderly people a transfer equal to
some prescribed level. Second, a punishment rule should be formulated in case the elderly
people have broken the social contract. A disadvantage of the social contract approach is
that there aze many alternative social contracts that could lead to a stable pension system.
Which of these contracts will occur depends upon the expectations held by successive
generations and on the way people solve any coordination problems.
A less sophisticated but related explanation is the confidence-building approach.
Successive generations could "build up confidence" in a system by looking at its past
performance. In other words, from the system's history people could derive a chance on
the maintenance of the system. It can be shown that public transfers can converge to
socially efficient levels if the confidence in the system grows when successive generations
keep following the scheme.'
Under both the social contract approach and the confidence-building approach, the
relationship between past and present decisions plays a central role. By monitoring the
behaviour of past decision makers, current decision makers decide whether or not to
support a transfer system. In reality, preferences and decisions are aggregated in a complex
(political) process. Therefore, in empirical data on the development of pension schemes,
disentangling any of the above-mentioned factors will be difficult, if possible at all.
As in many azeas of economics, a more detailed inspection of the determining factors
of the decision-making process is possible in a controlled experimental environment. This
part of the thesis studies individual decisions about transfers in an experimental
overlapping-generations (OLG) setting. In this setting, player (generation) P, decides on a
transfer to player P,.,. Then, player P,,, decides on a transfer to player P~; player P„Z
decides on a transfer to player P,,,, and so on. In addition to the OLG structure, the
features of the experimental design are as follows. First, the design is such that a voluntary
2 See Sjoblom (1985), and Kotlikoff, Persson and Svensson (1988) for related models.
' See Verbon (1987) and Van Dalen and Van Praag (1992) for this approach.
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transfer system is induced to be collectively efficient. Furthermore, intergenerational
transfers allow for the smoothing of consumption over time. Finally, transfers are
individually irrational as the direct private benefits of giving a transfer are negative.4
The central question in this chapter is whether allowing the present generation to
monitor and reciprocate the transfers of the previous generation(s) facilitates the
development and stability of a voluntary system of transfers. Two information treatments
are introduced to answer this question. In one treatment, player-generations are supplied
with information about the transfer levels of previous generations. In the second ( control)
treatment, they aze not supplied with this information. If monitoring and reciprocity across
generations adds to the development and stability of a voluntazy transfer system, this
should show up as a difference between the two treatments.
The study of this chapter is related to experiments concerning the voluntary provision
of public goods. Both in those experiments and in the present experiment, a tension exists
between collective and individual rationality. Recall that the typícal finding in public
goods experiments is that contributions aze cleazly bounded away from the individually
rational level of zero, but fall short of the collectively efficient contribution level.s Public-
good experiments, however, lack the intertemporal structure that is chazacteristic of
decision-making on intergenerational transfers.
The present study is also related to experiments on the role of altruism and reciprocity
in bilateral bazgaining. For example, in gift exchange experiments, the responder's return
on the proposer's gift is often found increasing in the size of the gift (Berg, Dickhaut and
McCabe, 1995, Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl, 1993a and 1993b). Similazly, in ultimatum
bazgaining experiments, the probability that a proposal is accepted by a responder is
increasing in the shaze of the cake the proposer is prepazed to give to the responder (Giith
and Tietz, 1990). Reciprocity can thus be observed in a bilateral relationship if both sides
have some power. Experimental evidence suggests, furthermore, that the latter condition is
not only sufficient but also necessary for gift giving to occur. If the receiving side of
relationship has no power at all, the gift by the proposer decreases drastically. For
example, in Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994), the modal proposal was about
SOo~o of the ~5 cake to a receiving player with veto power but less than l00~o to a receiver
with no reciprocal power (see also Guth and Van Damme, 1994).
" In other words, giving is dominated by not giving from a game-theoretic perspective.
5 See Ledyard (1995) for a review of the literature on public-goods experiments.
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The experimental games studied in this chapter aze, in some sense, in between the
dictator games with no reciprocal power and the ultimatum or gift exchange games with
full reciprocal power. Reciprocity may be anticipated by the sender of a gift, but
reciprocity (if at all) is not supplied by the receiver of the gift but by a third party, namely
the next generation-player. In the next chapter, the development of transfers is investigated
in an experiment with a bilateral matching structure instead of an OLG structure.
Although one of the aims of this chapter is simply to contribute to the literature
concerned with the development and efficiency of 'voluntary social contracts', it will also
be tried to relate the results to possible consequences for real-life situations. Of course, it
is not obvious how the experimental results would carry over to the complex (political)
process that determines intergenerational transfers. Nevertheless, by controlling the
information on the history of transfers, more insight is gained in how the system's history
influences today's decisions. Besides, the analysis may show whether (PAYG) transfer
systems can be established, and if so under what circumstances. The robustness of the
results is explored in Chapter 6.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The next section presents the underlying model and
the two main questions of the baseline experiment. Section 5.3 describes the experimental
design. Results are presented in Section 5.4 and, finally, Section 5.5 contains a concluding
discussion. The instructions of the experiment are annexed in Appendix SA.
5.2 An OLG model with transfers
The model that forms the basis for the experiment is a simple two overlapping-generations
(OLG) model.b Several assumptions aze made in the model. It is assumed that each
generation consists of one player. Furthermore, each player born after period zero lives for
two periods. In the first period (when young), players aze endowed with a fixed
transferable endowment E, for instance wage, and a fixed non-transferable basic
endowment et. When old, players only receive a fixed non-transferable basic endowment
e2. Young players make a transfer T to the old player, OSTSE. The remaining part of the
6 Here, a model with two generations instead of with three generations is used. Incorporating a third
generation would result in a more complex model and a quite complicated design, but it would not add much
to the conclusions compared with an experiment based on a model with two generations. See further Chapter
7.
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endowment is used for consumption. Therefore, first-period consumption C„ of player P, is
given by:
Ctt-E-Trtet (5.1)
Second-period consumption Cu of player P, is given by:
C~-T~.t }Ez (5.2)
where T„i is the transfer player P, receives from player P~„ in the second period of his
life. Total utility U, of player P„ t?1, is given by the following utility or pay-off
function:'
U~-C1t xC~-(E-Tr}et)(TJ,ttEZ) (5.3)
The form of the pay-off function reflects the fact that consumption in both the first and
the second period matter. The multiplicative form, in addition, implies that it is optimal to
smooth consumption over both periods.
In the model there exists a tension between individual rationality and collective
rationality or Pareto efficiency. The socially efficient stationary optimum, T', of the model
can be calculated to be8
T~-T'-0.5(Etet-ez), tIt (5.4)
Can this socially efficient outcome be established without commitment and without the
help of a social planner? Or, indeed, can any positive transfer level be sustained in this
setting? Of course, this will depend on the motivations and expectations of the players.
In this chapter, it is examined whether the possibility of monitoring previous
generations facilitates the realisation of collectively desirable positive transfer levels. To
that purpose two information treatments were employed in the experiment: treatment OI
(information) and treatment ON (no information). In treatment OI, each player-generation
P, was provided with information about the transfers of previous generations (T,,...,T,.~) in
the sequence. In (control) treatment ON, on the other hand, players were not provided with
this information. The two main questions of this chapter can now be formulated:
' First-period consumption C,o of player Po is assumed to be equal to the basic endowment, i.e., C,óei.
So, utiliry of the very first player Po is given by UóC,oxC20 el x(T,te ).
' Theoretically, a strategy in which players transfer altematingly ~1 and 7 results in higher total utility.
However, this altemating scheme leads to a very unequal distribution of pay-offs within a round, and
presumably to an unequal distribution of total eamings. This strategy may not be possible without the help of
a social planner. In the following I will, therefore, refer to eq. (5.4) as the socially efficient stationary
optimum or, simply, the socially efficient outcome.
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Q1. Does the possibility of monitoring the transfer levels of previous generations
facilitate the occurrence of positive transfers?
Q2. Does a systematic relation exist between the transfer level of the present generation
and that of the next generation(s) in information treatment OI?
The two questions aze, of course, interrelated. An affirmative answer to question Q1
requires an affirmative answer to question Q2 almost by necessity. If monitoring simplifies
the occurrence of positive transfers, then this facilitating role should come about through
some form of reciprocity. That is, some (positive) relation between present and future
transfers must exist. Several relationshíps are possible. After having described the
maximising problem more formally, three possible specifications aze briefly discussed.9
The more formal chazacterisation of the problem faced by a(non-altruistic) player t
who maximises expected utility reads:
OsT~sE
(E}et-Ti)(EZtTr~t) (5.5)
where T;,~ is player P,'s expectation about the next player's transfer. It is easily seen that
from a theoretical perspective a necessary condition for a positive transfer to be the
outcome of this maximisation problem is: BT;,,IaT, ~ 0. In other words, a positive
relationship between present and (expected) future transfers might result in positive present
transfers. For example, if 'strict reciprocity' is anticipated, i.e. 7;,,-T„ the individually
rational level of transfers is equal to the socially optimal level of transfers: T,-T '-
'~z(Ef E ~ - e2 ).
A more general specification, suggested by Van Dalen and Van Praag (1992), is the
following:
Tr`,t - Tr}a(Tr-Tr-t)~ 0'-1
(5.6)
where a denotes the degree of confidence or the support expected from the next
generation. Equation (5.6) states that the cunent generation expects to be rewazded for its
' Van der Heijden (1996) discusses several equilibria concepts for the OLG game in more detail. The
analysis includes sequential equilibria.
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own transfer and to receive an additional premium for increasing the transfer level above
the level provided by the previous generation.'o
Finally, a specification is considered that is more in line with the social contract
approach, mentioned in the introduction. In pazticular, a more strategically motivated fonn
of reciprocity is regarded. Strictly speaking, in a finite OLG game (that is, t is finite) the
only Nash equilibrium is that each player transfers T,-O. As we will see below, the present
experimental OLG game is finite. However, in finitely repeated games, experimental
subjects aze sometimes seen to learn to employ 'trigger-like' strategies to support outcomes
that aze non-Nash in the stage game (see, e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986, Camerer and
Weigelt, 1988). Similazly, if such trigger strategies aze (leatned to be) employed and
anticipated in the present finite OLG game, they might lead to positive transfer levels.
Consider the following special form of a social contract:
T,,, -
T ' if T~ -T, (c)
0 fT T( )i ~~ ~ c
(5.7)
where
T ~ f T~-i -T~-i (c)T,(c) -
0 if T,-,~T,-~ (c)
(5.8)
T,(c) denotes the transfer at time t specified in the social contract c. Obviously, generations
aze punished for not giving the socially efficient transfer level T' unless the deviation
from T' was to punish the previous deviating generation. In other words, deviators and
non-punishers aze punished, but punishers are not. Cleazly, if such a strategy is anticipated,
following the implicit contract is optimal (for all but the last generation). Of course, the
backwazd-induction unravelling azgument implies that this is not an equilibrium strategy.
Yet, as mentioned, experimental subjects aze sometimes observed to learn to employ such
strategies in finitely repeated games.
Of course, other more general or more complex forms of reciprocity aze conceivable
(Sjoblom, 1985). Nevertheless, the main point remains: if monitoring helps to ease the
'o A problem with this specification is that, in general, it is not consistent with expected pay-off
maximisation. It is easily checked that maximisation of (5.5) subject to (5.6) leads to a solution for T, that is
usually inconsistent with the hypothesised relation in (5.6). In other words, if players' expectations about the
transfers of others are based on (5.6), their own transfers will not be in line with (5.6) under expected pay-
off maximisation.
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development and continuance of positive intergenerational transfers, this must come about
through some form of intergenerational reciprocity. Furthermore, if monitoring and
reciprocity across generations adds to the development of voluntary transfers, a difference
between the two information treatments should show up in a comparison of the two
information treatments. I will therefore look for several types of reciprocal behaviour in
the data.
Before turning to the experimental design, three other remazks must be made. First, as
azgued above, an affirmative answer to Q 1 seems to require an affirmative answer to Q2.
The reverse, however, need not hold. Even if a systematic positive relation between
present and future transfers were found, the average level of transfers might still be lower
in treatment OI than in treatment ON. The reason for this is that low transfers in period t
will be followed by low transfers in period ttl (and tf2, tf3, etc.) in case of a positive
relation between T, and T„~. Therefore, if in the initial period or in some later period a
low level of transfers is observed, a low level of transfers after that period might be
obtained. Such a reciprocal chain of low transfers can occur in information treatment OI
but not in information treatment ON. However, if an affirmative answer to Q2 and a
negative answer to Q1 is observed, one would at least expect the (low) level of transfers in
treatment OI to be more "stable" than in treatment ON. Therefore, in discussing the
results, not only the average levels of transfers across the two treatments will be compazed
but also the variability of the transfers.
Second, enabling the subjects to learn and understand the structure of the OLG game
seems important. In the basic design several repetitions (15) of an OLG game v~ith a
restricted sequence of generations (8) and no 'reincarnation' (as Cadsby and Frank, 1990)
were run, rather than one OLG game v~ith a long sequence of (say, 120) generations and
reincaznation (as Marimon and Sunder, 1993). Consequently, the backward-induction
azgument of unravelling might apply to the design. The last generation in each OLG gazne
might leazn or realise that reneging is profitable. Owing to backwazd unravelling, a decline
of transfers within each OLG game might then result, and such a decline might become
stronger with more experience. Section 5.4 will investigate whether such a pattern is
visible in the data.
Finally, any design that allows for the possibility of learning or getting experience,
simultaneously allows for the possibility that reputational considerations enter the picture.
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Usually, there is little hope of disentangling these two effects." I will not pay too much
attention to this issue since the main purpose of this chapter is not to study leazning
behaviour but to study the effect of monitoring and reciprocity by compazing the results of
treatments OI and ON.
5.3 Design
Eleven experimental sessions, based on the model described above, were run in January
1995. Five sessions employed information treatment ON (no information) and six sessions
employed information treatment OI (information). Subjects were students recruited from
Tilburg University. They were promised that the experiment would last for about an hour
and that they would earn anywhere between 7 and 50 Dutch Guilders (i.e. between ~ 4 and
~ 29). No subject participated more than once, and most of them had no experience with
economic experiments. Eight subjects participated in a session.
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated behind computer terminals, which were
sepazated by paztitions. Instructions were distributed and read aloud (see Appendix SA).
After that, subjects were given several minutes to study the instructions more carefully and
to ask questions. Then the experiment was run. Upon completion, subjects were asked to
fill out an anonymous questionnaire about some background information (gender, age,
major, motivation). Finally, subjects were privately paid their earnings in cash.
The following pazameters were used in each session (see the model in the previous
section): E-7, et-2 and e2-1. Each session included 15 rounds and one practice round.
Each round consisted of a sequence of eight periods (0-7). Period 0 was an auxiliary
period in which the first 'old' player was randomly selected from the eight participants. As
no decisions were made in period 0, it will not enter the analysis. In each subsequetrt
period (1-7), one of the remaining subjects was randomly selected to be the young player
in that period.12 The young player had to type a number T from the set {0,1,...,7}, which
conveyed his transfer to the old player. First-period consumption of the young player then
" Some clues about the relative effects of experience and reputation might be discernible in the data,
however. For example, leaming curves are typically steep in the beginning and become flatter with more
experience. Effects of learning would then be strongest in the early rounds of the experiment. Effects of
reputation, on the other hand, would reveal themselves most strongly in the last rounds of the experiment, as
subjects would then be observed to 'cash in' on their reputation.
'j Of course, terms like 'young' and 'old' generation were not used in the experiment, but players were
called Decider and Receiver respectively.
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was C~-9-T. Second-period consumption of the old player was C21fT. The old player
was informed about the transfer received and her pay-off (in points) in the round: U- C~
x CZ. The young player became old in the next period and a new young player, chosen
randomly from the remaining players, had to make a transfer. This procedure was repeated
until period 7. Then all players had participated in the round, and a new round was started.
After the last round, the points eazned in the 15 rounds were added and converted into
money at a rate of 1 point - 5 cents. In addition, each player received a lump sum
participation payment of f5. All aspects of the procedure were common knowledge.
The two information treatments differ as follows. In treatment ON (no information), a
Decider was only informed about the period number t E(1,..,7). In treatment OI (with
information), a Decider was also informed about the transfer decisions of the previous
players in the round (T,,..,T,.,). When players left the round, in both treatments they were
informed about the transfer they received and their pay-off ( in points) for the round.
Some additional remazks have to be made with respect to the procedure. First, note
that the player who was selected to be old in period 0 of a round did not play the role of
the young generation in that round. Her first-period consumption (when young) was fixed
at C,-2 (- e~). Similazly, the player who was selected to be young in the last (7w) period
of a round did not play the role of the old generation in that round. His second-period
consumption was given by CZ 1 f T~, where T~ is the average transfer received by all
previous old players in the round (rounded up). Second, to simplify the computation of the
pay-offs, subjects could use a pay-off table, which was included in the instructions. Third,
in each period 1-6, players were also asked to type their expectation ( 0,..,7) regazding the
transfer to be received in the next period. As subjects were not paid to make (accurate)
predictions, I do not intend to use these predictions extensively in the analysis. Finally, as
mentioned earlier, the complexity of the OLG game requires the possibility of
familiazisation and learning by the subjects. In the sparse literature on OLG experiments,
basically two designs can be distinguished. Lim, Prescott and Sunder (1994), and Marimon
and Sunder ( 1993) used a design that consisted of one single, long OLG game in which
subjects entered several times. Here, one could speak of a'single OLG game with
reincarnation'. Cadsby and Frank (1990) used a design that consisted of a repetition of
shorter OLG games, where in each game subjects entered only once. One could, therefore,
speak of 'repeated OLG games without reincarnation'. The advantage of the former design
is that an OLG sequence has to be started and stopped only once. However, with one long
OLG game, the effects of monitoring across periods, which is the prime interest here, and
learning over time become intertwined. Discerning the two effects might be served by
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sepazating the development of transfers over periods (monitoring) from the development
over repetitions (learning). Therefore, I have opted for a repeated OLG game without
reincarnation in the basic design." To examine the robustness of the results, however, a
series of five experimental sessions with one long OLG game with reincarnation was also
run (see Chapter 6).
5.4 Results
First, the results regarding the level, development and stability of the transfers for both
treatments will be presented (Q1). Then the relationship between present transfers and
previous transfers (Q2) will be examined in more detail. Finally, results regarding end-
effects, experience and idíosyncrasy will be discussed.
5.4.1 Development and variabi[ity of transjer levels
Recall that there are five (six) sessions with treatment ON (OI), and that each session
comprises fifteen repetitions of an OLG game consisting of eight periods-generations with
seven transfer decisions. The overall average transfer, that is, averaged over sessions,
rounds and periods (1-7), is 1.90 in treatment ON (no information) and 1.83 in treatment
OI (information). So, at the aggregate level, hazdly any difference between the information
treatments is visible. In fact, the transfer level is somewhat lower in treatment OI, but the
difference is not significant (p-0.93, with a two-tailed non-pazametric Mann-Whitney U
test with session averages as observations, noN5, no~6).
The average level of transfers of about 2 might seem low compared with the socially
efficient stationary level of T'-4, but for the pay-offs the level of efficiency is quite high.
A stationary level of transfers of T'-4 leads to a pay-off (in periods 1-7) of 25 points. A
level of transfers of T-0 leads to a pay-off of 9 points. The actual overall average pay-off
(in periods 1-7) is 20.5 in treatment ON and 20 in treatment OI. So, a stationary transfer
level of T' leads to an efficiency gain of 16 (-25-9) points, of which about 11 (-20-9)
" Two differences with the design of Cadsby and Frank aze (i) that in the present experimental setting
eight, instead of two, generations participated in each round of the OLG game, and (ii) that the order in
which the subjects participated in each round was random in the design under consideration but fixed in
Cadsby and Frank's.
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were actually realised in the experiment. In other words, the voluntary transfers observed
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Figure 5.1: Average transfer per round per treatment
Figure 5.1 presents the level of transfers for each round of the OLG game (averaged
over periods and sessions). The development of the average level of transfers over the
rounds hardly differs between the two treatments. For both treatments, the average
transfers seem to decrease in the eazly rounds (1-3), remain almost constant during the
middle rounds (4-12), and decrease again in the final rounds (13-15). The average transfer
levels in these three subsets of rounds are 2.29, 1.96, and 1.32 for treatment ON, and 2.15,
1.90, 1.29 for treatment OI. The decline over time is statistically significant. That is, the
average transfers in rounds 1-3 differ significantly from those in rounds 4-12, which, in
turn, differ significantly from those in rounds 13-15 (non-parametric Wilcoxon matched-
pairs signed-rank tests with session averages as observations). Differences between the two
treatments are not significant in any subset of rounds.
Figure 5.2 presents a histogram of the distribution of the transfers in both treatments.
In both treatments, the modal transfer is zero and transfers of one to four each occur at a
rate of about 0.15. Transfers lazger than four aze raze. Although there aze some differences
between the two treatments, the distributions are very similaz.













Figure 5.2: Histogram of the transfers in treatments ON and OI
Finally, the stability of the voluntary transfer system is considered. As azgued in
Section 5.2, the possibility of monitoring previous generations might affect the stability of
the transfers at a high or at a low level. If the eazly generations start with a low (high)
level of transfers in treatment OI, then this low (high) level might be followed by
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Figure 5.3: Average coefficient of variation per round
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Figure 5.3 presents the coefficients of variation of the transfers per round, averaged over
the sessions in each treatment. No systematic difference in the variability between the two
treatments is found. The weak increase of variability over the rounds is due to the (weak)
decline in the transfer levels and an almost constant standazd deviation over the rounds.I n
summary, no difference in the level, development, distribution or stability of transfers
between the two information treatments is detectable in the data. The answer to question
Q1, whether or not information simplifies the occurrence of positive transfers, is cleazly
negative. Nevertheless, the average transfer level of about SOo~o of the collectively efficient
level and the average level of efficiency for the pay-offs of about 700~o aze fairly high.
Even in later rounds, the average transfer is cleazly bounded away from zero.
5.4.2 A close look at reciprocity
The results of the previous section suggest that no strong indications of reciprocity across
generations should be found. The present section confirms this suggestion.
For treatment OI, Figure 5.4 displays the average levels of T, as a functíon of the
transfer of the previous generation T,.~, t?2. As values of T,.~ lazger than four aze raze,
these transfers aze pooled with transfers of four. The results are displayed sepazately for
rounds 1-5 and rounds 11-15 in order to control for the decline of the average transfer
level over the rounds. This sepazation also enables one to see how reciprocity develops
over the rounds. Figure 5.4 suggests a weak positive relation between the transfers of the
previous and the present generation. The average transfer level after T,-~-4t is about SOo~o
higher than the transfer level after T,.,-O. However, the difference is insignificant at
p-0.17 for rounds 1-5 and at p-0.14 for rounds 11-15 (two-tailed Wilcoxon matched-pairs
signed-rank test with the (6) session averages as observations). In addition, no monotonic
positive relation between T,.1 and T, is observed. For example, the average transfer after
T,-,-2 is lower than after T,-~-1 in both subsets of rounds.
A compazison of reciprocity in the early rounds (1-5) and in later rounds (11-15)
does not reveal a systematic difference (also, the relationship for rounds 6-10 is similaz).
Although, as already observed above, the average level of transfers decreases over the
rounds, the weak positive relation between T, and T,., observed in rounds 1-5 becomes
neither stronger nor weaker in rounds 11-15. So, there aze weak signs of reciprocity, but
the effect is not strongly 'intrinsic' (it is weak in the early rounds), nor is it 'learned'
during the experiment (it remains weak in the final rounds).






Figure 5.4: Transfer conditioned on the previous transfer in the same round
(treatment O)7
One might azgue that a monotonic relationship between T,-~ and T, is not what one
should be looking for. If subjects are mainly strategically motivated, one should expect to
observe 'trigger-like strategies'. As azgued in Section 5.2, trigger strategies imply that
present transfers are conditioned on the transfers of all previous generations. No version of
trigger-like strategies is visible in the data, however. Consider, for example, the following
punishment rule (cf. equation (5.7)). If player P, observes a transfer of T,.,-O, then he
should not punish the previous player if T,-Z~T,.1(c), but he should punish her if T,.1?Tt-2(c),
where Tt-1(c) is defined by eq. (5.8). Therefore, the average value of T, after T,-~ 0 and
Tt-1~T,.1(c) is compazed with the average value of T, after T,.,-O and T,.~?T,Z(c). Under
trigger strategies, one should at least expect that, on average, the former value is larger
than the latter value. However, for each T' E{ 1, 2, 3,4} the average transfer in case there
should be a punishment is not distinguishable from the transfer in case there should be no
punishment.
I also looked for more 'loose' versions of a relationship between present transfers and
transfers of the previous two generations. Again, no strong relationships aze detectable at
the aggregate level or in the individual data. A version that gives some positive result is
the following (cf. equation (5.6)). On average, transfer levels T, aze lower in case the
previous player has decreased the transfer level (T,.~~T,.1), than in case she has not
decreased the transfer level (Tr.1?T,.2). The average transfer in the former case (1.68) is
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significantly lower than the average transfer in the latter case (1.81). The effect, though
significant, is relatively weak and shows no strong development over time.
In summary, as could be expected in view of the negative answer to question Q1 in
the previous section, only a moderate relation between present and previous transfers is
found in the data of treatment OI. Moreover, this relation seems to become neither
stronger nor weaker with more experience. ~'
5.4.3 End effects, experience and idiosyncrasy
As azgued before, besides the transfers of previous generations in the round, several other
factors may affect the level of transfers and its development over time. This subsection
briefly analyses end effects, experience, and individual idiosyncrasy.
First, the design consists of a repetition of finite OLG games. Subjects who entered an
OLG game in the last period knew that they were last in the sequence of that round.
Hence, backwazd-induction reasoning might induce them to renege on any positive transfer
level implicitly established by previous generations. Because of the backwazd induction
unravelling argument, one might expect to observe a gradual decline of the transfer level
over the periods in each round of the OLG game.
A weak final period end effect is indeed visible in the data. For both treatments,
Figure 5.5 displays the level of transfers for each period of the OLG game (averaged over
rounds). The average transfer level in period 7 is somewhat smaller than the average level
over periods 1-6. When considering both treatments together, the difference is mazginally
significant (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank tests, p~0.10), but it is not significant
when each treatment is taken sepazately. Furthermore, no monotonic development over the
periods of the OLG game exists. On average, eazlier and later generations in the OLG
game transfer about the same amount of their endowment. This holds both when players
" Subjects' expectations about the transfer level of the next generation were also asked for in the
experiment. Two relationships may be interesting in this respect. First, the relationship between one's own
transfer and the expected transfer (as a measure for 'anticipated reciprocity'), and, second, the relationship
between the expected transfer and the actually received transfer ( as a measure for the accuracy of the
expectation). Overall, it turns out that the fvst (cor)relation is stronger for treatment ON (.57) than for
treatment OI (.41). Reciprocity is thus anticipated more strongly if, by construction, it cannot be provided.
What is perhaps more interesting, is that this (cor)relation displays no systematic development over the
rounds, that is, it becomes neither stronger nor weaker. The second relationship is very weak ( a correlation
coefficient of about . lo) in both treatments. Therefore, subjects seem to be bad predictors. Again, the
correlation shows no systematic development over the rounds. Because subjects were not rewarded for
making (accurate) predictions, I do not wish to put much weight on these results.
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are in the beginning of the experiment and when players are more experienced in later
rounds.
transfer








Second, it is to be expected that subjects adapt their behaviour in response to their
experience in the previous round(s) of the experiment. A representative picture of the size
of the experience effect is given in Figure 5.6, which combines both treatments. Average
transfers in round R(-2,...,15) are related to the transfer received in the previous round
(R-1). The figure shows that, on average, subjects tend to give a somewhat higher transfer
if they were 'treated well' in the previous round. The gradual decline of the transfer level
over rounds is taken into account by displaying the effect sepazately for eazly (2-5) and
later rounds (11-15). This sepazation shows that the effect is not substantially different in
eazlier or later rounds. A weak positive relationship can be observed in both treatments,
but it becomes neither stronger nor weaker over time.15
15 Comparing the average transfer after having received 0 in the previous round with the average transfer
after having received 4 gives no significant difference for rounds 2-5 or rounds 11-IS when the two
treatments are considered together (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-rank test with I I observations). Taking
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Figure 5.6: Average transfer as a function of the transfer received in the previous
round (both treatments)
Until now the attention was mainly focused on aggregated data. A look at the
individual data, however, reveals that some 28 subjects followed an almost constant
strategy. That is, with at most three exceptions they chose the same transfer level (0, 1, 2,
3 or 4) in each round.1ó The presence of these 'obstinate' players could blur the
(quantitative) effects of reciprocity, end-effects or learning. Therefore, all previous
analyses were repeated for the subset of 60(-88-28) players with a non-constant strategy.
The overall conclusions, however, hazdly change. Some of the above effects become
quantitatively stronger, but the differences with the full-group analysis aze surprisingly
small.
Finally, it seems useful to have some overall picture of the relative effects of the
vazious factors analysed sepazately above. The simplest way to give such a picture is to
regress transfer levels on these factors. In particulaz, OLS-regressions of the following
behavioural equation were run:"
TR-a }a Rta TR ta (TR -TR~}a tta RR-t }a TR-t t
(5.9)
e 0 1 2 r 1 3 r 1 t 4 S 6 ~
16 These 28 subjects are spread almost evenly over the two treatments. Twelve of them chose a zero
transfer in each round (with at most three exceptions).
" Implicitly, the regression assumes that observations are independent. This is not the case, strictly
speaking. Regressions using individual decisions are rather common in experimental research, though,
particularly for 'illustrative' purposes.
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Equation (5.9) reads as follows. A subject's transfer T~R in period t(- 1,..,7) is supposed
to depend on a constant (ao), the round number (R), the transfer of the previous generation
in the round ( T~RI ), the difference between the transfers of the previous two generations in
the round ( T~RI - T~2), the period number (t), the transfer received in the previous round
(RR~~), the transfer given in the previous round (7~'~) and an error term ( t) ). In sequence,
these aze the factors analysed separately above.
Table 5.1: Regression results of the behavioural equations for ON and OI
treatment ON treatment OI
value p-value value p-value
a~ 0.92 ~ 0.01 1.17 ~ 0.00-- ------- --------~--------- --------i----------
R -0 01 ~ 0.47 -0.01 ~ 0.68-------- - ---~--------- --------~---------
TE ~ f 0.15 f 0.02- ----- -------- --------- --- ----
Tt~-T~~ ~ -0.06 ~ 0.19--------t--------- --------t---------
t -------- -0-05- ~ 0.32---~--------- -0.09 ~ 0.09---------~---------
RR-' 0.20 ~ 0.00 0.03 ~ 0.58- -------- --------~--------- --------~---------
TR-' 0.48 ~ 0.00 0.38 ~ 0.00
~ obs. 350 420
RZ 0.30 0.17
Table 5.1 presents the regression results, for each treatment separately. The exogenous
variables aze stated in the first column. Parameter estimates and their corresponding
significance probabilities aze given in the next two columns. The number of observations
used and the adjusted RZ statistics (RZ) aze given in the last two rows, respectively.'a In
treatment ON, T~Rt and T~RI-T~2 are not included, as information about these transfers
was not available to the subjects. The possibility of monitoring appears to influence the
decision-making process and to result in some reciprocity; with information, the coefficient
of TrRI has a significantly positive effect, although its quantitative effect is small. On the
other hand, no indication is found for the existence of the confidence pazameter suggested
by Van Dalen and Van Praag (1992); the estimated coefficient for the variable T~RI-T~RZ is
insignificant. In treatment ON, probably owing to the lack of information, decisions are
1e Because of the regression specification, only data of periods 3 to 7 of rounds 2 to 15 can be used.
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mainly based on the transfer received in the previous round (RR-') and the transfer given in
the previous round (7~-~). The latter result hints at some presence of personal inertia or
idiosyncrasy. The vaziable (7~'~) has a significant effect in treatment OI too, whereas the
vaziable (RR-~) has no effect at all.
Concluding, the regression results show some impact of monitoring and some presence
of reciprocity. However, in line with the findings in the foregoing analysis, the effect
seems small.19 As noted before, in the experiment a trade-off exists between the
collective efficiency of a transfer scheme and the individual temptation to defect on such a
scheme. The regression results suggest that, on average, subjects seem to balance the trade-
off somewhere 'halfway', with marginal adjustments in response to personal experience.Zo
5.5 Concluding remarks
The last section of this chapter merely presents the general conclusions and some policy
implications. Further comments, more detailed implications and the link with the results of
part I will be discussed in Chapter 7.
Just like the previous chapter, this chapter was also lazgely inspired by the observation
that in spite of the financial strain, the support for public pension systems does not seem
to decrease strongly. This observation raised the question of the basic motivation and the
driving force behind the establishment and maintenance of intergenerational transfer
systems. Theoretical explanations have suggested that there is a strong positive link
between the decisions of past, present and future generations. The incentive of the present
generation to renege can be mitigated by the possibility of the next generation to monitor
and reciprocate. The experiments presented here have provided (empirical) insight in these
issues.
The experimental results show that voluntary transfer levels fall short of the
collectively efficient levels, but also that they aze cleazly bounded away from zero. More
important, the level and stability of the transfer system aze not furthered by the possibility
of monitoring transfers of past generations. Furthermore, only weak signs of reciprocity or
19 Although the regression results are good, one should keep in mind that from a statistical point of view
OLS regression is in fact not permitted. Therefore, I will not overemphasize these results.
Zo It could be that the average transfer of about two is obtained because subjects look upon the basic
first-period endowment of two as a focal point. The effects of possible focal points cannot be investigated
here as all experiments employed the same endowment and pay-off structure.
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trigger-like strategies are observable. It seems that the interdependence in the underlying
OLG structure creates a kind of social cohesion in the experiments, which is independent
of the possibílity of monitoring. Nevertheless, subjects appear responsive to the trade-off
between the collective efficiency of a transfer scheme and the individual temptation to
defect on such a scheme. On average, subjects seem to balance the trade-off somewhere
about 'halfway', with marginal adjustments in response to personal experience.
It is interesting to relate these results to the typical results of both bazgaining
experiments and public-goods experiments. Although public-goods experiments lack the
intertemporal structure that chazacterises OLG experiments, there also the typical result is
that subjects balance the trade-off between individual and collective rationality somewhere
about halfway. With repetition and experience, contribution rates fall, but usually they stay
cleazly bounded away from zero. In bargaining experiments, a general finding is that the
power of the receiving side is a prime determinant of the 'generosity' of the proposing
side. In bilateral relationships, the possibility of monitoring and reciprocating is an
important check on the power of the proposer. The results obtained in this chapter, on the
other hand, do not show a strong impact of the possibility of monitoring and reciprocating.
Therefore, in the OLG experiment the public-good feature may be more important than the
intertemporal bargaining features.
Although the experimental results show a weak positive link between present and past
decisions, the aggregate support for the transfer system does not seem to depend strongly
on this link. On average, individuals appeaz to have a generic willingness to support
transfers to powerless individuals. This willingness is almost irrespective of past behaviour
of these recipients. Notions like reciprocity, rewarding and punishment hardly play a role.
As a result, the insurance element in the transfer system seems less important than the
(collective) public-good element. This might be relevant given the fact that in actual public
pension plans the intertemporal relationship between present private costs and future
private benefits is becoming increasingly unfavourable. However, if the experimental
results have some 'external validity', shrinking support for these plans in European
countries is not a necessary consequence. The reason may be that in these countries the
emphasis is often being placed on solidarity and the public-good aspect of pay-as-you-go-
financed public pension schemes. In the US, on the other hand, the investment chazacter of
public pension contributions is stressed, as witnessed, for instance, by the existence of a
trust fund for financing the US public pension system. If this implies that the public-good
element is of minor importance in the US-scheme, it could suggest that the inclination to
support old individuals through the public pension plan may be declining in the US. In
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that case, the European schemes have a better chance of surviving the current demographic
transition than the US-scheme has.
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Appendix SA: Instructions of the baseline experiment
Introduction (read aloud only)Z'
You aze about to participate in an experimental study of decision-making. The experiment will last
for about one hour. The instructions of the experiment are simple and if you follow them carefully
and make good decisions you may eatn a considerable amount of money. All the money you earn
will be yours to keep and will be paid to you, privately and confidentially, in cash right after the
end of the experiment
{For the experiment it is of crucial importance to have 8 participants. However, experience shows
that often 1 or 2 persons do not show up or do not show up in time. Therefore, we need to have
]0 instead of 8 subscriptions. This sometimes has, as now, the consequence that too many
participants are present and that 1 or 2 persons cannot participate in this experiment. These persons
can still put their name down for one of the following experiments and receive f 10 for any
inconvenience. T1tese persons are determined by lot because one or two blank envelopes are added
to the box with seating numbets, unless one of you checks in voluntarily not to participate in the
experiment and receive f 10 instead.}
Before we go on with the instructions, I would like to ask all of you to draw an envelope from
this box and open it. The number denotes the terminal you have to be seated. {If you draw a blank
envelope you cannot participate in the experiment and you receive f 10.}
We will distribute the instructions of the experiment now and read through them together.
After that, you will have the opportunity to ask questions. From now on, you are requested not to
talk to, or communicate with, any other participant.
Instructions (distributed and read aloud)
Decisions and earnings
The experiment exists of fifteen separate rounds. In every round, each of you will earn a certain
amount of points. At the end of the experiment the points earned in the I S rounds are added up for
each participant separately. Every point eamed is worth 5 cents (x~ 0.028) at the end of the
experiment. In addition to this, all participants receive a fixed extra amount of f 5. Your total
earnings will thus be equal to f 5 plus the number of points earned times 5 cent. Now, we describe
how the points earned in each round will be determined.
Each round will consist of seven periods. In every period two participants aze involved, a so-
called Decider and a Receiver. In each round of seven periods, every participant will, in principle,
once have the role of Decider and once the role of Receiver. The eatnings of a participant in a
round are determined by the final assets of a participant in the period in which he or she is a
Decider, and by the final assets of the participant in the period in which he or she is a Receiver.
~' The text between brackets ( {}) was added when more than 8 participants showed up. The text between
square brackets ([]) was added in treatment OI ("full information").
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We denote the final assets as Receiver by Eo and the final assets as Decider by EB. The earnings in
points of a participant in a round are determined by the product of the final assets as Receiver and
the final assets as Decider. The earnings of a participant in a round are thus equal to EB x Eo
points. Next, we describe how the final assets as Decider EB and the final assets as Receiver Eo aze
determined.
In the first period of a particulaz round, two participants are randomly assigned by the
computer to be Receiver and Decidec The Receiver starts with an endowment of 1, whereas the
Decider starts with and endowment of 9. The Decider has to decide which part of his or her
endowment he or she wants to transfer to the Receiver. This transfer, which we will denote by T,
is 0 at the minimum, and 7 at the maximum. After the Decider has decided about the transfer T to
the Receiver, the final assets of the Receiver are Eó ItT, and those of the Decider aze Eg-9-T.
After the Decider has decided about her or his transfer to the Receiver, the next period of the
round will be started. The participant who was the Receiver in the previous round is finished for
this round.
In the next period, the Decider of the previous period will now be the Receiver. The new
Decider is selected by the computer from the participants who have not yet taken turns in this
round. The determination of the final assets of the new Receiver and Decider in this period is
similaz to the previous period. The Receiver starts with an endowment of 1 and the Decider starts
with an endowment of 9. The Decider decides again about the part of her or his endowment that
will be transferred to the Receiver. This transfer T detertnines the final assets of both participants:
Eó 1fT for the Receiver and EB-9-T for the Decider.
Subsequently, a new period will be started in which the old Decider becomes the new Receiver
and the new Decider is selected from the participants who have not yet taken turns. In this way,
we continue to and including the seventh period. After that, the next round of seven periods will
be started.
Note that the participant who is Receiver in the first period of a round will not take a turn as
Decider in that particulaz round. For this participant the final assets as Decider are deten~nined to
be EB2. Further, the pazticipant who is Decider in the seventh period of a round will not take a
turn as Receiver in that round. For this participant the final assets as Receiver Eo will be equal to
the average final assets of all seven Receivers in that particulaz round, so including the current
Receiver.
As said, your earnings in a round are detennined by the product of your final assets Ea in your
role of Decider and the final assets Eo in your role of Receiver. Your assets EB depend on your
transfer to the Receiver in the period you are Decider and your assets Eo depend on the transfer
from the Decider to you in the period you are Receiver. To facilitate the determination of your
earnings, you may use the table below.
The table states your eamings in points in a round dependent on the transfer from you to the
Receiver when you are Decider and the transfer to you by the Decider when you are Receiver. In
this table the rows present the transfer from you as Decider to the Receiver and the columns
present the transfer to you as Receiver from the Decider. When you first look for the transfer from
you in the row and then go to the right to the column stating the transfer to you, you can read your
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eamings in points, EB x Eo, for the round. The eamings in money are determined by multiplying
the stated amount in points by 5 cents.
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When you are the first Receiver in a round, your final assets as Decider aze determined to be
EB2. Then, your earnings in points, EB x Eo, only depend on the transfer from the Decider to you
Eó1tT. You can read these earnings from the table by looking for the column with the
concerning transfer to you in the bottommost row (with transfer from you is 7).
When you aze the last (seventh) Decider in a round, your final assets as Receiver Eo are
determined as the average final assets of all seven Receivers in that round (rounded up). Your
eamings in points, EB x Eo, are determined via the table by the row with the transfer from you and
the column of which the number equals the average transfer to all Receivers in that round.
Procedure and usage of the computer
After we have gone through the instructions, a practice round will be run first. After the practice
round, the fifteen rounds that determine your earnings for this experiment will be run.
In every round the computer, in a completely random manner, detertnines who get the roles of
Receiver and Decider in the first period. On the screen the Receiver sees the message "You aze the
first Receiver". The Decider sees the number of the current period on the upper left part of the
screen. [Next to it, you see "INFORMATION until now". In the first period this information only
consists of the message "There have been no previous periods in this round"]. Underneath, the
Decider sees the question "How much of your endowment do you transfer (0-7)?" The Decider has
to type an integer from 0 up to and including 7. The number typed is the transfer T to the current
Receiver.
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Next, the current Decider will be asked the question "How much do you expect to receive?".
Here, the Decider types an integer from 0 up to and including 7, dependent on her or his
expectation about the transfer she or he expects to receive as Receiver in the next period. This
expectation is used by us when analysing the experiment, but your eamings will be unaffected by
it. Besides, the other participants aze not informed about your expectations stated.
After the Decider has taken her or his Decision, the current Receiver sees the number of the
present period on the screen and undemeath how much she or he receives and her or his earnings
for the round. After the Receiver has taken note of this, he or she has to press Return to close the
current period and to start the new one.
The Decider of the previous period becomes Receiver in the new period and the computer will
select a new Decider from the participants who have not yet taken tums in this round. This new
Decider sees the number of the current period on the upper left part of the screen [and next to it
"INFORMATION until now". Undemeath, it is reported for every Decider of the previous periods
how much he or she has transferred, how much he or she has received as Receiver and what her or
his eamings are for the round. For the Decider of the previous period it is only shown how much
he or she has transferred because this Decider is Receiver in the current period] and underneath the
question "How much of your endowment do you transfer (0-7)?" After this decision has been
typed and passed on to the current Receiver a new period is started in which the Decider of the
previous period is the new Receiver. This procedure is repeated up to and including period 7.
In all periods, a new Decider is randomly selected by the computer from all participants who
have not yet taken turns in that round. After all seven periods in a round have been completed, the
first period of the next round is started. Then, a new Receiver and Decider aze again randomly
selected by the computer for the first period and time after time a new Decider for the next periods
is selected. Therefore, the order in which the participants take tums in every round is not fixed but
is determined time after time by the computer in a random way. You cannot know when it will be
your turn in a round. Moreover, you cannot know with whom you will be paired in a certain
period.
Summary
The experiment consists of 15 rounds, and every round consists of 7 periods. In every period, two
participants are involved, a Receiver and a Decider. The endowment of the Receiver is 1 and the
endowment of the Decider is 9. The final assets of Receiver and Decider are dependent on the
transfer T of the Decider to the Receiver: Eó1tT, F,~-9-T. In every round, in principle, you are
the Decider in one period, and the Receiver in the next period. Your eamings in points in a round
are determined by the product of your final assets in the period you are Decider and your final
assets in the period you are Receiver: EB x Eo.
The participant who is Receiver in the first period will not act as a Decider in that round. His
or her final assets as Decider are determined to be EB-2. The pazticipant who is Decider in the last
period will not act as a Receiver in that round. His or her finals assets as Receiver Eo are
determined as the average final assets of all seven Receivers of that round, so including the cunent
Receiver.
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In every period only the cunent Decider and Receiver are infortned about the size of the
transfer given from the Decider to the Receiver. [instead of the previous line in treatment Ol: In
every period the current Decider receives information about the transfer of the Deciders in the
previous periods.J
The order in which the participants participate in the periods of a certain round is determined
by the computer in a completely random way time after time. You will never be able to know
when it will be your turn in a round or to whom you will be matched in a certain period.
Final remarks
After the last round, you will first be requested to answer some questions to evaluate the
experiment. This questionnaire is anonymous. We can link your answers to your seat number but
not to your name. After that, you will be called by your seat number to receive your eamings
privately and confidentially. Your earnings are your own business; you do not need to discuss with
anyone. It is not allowed to talk to or communicate with other participants during the experiment
in either way.
On your table you find an empty sheet, which you can use to take notes. Additionally, you
find a sheet labelled "REMARKS". On this sheet you can make remarks about the instntctions or
your decisions.
You get a couple of minutes to go through the instructions and to ask questions. When you
want to ask something, please raise your hand. One of us will come to your table to speak to you.
After that we will start the practice round.




The previous chapter has examined the development of a voluntary transfer system in an
overlapping-generations (OLG) experiment. In particulaz, the effect of monitoring across
generations, introduced by providing information, and the role of reciprocity were
explored. It turns out that although the level of voluntazy transfers falls short of the
collectively efficient levels, a fairly high level of transfers is obtained. Moreover, the level
or stability of the transfer system was not advanced by the possibility of monitoring
transfers of past generations. Only weak signs of reciprocity can be found. It was azgued
that the results might be explained by the fact that the interdependence in the underlying
OLG structure creates a kind of social cohesion, which is independent of the possibility of
monitoring. To examine the robustness of the results derived in the basic OLG experiment,
fout sets of additional experiments were conducted. The design of each experiment
deviates somewhat from the baseline OLG design. This chapter presents the results of
these additional experiments.
The motivation for the first extension is the finding that in the basic OLG experiment
the support for any fairness theory is much weaker than observed in other economic
experiments (see Chapter 2 and, e.g., Kagel and Roth, 1995, for an overview). As
mentioned previously, one reason for this result might be the OLG structure imposed in
the basic design. Because OLG experiments aze scarce in the economic literature2, little is
known about the effects of an OLG structure as such. More generally, the possible effect
of the matching structure has received little attention in the literature so faz. It is thus hard
to say whether results found in experiments with a bilateral matching structure cazry over
to OLG experiments. Therefore, as a first extension, ten additional sessions using a
bilateral matching (BM) structure instead of an OLG structure were run. The pay-off
structure in the BM experiment is identical to that in the OLG design. The information
condition is again varied in order to generate two treatments.
' This chapter is based on Van der Heijden, Nelissen, Potters and Verbon (1995b) and Van der Heijden,
Nelissen, Potters and Verbon ( 1995c).
Z I am only aware of papers by Cadsby and Frank ( 1993), Marimon, Spear and Sunder (1993), Marimon
and Sunder ( 1993), and Lim, Prescott and Sunder ( 1994).
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Second, in the OLG experiment of the previous chapter, a player's second-period
consumption can only be higher than the welfaze level if the player receives a transfer. Of
course, this is a very simplifying and restrictive assumption compared with the real-life
situation. The second extension, which comprises five sessions, relaxes this assumption by
giving players the opportunity to save part of their first-period endowment E and to use it
for consumption in the second period.
Finally, two additional sets of experiments (with information) were conducted to
examine the robustness of the results for some choices made in the baseline design. The
third extension involves five sessions that consist of a'long OLG game with reincarnation'
instead of a'repeated OLG game without reincarnation' (see Chapter 5 for further details).
Lastly, the statement is considered that the raze application of trigger-like strategies in the
baseline experiment might be caused by the fact that the strategy space is too lazge. To
simplify the development and employment of trigger strategies in support of a social
contract, four additional sessions were conducted with transfer levels restricted to the set
{0, 4} instead of {0, 1, ..., 7}.
The remainder of this chapter is organised according to the respective extensions.
Section 6.2. discusses transfers and reciprocity in an experiment with a bilateral matching
structure. The development of private savings and public transfers in an OLG experiment
with the possibility of savings is examined in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 considers the results
of the designs with the long OLG game and with the restricted strategy space. Concluding
remazks about the relationship between the outcomes of the extensions and the baseline
design are given in Section 6.5.
6.2 Transfers and reciprocity in an experiment with a bilateral matching
structure
This section considers the effect of the matching structure on the results of a gift
experiment in which the establishment of a voluntary transfer system is, again, collectively
efficient. The organisation of the section is as follows. Section 6.2.1 introduces and
motivates the experiment. The experimental design and the hypotheses aze described in




The weak impact of information and the possibility of monitoring in the baseline OLG
experiment came a bit as a surprise. Unlike other studies, only very moderate support for
any fairness theory was found.3 One could azgue that this result is caused by the OLG
structure. To investigate the pure effect of the matching structure, an additional experiment
was run with the same pay-off structure as in the basic OLG experiment. The results aze
discussed in this section. In the additional experiment, a bilateral matching (BM) structure
was imposed. In this BM design, players aze randomly paired two by two instead of in a
sequence of overlapping players as in the OLG design. Again, the development of a
voluntary transfer system is studied. Furthermore, the effects of information and
reciprocity aze analysed.
Earlier experiments have shown that considerations of fairness may be one of the
reasons why game theory has such a weak descriptive power in experimental situations, at
least in bazgaining games. The experimental evidence on the impact of fairness is mixed,
however. Chapter 2 has already paid to attention to this. However, here I will elaborate on
some of the aspects and concentrate on the consequences for the experiments of this
chapter. It is often argued that fairness plays a role in bilateral relationships whereby both
sides have some bargaining power. Apart from the experimental papers mentioned in
Chapter 2, a paper by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) is worth mentioning in this
connection. Berg et al. have considered the following two-stage one-shot investment game.
In stage one of the investment game, a player has to split ~ 10 between a second player
and herself. In the second stage, the amount given away is tripled by the experimenter, and
the second player has to decide how much of the total amount he wants to return to the
first player. The investment game is a completely anonymous and one-shot game. So,
game theory predicts that first players will not invest any money. Furthermore, if, for
whatever reason, second players receive money, it is predicted that they will not return any
money to the first player. The authors found, however, that many first players transferred
money and that most second players actually returned considerable amounts of money.
Although the correlation between the amount invested and the amount returned was not
strongly positive, the authors conclude that reciprocity exists as a basic element of human
behaviour.
' Fairness theory refers here to the possible manners in which faimess can be revealed, like the social
contract approach and the confidence-building approach, which were examined in the previous chapter.
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, Guth and Tietz (1990) have reviewed several ultimatum
games and they found that, in general, considerations of distributive justice have a serious
impact. Other experimental evidence suggests, furthermore, that a necessary condition for
gift giving is that both sides of a relationship have some bargaining power. If the receiving
side has no power at all, the proposer's gift usually decreases dramatically. For example,
in Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin and Sefton (1994), the modal proposal was about SOo~o of the
~ 5 cake to a receiving player with veto power, but less than l00~o to a receiver with no
reciprocal power.
Results aze more ambiguous when more than two players are involved. Fehr,
Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993a and 1993b), Fehr, G~chter and Kirchsteiger (1993) and
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986a and 1986b) have demonstrated in various contexts
that feelings of fairness aze not necessarily restricted to bilateral relations. Giith and Van
Damme (1994), on the other hand, have not found any support for this statement. They
considered an extension of the standazd ultimatum bargaining game by adding an inactive
third player. They found no evidence that a responder with veto power reciprocated the
proposer for his treatment of the third dummy player.
The experimental situation in the baseline OLG experiment is in a sense comparable
with that in the Guth and Van Damme experiment. In the OLG experiment, reciprocity
may be anticipated by the sender of a gift, but reciprocity (if at all) is not supplied by the
receiver of the gift, but by a third party, namely the next player. In other words, only
indirect reciprocity is possible. The experiment discussed in this section, on the other hand,
has a bilateral matching structure. This BM structure enables more direct forms of
reciprocity. Like in the baseline design, two information conditions were used in the BM
design, i.e information was provided or not. Introducing two information treatments offers
the opportunity to separate the pure effect of the matching structure from the (monitoring)
effect of information.
Before turning to the experimental design and the theoretical predictions, it seems
useful to speculate about the results. What should one expect in a design in which players
aze paired two by two instead of in an overlapping sequence? Will transfers and pay-offs
be higher or lower in the BM structure than in the OLG structure? The relationship is
more direct in the former structure, which might imply slightly less anonymity." The
literature suggests that higher transfers should be obtained because of this. Furthermore,
' In all sessions there is complete anonymity in the sense that players do not know to whom they transfer
or from whom they receive a transfer. However, in the BM treatments players may feel a stronger bond with
another (unknown) player because they are a couple.
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feelings of reciprocal altruism could be more important in the BM structure, which could
also increase the level of transfers. Social interaction might be stronger in an OLG
structure, however, and the results of Chapter 5 suggest that feelings of social cohesion
affect the level of transfers. The ultimate outcome on the level of transfers is thus not
obvious. This discussion and the analysis of these sepazate effects are further amplified on
in Sections 6.2.3 and 6.2.4.
6.2.2 Experimental design and hypotheses
Design
The model and the experimental design of the bilateral matching (BM) experiment aze
very similar to those in the OLG experiment. Again players live for two periods. In one
period an individual is the Decider and in the other period he or she is the Receiver.
Deciders aze endowed with a fixed transferable endowment E(-7) and a fixed non-
transferable basic endowment et (-2). Receivers are only endowed with a fixed non-
transferable basic endowment e2 (-1).
Ten experimental BM sessions were run in Mazch 1995.5 As the BM design is lazgely
similaz to the OLG design, which was described in detail in the previous chapter, merely
the procedural differences will be mentioned here. In each round of the experiment with
the bilateral matching structure, players were randomly and anonymously paired two by
two, i.e. four couples of two players were formed. So, a round of the BM game consisted
in fact of four times two decision periods. For each pair, the computer determined who
was the Decider in the first period. A first-period Decider, say player i, had to decide on
his transfer T; out of the set {0, 1, ..., 7} to his partner, say player j. Player i's first-period
consumption (as Decider) ,then was C;D9-T;. In the second period, the roles were reversed:
player j had to make a transfer T. to player i. Player i's second-period consumption (as
Receiver) then was C;R 1-1-T~ and his pay-off (in points) for the round U;C;DxC;R. After
that, a new round was started by a new random match of the players in four pairs.
The most important difference between the BM experiment and the OLG experiment is
that in the latter experiment players received a transfer from another player than to whom
they made a transfer. In the BM setting, on the other hand, two matched players made a
transfer to each other, i.e there was a bilateral relationship. As in the OLG experiment, the
5 Analogously to the OLG sessions, eight inexperienced subjects participated in each BM session, which
consisted of 15 rounds and one practice round.
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information condition of the BM game was varied. In a round of the BM game with
information (called treatment BI), players who were Decider in the second period of a
round knew the transfer made by their partner in the first period of the round. In a round
of the BM game without information (called treatment BN) the partner's first transfer was
not known. Under both information conditions, players were informed about the amount of
points they earned in each round, in the same way as was done in the OLG setting.
When the OLG experiment is combined with the BM experiment, a 2x2-factorial
design results with two treatment variables: the matching structure and the amount of
information provided to the players. The following scheme summazises the 2x2-factorial






OI (6) BI (5)
ON (5) BN (5)
Scheme 6.1: The 2x2-factorial design of the OLG and BM treatments
Hypotheses
The factorial design allows for a comparison of the treatments in two ways. First, the
treatments with the OLG structure can be compared with the treatments with the BM
structure. Second, the treatments with information can be compared with the treatments
without information. Chapter 5 has compared treatments OI and ON. In this section the
remaining compazisons are translated into hypotheses and then tested. Besides, a related
hypothesis about reciprocity is formulated and tested.
First, the effect of the matching structure is considered. Other experiments have
established that in a BM structure the power and the anonymity of the players and the
information of the receiving players aze crucial. A direct relationship between players
exists in the BM treatments, which might reduce feelings of anonymity. An OLG setting
implies less (bilateral) power and perhaps more anonymity as there may be fewer feelings
of solidazity (in the sense of a weaker bond, see footnote 4). Therefore, it can be
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conjectured that voluntary gifts will be lower in the treatments with an OLG structure.
This conjecture is formulated as Hypothesis 1.6
HrpoTHES~s 1(the effect of the matching structure)
The level of transfers in the treatments with a bilateral matching structure is higher than
the level of transfers in the treatments with an overlapping-generations structure.
Second, it is well known from other experiments that generally gifts increase if more
information is provided (see, e.g., Guth and Van Damme, 1994). One obvious reason is
that information provides a monitoring device and thereby the possibility of rewarding and
punishing. On the other hand, we have seen in the previous chapter that the monitoring
device did not result in higher transfers in the basic OLG design. In the experiment with
the bilateral matching structure, however, the existing direct relationship between players
offers a possibility of direct rewazding and punishing. It is therefore expected that
providing information contributes to a higher level of transfers in the BM treatments. The
second hypothesis follows directly from this reasoning.'
HYportrESls 2(the ejject oj information)
The level of transfers in the bilateral matching treatment with information (BI) is higher
than the level of transfers in the bilateral matching treatment without information (BN).
A final hypothesis can be derived from the foregoing. If information and the associated
possibility of monitoring facilitate the development of a voluntary transfer system in
treatment BI, this facilitating role should come about through some form of reciprocity
6 One could argue that only in the treatments with information the transfers will be higher in the BM
treatments, thus transfer(BIptransfer(OI). The reason is that with information the direct relationship in BI
gives the possibility of direct reciprocity. Although the 'value' of a more d'uect relationship is somewhat
unclear in BN, it seems reasonable to conjecture that also transfer(BNytransfer(ON). Another comment one
could have is that the value of infonnation is different in the OLG and BM treatments; information has in a
sense more value in the BM treatments. In BI and BN players have full infortnation about their own pay-off
and about their partner's pay-off at the end of the round. In OI and ON players have to wait until the next
period, and they merely know their own pay-off (and in OI that of their predecessor). So, transfers in the
BM treatments are in a sense more infortnative.
' Note that from a theoretical perspective a kind of inconsistency could occur here. From the above it
can be ezpected that the difference between the BM and the OLG treatments is largest with infonnation. So,
at least transfer(BIytransfer(OI). Furtherrnore, from Hypothesis 2 and the previous chapter it follows that
transfer(BIytransfer(BN) and transfer(OI~transfer(ON). If then transfer(Blp~transfer(BN) it could be that
transfer(BN)~transfer(ON), which is in contrast with Hypothesis 1.
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(see also question Q2 of the previous chapter). That is, some positive relationship between
present and future transfers should exist. This azgument is formulated in the first part of
Hypothesis 3. The second part of the hypothesis states that feelings of reciprocity play a
larger role in treatment BI than in treatment OI. The intuition is that presumably players
aze more inclined to rewazd and punish on the basis of how they aze treated themselves
than on the basis of how a third player is treated. Therefore, it can be conjectured that the
existing direct relationship between players in treatment BI enlarges feelings of reciprocity.
HYPOTHES7S 3 (reciprocity)
a) In the bilateral matching treatment with information (BI), there is a positive
relationship between a transfer and the subsequent transfer.
b) Reciprocity is stronger in the bilateral matching treatment with information (BI) than
in the overlapping-generations treatment with information (OI).
6.2.3 Results
The effect of the matching structure
The overall average transfer (that is, averaged over all sessions, rounds and periods) in
treatment BI amounts to 1.41, whereas it is 1.83 in treatment OI. The overall average pay-
offs are respectively 18.8 points and 20 points. Figure 6.1 displays the development of the
average transfer per round for treatments BI and OI.
The figure shows that the development of the level of transfers is roughly similar in
the two treatments with information. The decline of the average transfer over the rounds in
treatment BI is compazable with the development of the average transfer in treatment OI,
as described in Section 5.4. Although the average transfer in treatment OI is higher than in
treatment BI in almost all rounds, a Mann-Whitney U test with the average transfers per
session as observations (no~6, nB~ 5) does not result in a significant difference between
both treatments (p-0.27).8 It is, however, cleaz that in contrast with the prediction of
Hypothesis 1, transfers aze not higher in treatment BI. So, concerning the treatments with
information, Hypothesis 1 has to be rejected.
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Figure 6.1: Average transfer per round in treatments BI and OI
Figure 6.2 depicts the development of the average transfer per round in the treatments
without information. The overall average transfers in treatments BN and ON are 1.01 and
1.90 respectively, whereas the overall average pay-offs are 16 and 20.6 points. Two
striking aspects can be observed in the figure. First, in both treatments the average transfer




2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15
rouud
Figure 6.2: Average transfer per round in treatments BN and ON
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Second, a clear difference between the average transfer in both treatments exists; the
average transfer in treatment BN is much lower than the average transfer in treatment ON
in all rounds. A Mann-Withney U test confirms that the average transfer is significantly
lower in treatment BN (p~0.08), which contrasts with the prediction of Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 1 is thus clearly rejected for the treatments without information.
So, Hypothesis 1, which was suggested by the idea that the more direct relationship in
the BM treatments would increase the level of transfers, is not supported by the data.
Transfers in the BM setting aze not higher than those in the OLG setting for both
information conditions. What drives this result? One reason might be the social cohesion
created by the OLG structure, that is, the high degree of social interaction and the public-
good feature of the experiment. Put differently, the OLG structure can evoke a feeling that
the group has to establish or maintain a voluntary transfer system. This feeling is
presumably weaker in the BM structure. If the (group) effects of the higher social cohesion
and the public-good nature aze stronger than the effects of more direct relationships,
transfers are higher in the OLG treatments. This could be the case here. I will come back
to this later.
The role of monitoring and reciprocity
As the effect of information in the OLG treatments was already extensively discussed in
Chapter 5, here the attention is focused on its impact in the BM treatments. A first idea of
the effect of information in these treatments is given by Figure 6.3, which graphs the
average transfer per round in treatments BI and BN.
The figure implies that the average transfer in treatment BN is lower than in treatment
BI, which is co~rmed by a Mann-Whitney U test (p~0.08). So, Hypothesis 2, which
predicts a positive impact of information on the level of transfers is accepted. As we have
seen in the previous chapter, the average transfers in the overlapping-generations
treatments ON and OI aze not significantly different. So, providing information has no
significant effect in the OLG treatment whereas it results in higher average transfers in the
BM treatments. The role of information is thus not univocal. What is the reason for this?
It was claimed above that in the OLG setting the social interaction and public-good effect
may be more important than the possibility of monitoring. The fact that (all) subjects
depend on each other and strive after a collective goal (namely the establishment and
maintenance of a voluntary transfer system) could explain why substantial transfers occur
in the OLG setting, even without information. In the BM treatments, on the other hand,
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Figure 6.3: Average transfer per round in treatments BI and BN
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players of a couple. The direct relationship is particulazly important when information is
provided (see footnote 6). The possibility of direct rewarding and punishing in treatment
BI can be responsible for the relatively high transfers in this treatment, but the (in all
respects) low transfers in treatment BN are more difficult to explain. It is, therefore,
interesting and useful to explore in more detail what drives the different impact of
information and why a difference exist between treatments BN and BI.
The strong effect of information in the BM structure may be related to feelings of
reciprocity. The relatively high level of transfers in BI should then be explained by a
strong relationship between a transfer and the previous transfer. A fust indication for this
may be given by the correlation between the first-period transfer T~ and the second-period
transfer T2. The conelation coefficient between Ti and TZ in treatment BI is not
significantly positive, however. The relationship between a transfer and the previous
transfer can be examined further by plotting the transfer against the previous transfer in
the same round. Analogously to Figure 5.4 for treatment OI, Figure 6.4 depicts for
treatment BI the average transfer Tz as a function of the previous transfer T, for the rounds
1-5, 6-10 and 11-15 separately.
Clearly, the relationship between T, and T2 is not monotonically increasing in BI. In all
subsets of rounds, the second-period transfer T1 seems hazdly affected by the value of the
first-period transfer T~, although a small positive link might be observed in the first
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rounds.9 So, the possible effect of reciprocity in treatment BI seems even weaker than the
weak effect found in treatment OI. The idea that reciprocity is important in treatment BI is
thus not supported by the experimental data; Hypothesis 3a has to be rejected.
Furthermore, Hypothesis 3b, which says that reciprocity is stronger in treatment BI than in
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Figure 6.4: Transfer T2 conditioned upon the partner's transfer T, in BI
Essentially, one is now struck by the following puzzle: information has a significant
impact in the experiment with the BM structure, but reciprocity does not seem to play a
role at all. What is the solution to this puzzle? How can the difference between treatments
BN and BI be explained? Apparently, other forces are at work here. To gain more insight
in the puzzle, the transfers in BN and BI are considered in more detail by examining the
development of the first-period transfer T, and the second-period transfer T2 sepazately.
For that purpose, Figures 6.5 and 6.6 present the average values of T, and T~ per round in
treatments BN and BI, respectively.'o In this connection, it is important to recall that per
couple the roles of the first and second Deciders were randomly determined. So, with a
lazge probability all players make transfers more than once both in the first and in the
second period.
9 All values of T, occur frequently except for T,-1. Furthermore, only in the first rounds the transfer T,
after T,?3 is on average larger than after T,~3, but the difference is not significant.
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Figure 6.6: Average transfer T, and TZ per round in treatment BI
Without information, no difference between T~ and TI can be found. This is intuitively
correct as in BN decisions aze in fact taken simultaneously and both sides have equal
power. In other words, both players have the same role in treatment BN. On the other
hand, a lazge difference between the values of T~ and T~ is observed when information is
provided. In all rounds of treatment BI, the average value of T~ is higher than that of T, (a
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test results in p~0.04). While first-period players
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transfer about 2, they receive usually less than 1 in return. The underlying idea is probably
as follows: first-period players want to make a gesture by transfetring a substantial
amount. By doing this they hope (and expect) to be rewazded by a substantial transfer
from the second-period player. However, their expectations turn out not to be fulfilled, at
least not completely.
What is especially striking in Figure 6.6 is the fact that the level of T~ remains high;
even after people have found out, or at least could have found out, that they aze hardly
rewarded for efforts made in the first period, first-period players keep on transferring
about 2. The decrease in T2 is even lazger than in T,. Although this result may seem
strange, it has been found in other studies too (see, e.g., Fehr et al. 1993a, Fehr et al.,
1993, and Forsythe, Lundholm and Rietz, 1995). Lastly, Figure 6.6 confirms that feelings
of reciprocity are absent in the BM setting. This result is in contrast with the usual
findings in gift exchange experiments (see, e.g., Berg et al., 1995).
In conclusion, the compazisons of the treatments of the 2x2-factorial design yield some
surprising results. First, the transfer levels observed in the BM setting aze not higher than
in the OLG setting; second, the possibility of monitoring does not result in higher transfers
in the OLG game, whereas it does in the BM game; third, in treatment BI, the level of T2
is very low compazed with the level of T, and this is maintained throughout the game;
fourth, this last result does not occur in treatment BN.
6.2.4 Discussion and conclusions
The results from testing Hypothesis 1 suggest that the impact of the direct relationship in
the bilateral matching structure should be somehow more than offset by the effect of the
underlying structure in the OLG setting. In the OLG experiment substantial transfers were
obtained, which were independent of the information condition. These results may be
connected to the social interaction and a kind of social cohesion present. Besides, as
azgued in Chapter 5, the nature of the decisions taken in an OLG game has, at least paztly,
the nature of a decision on a public good. In the bilateral game structure, the decisions
taken by a pair of players do not influence other subjects involved in the experiment. So
here, the public-good aspect of the decision within a particulaz round of the game is
absent." The higher level of transfers under the OLG structure may thus be explained by
" The public-good aspect might show up, nevertheless, given the fact that a repeated game was played.
In this respect, aspects like reputation and learning can be relevant. As these aspects are not d'uectly related
to the main themes addressed in this chapter, they will not be considered.
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the fact that the public-good aspect of the OLG structure is more important than the
bargaining effect of the BM structure.
The experiments presented in this chapter are somewhat related to Andreoni's Partners
and Strangers experiments (Andreoni, 1988 and 1993). In his 1988 paper, Andreoni
presents an experiment on the provision of public goods. The paper intends to explain two
general findings, namely, first, that in one-shot games subjects provide a substantial
amount of public goods and, second, that in repeated games the provision of public goods
decays towazds the free-riding level with each repetition. To sepazate strategic behaviour
from learning behaviour, two conditions were used: Partners and Strangers.'Z In contrast
with the expectations, he found that strangers gave significantly more to the public good
than partners. Andreoni (1993) used the Partners and Strangers design in an experiment on
cooperation in finitely repeated prisoners's dilemma (RPD) games." He found, among
other things, that partners were more cooperative than strangers. In a sense, the condition
Partners shows some similazities with the BM structure and the condition Strangers with
the OLG structure." From that point of view, the results presented here correspond to his
findings for the public-good game but not to his findings for the RPD game.15
The judgement about the effect of information is thus not univocal in the OLG and
BM treatments. Contrary to what was found in the OLG game, information appeazed to
affect the decisions in the bilateral game. A possible explanation for this could be that
because of the direct relationship the power structure of the game in the BM treatments is
changed by the possibility of monitoring. In treatment BN both sides have equal power,
whereas in treatment BI second players have more power than first players. Apparently,
second players use this bargaining power. Although the finding that providing information
under the bilateral structure has a lazge impact is quite common, the development of the
transfers in the BM treatments is not in line with the behaviour usually observed in
compazable experiments. In particulaz, the absence of reciprocity is striking in the
12 In Partners, subjects played the public good game in groups of 5. In each repetition of the game,
subjects played with the same group of 5. In Strangers, 20 subjects played the game also in groups of 5.
However, here the composition of the groups was randomly reassigned in each repetition.
" In condition Partners of the RPD experiment, 14 subjects were randomly paired and each subject
played a 10-period RPD game with their partner. After that players were rematched for another 10-period
game. In Strangers, subjects were randomly paired for every iteration of the RPD game, for a total of 200
iterations.
" On the other hand, one could also argue that just the opposite holds. 7'hat is, as in every round of the
BM treatments, two players out of a group of eight players were randomly matched, these treatments show
some resemblance with the Strangers design.
15 This could be seen as indirect evidence that the OLG game has some public-good features.
140 Chapter 6
treatments under consideration here. Some feelings of reciprocity can be found in the OLG
setting, but in the BM setting reciprocity seems completely absent. The latter result is in
contrast with the expectations and it is hazd to find a good explanation for it. Perhaps even
more striking is the constant high level of the first transfer in treatment BI. Subjects
remain to give a transfer of about two as a first Decider, whereas they could know that the
second Decider is not inclined to give more than one. The average second-period transfer
even decreases at the end of the BI sessions. Here, it looks as if "a sucker is born every
half a minute" (see Forsythe, et al., 1995). It should be noted, however, that also first-
period players benefit from this situation. Transferring two and receiving one yields a pay-
off of 14 points, which is more than the basic pay-off of 9 points one would receive in a
situation without transfers. This could in part explain why players maintain the situation
with unequal transfers.
Forsythe et al. (1995) and Fehr, et al. (1993) have derived similaz results in a more
complicated setting. Forsythe et al. studied an experimental financial market in which a
seller is endowed with an asset and, with symmetric information between the buyer and
the seller, both pazties gain by trading the asset. In the experiment, the asset's quality is
detennined by three states of nature. The communication from the seller to the buyer is
one of the following three types: no communication, credible disclosure, i.e. sellers cannot
lie, and non-credible disclosure. They found, among other things, that players when acting
as buyers were taken in by the non-credible disclosures of sellers and purchased assets that
would normally not trade. More striking is their finding that the same subjects, when
acting as sellers, were quite willing to lie to the buyers. This finding led them to entitle
their paper 'Half a sucker is born every minute'. Note that their results aze compazable to
the above-mentioned findings in treatment BI.
Fehr et al. (1993) examined the effect of reciprocity forces in an experimental
efficiency wage mazket. Their basic experimental design consists of two stages. In the first
stage, finns simultaneously post employment offers. Workers choose among the available
offers and, at the second stage, workers that have accepted an offer determine their effort
level. In a second design, the possibilities for reciprocal behaviour aze increased by adding
a third stage to the game. In this third stage, firms can punish or rewazd their workers at
some cost to themselves. Fehr et al. found significant differences between the two-stage
and the three-stage game, which made them suggest that reciprocity can have a very
powerful impact on behaviour. Even more interesting is their finding that workers shirk
substantially. Even in later rounds of the game, firms offered relatively good employment
offers whereas workers chose relatively low effort levels.
Additional Experiments 141
The results by Forsythe et al. (1995) and Fehr et al. (1993) aze lazgely consistent with
the present findings that first-period players constantly make relatively high transfers (good
offers) and that second-period players exploit theír bazgaining power. T'he difference
between the other studies and the present experiment is, however, that they used a much
more complicated set-up to derive this result. It has been demonstrated here that the result
even holds true in one of the simplest possible set-ups.
In conclusion, it has been shown that reciprocity cannot account for the differences in
the results between the OLG and the BM game. The compazison of the two game
structures shows that subjects in the OLG setting may recognise the public-good aspect of
transfers in the OLG setting, whereas the bazgaining frame dominates the BM setting.
Information has little impact in the public-good-like experiment as the social cohesion is
present with and without information. In the bilateral experiment, information has more
impact. It changes the bazgaining power and it allows for direct rewarding and punishing.
In total, most of the results can be explained. The absence of reciprocity and the constant
high level of T, in treatment BI remain peculiaz, however. Finally, the game structure can
obviously have an important impact on experimental results. To put it differently, results
from bilateral experiments cannot automatically be applied to experiments with another
game structure like, for instance, an OLG structure.
6.3 Private savings and public transfers in an OLG experiment
In this section, the baseline OLG experiment is extended by introducing an opportunity to
save privately. The section is largely organised in the same way as the previous section
except for the fact that the underlying model is discussed in more detail (in Section 6.3.2).
6..~.1 Introduction
As already mentioned in previous chapters, Pay-As-You-Go (PAYG) public pension
schemes have been introduced in almost all western countries in the past. PAYG pension
schemes are advantageous compared with Capital-Reserve (CR) pension schemes if the
growth rate of population is larger than the interest rate ( assuming zero growth of income
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per head).16 This condition is not satisfied anymore in practice because of the ageing of
the population. As future benefits aze under pressure because of this, in some countries it
has been proposed to introduce a pure capital-funded scheme along with or instead of a
PAYG scheme. For example, in the UK many individuals can nowadays somehow choose
between the 'old' PAYG system and a CR system. As these developments have started
only recently, the effect of the increased freedom of choice is still quite uncleaz.
Furthermore, as in most countries pension schemes aze mandatory instead of voluntary, it
is not clear which type of pension provision would be chosen if people were offered free
choice. Economic experiments offer a solution in this situation. By conducting experiments
it can be derived whether people aze willing to invest in collective systems, to invest in
private savings or to combine the two pension systems, if they had free choice.
In the experiment of the previous chapter, it appeazed that the public-good feature of
the overlapping-generations structure and the social cohesion play an important role.
Furthermore, individuals in the OLG setting seemed to have a generic willingness to
support transfers, almost irrespective of the past behaviour of the receivers. This section
wants to investigate to what extent the possibility of saving (which can be seen as an
individual Capital-Reserve pension scheme) affects the willingness to support a voluntary
transfer system (which can be seen as the public pension scheme). If the alternative of
private savings exists, the voluntary transfer system may be eroded due to lower solidarity
or risk aversion of the players. This is possible even if the voluntary transfer system is
collectively efficient.
So, in a sense, the analysis presented in this section tests the robustness of the results
of the baseline experiment. To that end, the experiment with the possibility of savings has
an OLG structure, too. The extension is that now players cannot only use their transferable
endowment E to make a transfer, but they can also save (part of) the endowment for their
second-period consumption. That is, subjects can invest the transferable endowment both
in a collective voluntary transfer scheme and in a private savings scheme. Savings earn a
fixed rate of return so that their return is more certain than the return on transfers. The
attractiveness of savings is, however, reduced by assuming a negative rate of return on
savings. This assumption forces subjects to make a trade-off between an investment in
private savings with a certain but relatively low rate of return and an investment in a
collective transfer system with uncertain but possibly higher rates of return. The
(collectively) efficient outcome can only be obtained if all people join the collective
16 This condition is known as the Aaron condition (Aaron, 1966).
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scheme. Anticipating somewhat on the results, one might expect that the establishment and
the maintenance of a voluntary transfer system will be more difficult as many (risk-averse)
players will resort to the certainty of a savings system. Whether this actually occurs will
become cleaz in Section 6.3.3.
6.3.2 Mode[, design and hypotheses
The model
The underlying model for the experiment with the possibility of savings is again a simple
two overlapping-generations (OLG) model. Endowments and the pay-off structure are
equal to those in the basic OLG design. The only thing changed is that now players can
use the endowment E to save S, OSSSE, and to make a transfer T, OSTSE-S, to the old
player. The remaining part of the endowment is used for consumption. So, first period
consumption C„ of player P, is given by:
Ctr-E-Sr-Tr}et (6.1)
Savings eatn an interest at a constant rate r, O~r?-1, in the second period. In that period,
players consume their savings plus the interest, the transfer T„~ received from player P~,~
and the basic endowment e2. Second-period consumption CZ, of player P, is thus given by:
Cu-T~,t t(ltr)S~}eZ (6.2)
Total utility U, of player P„ t?1, is given by the following utility or pay-off function:"
Ut-Ctr xC~-(E-S~-Trtet)(Tr.t t(ltr)SrtE2) (6.3)
Like in the baseline design, it is optimal to smooth consumption over both periods. In the
experiment with the possibility of savings, both savings and transfers can be used to realise
this smoothing.
What decisions should players make in the OLG game with savings? A non-altruistic
pay-off-maximising player P, maximises now the following problem:
" Again, first period consumption C,o of player Pe is assumed to be equal to the basic endowment, i.e.,




where T~;1 is player P,'s expectation about the next player's transfer. As we have seen in
Chapter 5, if savings aze not possible (i.e. S-0) the socially optimal level of transfers T' is
given by Tt - T' -0.5 (E t e1- e2), `dt. If savings aze possible and if r is relatively large, it
is advantageous to 'invest' in savings. In particulaz, in case of r?0 solving eq. (6.4) for the
socially optimal levels of savings (S') and transfers gives S~-S`-0.5(Etel- ~~), T~-O, dt.
More interestingly, however, is the case r~0. Then, the socially optimal levels of transfers
and savings read T~-T'-0.5(E}el-e2), S~-O, b't. So, if r~0 the collectively efficient
solution for players is to rely fully on the (uncertain) transfer system and to save nothing.
Again, the question is whether this socially efficient outcome can and will be
established without the help of a social planner. Apart from the expected transfer by the
next player, a player's decision now also depends on the value of r. It was derived in
Chapter 5 that without savings a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for a positive
transfer is aaT,-`r' ~0. As it is very likely that the case r?0 will result in the socially optimal
amounts of savings and transfer, i.e. S,-S' and T,-O, this case is uninteresting and will not
be considered. Instead, the focus is on the more interesting case r~0. In that case, people
have to make a trade-off between an investment in savings with a certain but relatively
low rate of return and an investment in a transfer system with an uncertain but potentially
higher rate of return. If r~0, from a theoretical point of view a necessazy condition for a
positive transfer is again ~"' ~0. The actual transfers players make can be observed in the
experiment. Comparison of the results of the basic treatment and the treatment with private
savings gives the empirical value of the above issues.
Design
Five sessions of the treatment with savings and information, which will from now on be
abbreviated as SI, were conducted in Mazch 1995. The parameter values in the savings
treatment SI were similar to the values in the basic OLG treatment: E-7, e1-2 and e2-1.
Furthermore, in treatment SI the interest rate was determined to be r--ll3 and S was
restricted to the set S E{0, 3}; if S-3 then 05TS4. The pazameter values imply that the
socially optimal level of transfers and savings are T'-4 and S'-0, which would result in a
pay-off of 25 points. Given S-3, the optimal transfer is T-1 or T-2, which would result in
a(suboptimal) pay-off of 20 points.
The procedure in treatment SI was largely similaz to that in OI and can be summarised
as follows. When a player was selected to be young in period t, he first had to type a
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number S, from {0, 3} which indicated his amount of savings. Next he had to type a
number T, from {0,1,...,7-S,}, which indicated his transfer to the old player. First-period
consumption of the young player then was C„9-S; T,. Second-period consumption of the
old player was C2t.,-1-f-T,. The old player was informed about the transfer received and her
pay-off ( in points) in the round: U,.~C„-,xCZ,-,. In the next period the young player
became old and a new young player, selected randomly from the remaining players, had to
make a savings decision (S,t,) and a transfer decision (T,t,), leaving C,,,,-9-S,,,-T,,, for
first-period consumption. Second-period consumption of the old player born at time t then
was C2t 1f213S,tT,,,.
As in treatment OI, in treatment SI players knew the transfer made by the previous
player(s) in the same round. The level of savings of the previous player(s) was unknown,
however. The reason for this is that in real life old-age pension contributions (transfers)
aze known whereas individual savings aze usually anonymous. In treatment SI, two pay-off
tables were included in the instructions; one table applied to S-0 and one to S-3 (see
Appendix 6B).
Hypotheses
Before running any experiment, it was expected that the establishment and maintenance of
a transfer system in an OLG setting would be rather difficult. Reasons include the facts
that no commitment was possible and that players could not punish other players directly.
The establishment of a private fund by means of savings seems much easier as one can
rely fully on one's own (private) decisions. As we have seen in Chapter 5, however, a
reasonable level of transfers was obtained in treatments OI and ON. Here, it is investigated
whether this result changes when the possibility of savings is added. For that purpose, the
transfers and the pay-offs obtained in treatments SI and OI will be compazed. Three
hypotheses will be formulated in this respect.
First, while in treatment OI players can only decide on transfers, in treatment SI they
can decide both on transfers and on savings. Because players basically have an additional
instrument in treatment SI, it seems plausible that the average pay-off in treatment SI is
not lower than in treatment OI. On the other hand, people may be risk averse and
therefore choose to only save. Pay-offs would then be lower in treatment SI. It is unclear
which effect will dominate. If it is supposed that the former effect will dominate, this
results in the following hypothesis:
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HYPOTHESis 4 (pay-offs)
The average pay-off in treatment SI is not lower than the average pay-o,f~j`' in treatment OI
Furthermore, since in treatment OI players can only obtain a pay-off above the basic pay-
off of 9(-9x1) by establishing a voluntary transfer system, it can be conjectured that
transfers in treatment SI will not be higher than in treatment OI. This is formulated in
Hypothesis 5:
HYPOTHESIS S (transfers)
The average transfer in treatment SI is not larger than the average transfer in treatment
OI
One could raise azguments against this hypothesis. In particulaz, consider the following. In
treatment SI, the possibility of savings could make players better awaze of the situation.
Consequently, they might realise what the possible advantages aze of the transfer system.
A comparison of the rate of return on savings and transfers could then induce them to
prefer the potentially higher rate of retum on transfers to the negative rate of return on
savings. Although it is not very likely that people will follow this reasoning, the possibility
that this azgument might lead to higher transfers in treatment SI cannot completely be
ruled out.
For the last hypothesis, the distribution of pay-offs over the players and the variability
of the transfers aze considered. In this connection, a plausible assumption seems that in
treatment SI pay-offs aze more equally distributed across subjects as all players have the
opportunity to invest in savings with a certain, fixed rate of return. In other words, by
introducing the possibility of savings, subjects no longer lazgely depend on the decisions
taken by others. It is, therefore, conjectured that the income distribution in treatment SI is
more equal.
HYPOTHES~s 6 (income distribution)
The distribution of the pay-offs over the players is more equal in treatment SI than in
treatment 01.
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The above hypothesis implies that the variability of the pay-offs per person, i.e. the
standazd deviation of the pay-offs per player, is smaller in treatment SI.1e What happens
to the vaziability of the transfers is less straightforwazd. In treatment SI it seems plausible
to assume that if S-0 then 7y0. Furthermore, in the case that people do not or cannot
save, it is likely that the variability of the transfers is higher than in the case that people
do save. When describing the results, some attention will be paid to these statements too.
Finally, the presence of possible feelings of reciprocity in treatment SI is briefly
examined. Transfers may have a strong signalling effect in treatment SI. That is, as
transfers may be seen as an intention to establish a transfer system, players may be
rewazded for making a transfer.
6.3.3 Results
General results
First, the development of the pay-offs across rounds is considered. The thick lines in
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 show the average pay-off per round in treatments SI and OI
respectively. The intervals shown aze 900~o confidence intervals, that is, they give the range
between the average pay-off minus and plus two times the standazd deviation of the
average pay-off per round.
Figure 6.7 shows that the average pay-off in treatment SI is very stable and slightly
below 20 points in all rounds. Although the average pay-off is more volatile in treatment
OI (see Figure 6.8), the overall average pay-off, that is to say, averaged over all sessions,
rounds and periods, is higher than in SI, namely 20 points versus 19 points. The difference
is not significant, however, as a Mann-Whitney U test results in p-0.36 (no,-6, nS,-S).19
So, Hypothesis 4, which says that the average pay-off in treatment SI is not lower than in
treatment OI is neither really rejected nor confirmed. To see where these results come
from, the development of the transfers and the savings has to be considered.
" It is not obvious what the correct measure for income distribution is. One could argue that the equality
of income should be measured by the (average) standard deviation of the pay-off per person. On the other
hand, as the results within a session are related, they cannot really be regarded as independent observations.
T'herefore, one could argue that the standard deviation of the average pay-off per round is the correct
measure. This latter measure has been used most, but some attention will be paid to the former measure too.
" The fact that the difference is not significant is mainly caused by one session in treatment OI in which
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Figure 6.8: Average pay-off per round in treatment OI
The overall average transfer is 0.66 in treatment SI versus 1.83 in treatment OI. In the
former treatment the overall average savings are 2.52. The difference between the transfer
levels in treatments SI and OI is significant (p~0.01, with a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U
test with session averages as observations, nS,-S, no~6). For both treatments the
development of the average transfer and the average savings per round is displayed in
Figure 6.9. Clearly, the average transfer in treatment SI is lower than in treatment OI in all
pay-ott
5
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rounds. Furthermore, the average savings increase across the rounds, whereas the average
transfer decreases in both treatments. All changes over time aze significant, e.g., the
average savings in rounds 1-3 aze significantly lower than in rounds 4-12. Obviously, the
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Figure 6.9: Average transfer and savings per round in treatments OI and SI
Figures 6.7 and 6.8 provide also information about Hypothesis 6 concerning the
income distribution. The figures show that in all rounds the vaziability of the average pay-
off per round is smaller in treatment SI than in treatment OI. The most conservative
(Mann-Whitney) test with session averages as units of observation shows that both the
average standazd deviation of the pay-off per round and the average coefficient of
variation of the pay-off per round aze significantly smaller in treatment SI (p~0.01).Zo
These results can be examined in more detail when the outcomes of treatment SI are
split in two subsets: one subset contains the decisions after S-0 and the other after S-3.
Considering the volatility of the pay-offs in these subsets gives the following results. First,
the standard deviation as well as the coefficient of variation of the average pay-off per
round are significantly lazger in treatment OI than in treatment SI both after S-0 and after
Zo When the average pay-offs per person are taken as units of observation (no~-48, ns,-40), it cannot be
rejected that the average pay-off per person is not smaller in treatment SI. On the other hand, tests on the
differences between the average standard deviations and the average coefficients of variation of the pay-off
per person (not reported here) show that the variability of these pay-offs is also significantly smaller in
treatment SI.
150 Chapter 6
5-3. Furthermore, results from Wilcoxon tests suggest that the average pay-off per round
after S-0 is significantly more volatile than after 5-3; in the former subset the coefficient
of variation of the average pay-off per round is significantly larger, but the standard
deviations are not significantly different.
In addition, as said in the previous section, the variability of the transfers is also
considered. Apparently, the standard deviation of the average transfer per round in
treatment OI is not significantly different from that in treatment SI after 5-0. After 5-3,
however, the standard deviation of the average transfer per round in treatment SI is
significantly lower than it is in treatment OI. Because of the large difference between the
level of transfers in both treatments, the coefficient of vaziation of the average transfer per
round may be a better measure. A similaz analysis then shows that the coefficient of
variation of the average transfer per round in treatment OI is significantly smaller than that
in treatment SI, both after S-0 and after S-3. Finally, Wilcoxon tests show that the
standazd deviation of the average transfer per round in treatment SI after S-0 is
significantly lazger than after S-3, whereas the coefficients of variation are not
significantly different.
The picture sketched in Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9, and confirmed by the statistical tests,
is that in treatment SI savings are the major source of investment and that traz~sfers occur
merely on an incidental basis. On average, transfers aze cleazly much higher in treatment
OI. One obvious reason for this is the lack of an alternative in treatment OI. In treatment
SI people can choose between two sources of investments. There, it turns out that most
people prefer the certain alternative of savings to the uncertain investment in a transfer
system. Appazently this choice is not complicated by the low rate of return on savings. So,
most individuals proved to behave in a risk averse way. This behaviour does not result in
higher pay-offs in treatment SI but the pay-offs are less volatile and earnings aze more
equally distributed among the players. Phrased in terms of pay-offs and efficiency one
could say that the 'bad' system drives out the 'good' system. I will briefly come back to
this in the conclusions.
Specific results
Until now, the attention was fixed on some overall tendencies. The focus was on the
developments of savings and transfers and to a lesser degree on the relation between them.
The actual decisions will now be considered in more detail and it is tried to identify
factors that affect these decisions. The analysis is roughly similaz to that in Chapter 5,
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though shorter. Besides the factors investigated in the previous chapter, the relationship
between transfers and savings will be examined.
transter, savings
t S (r 1-5)
} S (r 11-15)
rt T (r 1-5)




Figure 6.10: Average transfer and savings as a function of the previous transfer in
the same round
First, feelings of reciprocity could also play a role in treatment SI. It could even be
supposed that reciprocity is more important than in treatment OI. The reason being that
transfers may now be seen as an even stronger sign that players want to establish the
collectively efficient system (instead of the certain but inefficient alternative system of
savings). Hence, it could be that players who transfer aze more (often) rewazded for their
effort. To examine the presence of possible feelings of reciprocity, Figure 6.10 shows the
average transfer and the average savings conditioned upon the previous transfer in the
same round for rounds 1-5 and rounds 11-15 sepazately. As transfers lazger than 3 hardly
occur in treatment SI, these transfers have been pooled with the transfers of 3.21 The
relationships between the amount of savings or transfers and the previous transfer are
fairly flat for both subsets of rounds.22 Support for the presence of reciprocal forces is
hardly observed. For instance, for rounds 1-5 the average values of T, aze not significantly
different after T,-~-0 and after T,.~-3f; the same holds for S,. Furthermore, the relationships
in the eazly and in the later rounds are hardly different, although the average value of the
" Even in this pooled group transfers were rare. In rounds 1-5 20 transfers were larger than 2 while in
rounds 11-15 this number was reduced to 6. These numbers are very small compared with the frequency of
zero transfers, namely 100 and 130 in the early and later rounds respectively.Z2 The picture for rounds 6-10 is similar to that for rounds 1-5.
152 Chapter 6
transfer and the savings aze relatively high after T,"~-3f in rounds 11-15.Z' So, consistent
with the findings in treatment OI, only very weak signs of reciprocity are observable in the
data of treatment SI.z4
End effects may be another relevant factor. Recall from Chapter 5 that a weak final
period effect was found in treatment OI. In treatment SI, transfers do not differ across
periods, whereas savings first increase from 2.4 in period 1 to 2.7 in period 4 and then
decrease to 2.24 in the last period. Thus, the number of the period has no strong
monotonic effect on the savings and no effect on the transfers.
Analogously to the analysis of treatment OI in the previous chapter, the effect of one's
personal experience can be investigated by relating one's own transfer to the transfer one
received in the previous round. The results then show that a weak positive relationship
between T, and the transfer received in the previous round ( RR"`) exists in treatment SI, as
was the case in treatment OI. The correlation coefficient is not significantly different from
zero, however.
The second last factor briefly discussed here is one's personal habit or idiosyncrasy.
The correlation coefficient between one's own transfer in a round ( T,) and that of the
previous round (TR"') and, analogously, between S, and SR"` could be taken as a first
indication for this. The correlation coefficients between T, and TR"' in treatments SI and OI
amount to 0.25 and 0.44, respectively, whereas the correlation coefficient between S, and
SR"` is 0.19. The coefficients imply that there is at least a positive relation between
individuals' decisions in various rounds.25 Furthermore, although a sensible strategy
seems to be to transfer a positive amount when savings aze zero, only very few players
actually followed this strategy.
Finally, the relationship between transfers and savings in treatment SI will briefly be
discussed. Figure 6.9 already showed that savings increase and transfers decrease across
rounds. Because people have to choose between S and T, the relationship between S and T
can be expected to be negative, i.e the correlation coefficient between S and T should be
negative. The correlation coefficient is indeed negative (about - 0.25). Moreover, its value
21 The number of observations on which this result is based is quite low, however. See footnote 21.
" Additionally, the transfers and savings given several values of the difference T,"; T,"1 were examined.
Again, no significant results can be found. [ will come back to this later when the estimation results are
discussed.
ZS Another way to investigate this and to detect fixed-strategy players is to look at individual data. In
treatment SI 16 players always saved three and an additional I1 subjects saved three at least 80"~0 of the
time. Furthertnore, 13 players transferred zero at least 85"~0 of the time; only one of these players dces not
belong to the group of 'fixed savers'.
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hazdly changes across rounds. Other evidence for the negative relation between S and T is
that the average transfer after S-0 is significantly higher than the average transfer after
S-3 (a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test gives p~0.08). This again illustrates the
trade-off between S and T people have to make. Obviously, the savings option induces
almost everybody to leave the transfer system and to establish a private savings system.
This section is concluded by an overall picture of the relative effects of the factors
analysed separately above. For that purpose, both transfers and savings aze regressed on
these multiple factors. For completeness, the number of the round and the number of the
period aze added. The regression equation for the transfers is similar to eq. (5.9) apart
from the fact that in (6.5) one's own savings in the round (SrR) and in the previous round
(SR-t) are included. The behavioural equation for the level of the transfers thus reads:
TrR-aota~RtaZTtR~ta3(TrRt-TrR~ta4tta5RR-rtaó7'R-~ta~SR-itaSS1Rt~~ (6.5)
The behavioural equation for the level of savings is:
SR-a ta Rta TR ta TR-TR~ta tta RR-lta TR"rta SR-tta TRt (6.6)r 0 I 2 rl 3( rl r 4 S 6 7 9 r ~Z
Table 6.1 presents the regression results. The explaining variables aze mentioned in the
first column. Pazameter estimates and corresponding significance levels of the t-statistics
are in the next columns. To simplify the comparison with the regression results of
treatment OI, these estimation results aze repeated in the last two columns.
The regression results can be summazised as follows. First of all, it should be noted
that the estimation results are for the most part in line with the findings in the previous
section. Some differences can be found, however. For instance, in the transfer equation,
the estimated coefficient for the number of the round R does not follow the suggestion
created by Figure 6.9 of decreasing transfers over the rounds. The increase of savings over
the rounds is confirmed by the estimations for the savings equation, however.2ó The
effect of reciprocity seems weak; the previous transfer in the same round appeazs to have a
significantly positive effect on the transfer but no effect on savings, whereas the difference
TrRI-Tt z has no positive effect in both equations. Furthermore, a strong negative effect of
the number of the period on the level of savings is found, which has to do with the
relatively high level of savings in periods 3 and 4. As could be expected, a higher received
Z6 An indirect effect of the number of the round on the transfer exists, however, via the round effect on
the savings and the negative relation between transfer and savings.
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transfer in the previous round turns out to affect transfers in a positive but savings in a
negative way. The transfer given in the previous round has a significant positive effect on
the transfer, which índicates the presence of some personal inertia or idiosyncrasy. Finally,
evidence for the negative relation between S and T is found. The corresponding estimated
coefficients are significantly negative in both equations (aa and a9). In fact, apart from the
numbers of the round and the period and the intercept, TrR is the only vaziable in the
savings equation that is significant at a level smaller than So~o.Z'
Table 6.1: Re~ression results of the behavioural equations for transfers and savings
transfer (SI) savings (SI) transfer (OI)
value p-value value p-value value p-value
ao 1.10 ~ 0.00 3.05 ~ 0.00 1.17 ~ 0.00------------ ---------~-------- ---------~--------- ---------f---------
R -0.02 ~ 0.19 0.04 ~ 0.02 0.01 ~ 0.68------------ -- --------~-------- --------f--------- -- ------~---------
TR 0.20 ~ 0.01 -0.02 ~ 0.81 0.15 ~ 0.02--~~------- -- ---~-------- --------~--------- ---------~---------
TR -TR 0.11 ~ 0.05 -0.01 ~ 0.89 -0.06 ~ 0.19
--~~---~~---
----
- t-------- --------t--------- - ------t---------
t ~ 0.490 03 0.17 ~ 0.00 -0.05 ~ 0.09------------ - ----- ~-------- -- -------f--------- ---------F---------
RR-' ~ 0.030.11 -0.11 ~ 0.05 0.03 ~ 0.58------------ ---- ~-------- ---------~--------- --------~---------
7~-' ~ 0.000.13 0.02 ~ 0.79 0.38 ~ 0.00- ---------- ---- ~-------- ---------f--------- --------~---------
SR-' -0.06 ~ 0.20 0.07 ~ 0.19 ~------------ ----------~--------- --------~--------- --------f---------
R
5
~ 0.020.13 ~ ~~~--------- --~-- ----- ---------~--------- -------- ---------
TR ~ -0.14 ~ 0.02 ~
~ obs. 350 350 420
RZ 0.13 0.13 0.17
Comparing the regression results for the transfer in treatments SI and OI shows that all
signs of the estimated coefficients aze equal. Moreover, most coefficients are in the same
order. The main difference between the regression results for the transfers in treatments OI
Z' The similar size of the intercept in the transfer equation in treatments OI and SI is perhaps remazkable.
One might think of this as a kind of basic, intrinsic level of transfers. However, one has to be careful here.
The (fixed) effects of the number of the period and the round should be taken into account, too. The same
holds for the savings equation, which can explain why the value of the intercept (3.05) is higher than the
maximum amount of savings (3).
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and SI is that in the former treatment idiosyncrasy seems important, whereas in the latter
treatment both the transfer of the previous player and the transfer received in the previous
round seem to have a relatively lazge impact.
6.3.4 Concluding remarks
In Chapter 5 it was claimed that a PAYG pension scheme could best be represented by an
OLG structure with a possibility to transfer. The basic OLG experiment is a simple and
abstract version of reality, however. To make the experimental design more realistic, this
section has extended the basic design by adding the possibility of private savings. So, a
situation was created in which people could choose between private savings and
intergenerational voluntary transfers. In this way, the experimental design approaches the
situation that has arisen in some countries by the introduction of a pure capital funded
scheme in addition to or instead of a PAYG scheme. In some countries people have
nowadays a voluntary choice between joining a PAYG system or a CR system. In many
other countries both systems exist side by síde, but participation is mandatory. By means
of the experiment it was studied which pension provision individuals would choose if they
were allowed to choose.
For that purpose, people in the treatment with private savings could either use their
first-period endowment E to invest in a collective transfer system or to save for
consumption in the second period. As savings had a negative rate of return, subjects had to
make a trade-off between a certain investment with a low rate of return and an uncertain
investment with a possibly higher rate of return. One aim of this section was to investigate
whether the relatively high level of efficiency obtained in the basic OLG experiment could
be achieved or even improved when people had the additional instrument of savings.
As expected, when people can save the average transfer decreases substantially
compazed with the average transfer in the basic OLG design. Players lazgely use the
possibility of saving. The decision to save does not lead to higher pay-offs but the income
distribution is more equal in treatment SI. The reason is that players depend less on the
(volatile) transfer decisions made by others, as they can have their own private provision.
The transfer system established in treatment OI is thus lazgely substituted by a system of
savings and some very low level of transfers. Apparently, the trade-off between efficiency,
i.e. (possible) high pay-offs, and certainty results in a choice for certainty. From an
efficiency point of view, this is no improvement. On the contrary, the 'bad' system drives
out the 'good' system.
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In reality, PAYG public pension schemes aze for the most part based on the confidence
of people that future generations will adhere to the scheme (the implicit contract). In this
connection, feelings of solidarity play a role. It is sometimes azgued that the introduction
of private pension schemes might undermine the solidarity. Indeed, the collective transfer
system hardly gets off the ground in treatment SI, even if savings aze relatively
unamactive. In real life, there is no problem if private schemes are more efficient than
PAYG schemes.Zg If, however, private schemes aze less efficient, their introduction might
decrease welfaze. It is hazd to derive from the results why people resort to lower transfers
and savings. People might transfer less because the solidazity is (expected to be) reduced
or because they are risk averse. Disentangling these two effects is difficult and more
experiments should be conducted before one can draw strong conclusions in this respect.
Although one has to be careful, this section is concluded by deriving two (related)
implications from the experimental results. First, when (mandatory) PAYG public pension
systems were introduced several decades ago, the Aazon condition was generally satisfied
in most countries, i.e. PAYG schemes were beneficial. The results of this section might
imply that the mandatory element was necessary, since if people then had had a choice
they would have chosen for a private scheme. Second, in most western countries the Aaron
condition is no longer satisfied and financial problems caused by the ageing process ask
for pension schemes reforms. One proposal is to offer people the choice between a public
PAYG scheme and a private or Capital-Reserve scheme. The experimental results suggest
that people will then move to the CR scheme. Recent experience in the UK suggests that
this seems to happen there too. Some first analyses show that even people for whom the
PAYG system is much more favourable switch to the CR scheme.29 The reduced
solidazity caused by the introduction of the private scheme, the reduced confidence in the
public scheme and a risk-averse attitude might all be (part of) an explanation for this
behaviour.
'e Of course, the situation in much more complicated in reality. For instance, all kinds of
intragenerational differences occur, so that an overall Pareto improvement is almost impossible.
29 Note, however, that data in the UK referring to the contracting-out of the state pensions have the
disadvantage that the process is actually in a too young stage to draw conclusions. Furthermore, some
incentives to contract out are (implicitly) present; see Disney and Whitehouse (1993).
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6.4 Two additional designs
As a final check on the robustness of the results of the basic experiment, two additional
sets of experiments with an OLG structure and with information were conducted (in Mazch
1995, with again eight inexperienced subjects in each of the nine sessions). The main aim
of the two additional designs was to examine the effect of some choices made in the
baseline design. Therefore, the designs of the additional experiments deviate only
marginally from that design. As the results obtaíned from these additional experiments
confirm the picture presented in the previous chapter, I do not dwell on them extensively.
First, the results described in Chapter 5 might be sensitive to the choice for a'repeated
OLG game without reincarnation'. Therefore, five additional experimental sessions were
run with 'one long OLG game with reincarnation'. These experimental sessions consisted
of one OLG game of 120 (-15x8) periods. In this design, the OLG sequence had to be
started and finished only once. The young player entering in each period was determined
randomly with two restrictions (about which the subjects were informed). First, each
subject would enter the game fifteen times, and, second, a player who entered in a
particulaz period could not enter in the next two periods. Furthermore, in line with the
information provided in treatment OI, a player entering a period was informed about the
transfer levels in the preceding eight periods.
The results show that the average transfer level in this design (1.38) is lower than in
the basic design (1.83). The difference is not significant, however (Mann-Whitney U test
with session averages as observations). Also in other respects the results are similar. For
example, in each session the transfer level is relatively volatile, there is a slow decline
with experience, and there aze only weak signs of reciprocity.
A second worry one may have regazding the baseline design is that the strategy space
is 'too lazge' to employ trigger-like strategies. The more options a player has, the more
difficult it will be to coordinate on any implicit social contract. For example, subjects
might not agree on the transfer level aimed at by a contract. Similazly, it might be uncleaz
whether transfer levels of, say, 2 should also be punished or that punishment should only
occur with levels of 0 and 1. To simplify the development and employment of trigger
strategies in support of a social contract, four additional sessions of treatment OI were
carried out in which the transfer levels were restricted to the set {0,4} instead of {0, 1,...,
7}. This design, in a sense, solves the coordination problem for the subjects. If an implicit
contract aims at a positive transfer level, it is clear what this level should be. Moreover,
defining defection is much easier.
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It turns out that the restriction of the strategy space results in lower average transfer
levels (1.04) than in the basic OLG design with information (1.83). The difference is
significant at the So~o level (two-tailed Mann-Whitney U test with session averages as
observations). Moreover, there is no indication of any increased success or even an attempt
to use trigger-like strategies. Under trigger strategies, the least one should expect is that
the average transfer in case there should be a punishment is smaller than the transfer in
case there should be no punishment. However, no significant difference is observable. On
the contrary, the weakly positive relation between T, and T,.~ displayed in Figure 5.4,
becomes even weaker. Average transfers in response to T,-,0(1.04) aze almost identical to
average transfers in response to T,.,-4 (1.02). What the restriction of the transfer set seems
to do, is to make it more difficult for subjects to balance the trade-off between individual
and collective rationality. In the baseline design, on average subjects seem to make a
balance at a value of about 2, but restricting the choice to 0 or 4, seems to tip the balance
downward.
In summary, the last two additional series of experiments confirm the general picture
of the baseline design. Although average transfer levels are somewhat lower, they aze still
cleazly bounded away from zero. More important, the absence of strong signs of
reciprocity or trigger strategies in the baseline design seems not because of 'repetition of
an OLG game without reincarnation' or because of the 'lazge strategy set'.'o
6.5 Concluding remarks
The experimental results presented in Chapter 5 have evoked some questions about the
generality of these results. This chapter has examined the robustness of the results derived
in the basic OLG experiment. For that purpose, four sets of additional experiments were
conducted, which all deviated in some respect from the base}ine OLG design. As most
results were extensively described in the preceding sections, the major findings aze merely
summazised here.
Section 6.2. has primarily investigated the impact of the matching structure. One
reason why the results presented in Chapter 5 deviate from the results of other gift
exchange experiments may be the OLG matching structure imposed in the basic design.
'o This conclusion might be slightly premature for the strategy set aspect. For instance, it could be that
players consider 4 too high as the average transfer in the baseline experiment is about 2. So, a stronger
impact of reciprocity might be found with a strategy set of {0, 2} or {0, 3}.
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Although several types of gift exchange experiments can be found in the literature,
comparisons aze often difficult because the chazacteristics of each design differ, e.g., the
pay-off structure. Therefore, an experiment was designed with the same pay-off structure
as the basic OLG experiment but with a more standazd bilateral matching structure. It was
found that the matching structure is indeed important. This implies, among other things,
that results from experiments with a bilateral structure cannot simply be applied to
experiments with an OLG structure. In contrast with what was found in the OLG
treatments, a lazge impact of information was found in the BM treatments. The presumed
effect of monitoring is, however, not observed. On the contrazy, the effects of reciprocity
aze even smaller than in the basic OLG design. The higher level of transfers in the
bilateral treatment with information merely comes about because first-period players try to
conciliate second-period players by giving a substantial transfer. Although second-period
players proved not responsive to these gestures, people continued their behaviour until the
end of the session. This result is probably one of the most remarkable ones.
In Section 6.3 the basic OLG design was extended with the possibility of savings.
Apazt from making the experiment more realistic, the extension offers the opportunity to
investigate which transfer system people would choose if they had free choice. It was
found that the transfer system established in treatment OI was lazgely substituted by a
system of savings and some very low level of transfers. The fazniliaz claim that the
introduction of private pension schemes undermines solidarity seems to be supported by
the data. Another explanation is that players are risk averse and therefore resort to private
savings, which give a certain rate of return. The possibility of savings does not yield an
improvement from an efficiency point of view. Although people have an additional
instrument in treatment SI, the average pay-off is certainly not higher than in treatment OI.
The income distribution over the players is, however, more equal in the former treatment.
The results of the two additional designs presented in Section 6.4 have confirmed the
general picture of the baseline design. Some choices made in the basic design, e.g., having
15 rounds instead of one long round, turned out to have little impact on the results.
Concluding, the results of this chapter seem to imply that the high level of transfers in
the basic design is lazgely caused by the specific OLG structure. The social cohesion and
the confidence that may exist in the OLG structure seem sensitive to changes in the
structure and to the variety of choices people can make. For instance, when people do not
completely depend on others, the collective transfer system hazdly gets off the ground.
Reasons may be that the confidence or the solidarity is severely undermined or that people
just opt for the safer option because they aze risk averse.
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This part has examined the establishment and the maintenance of a voluntary transfer
system in several related economic experiments, which (in an abstract and simple way)
represent some features of public pension schemes. Overall, some support for a transfer
system is observed. It is, however, unclear if and how the experimental results carry over
to realistic situations. Chapter 7 tries to link the experimental results of Part II and the
findings of the survey of Part I.
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Appendix 6A: Session averages and statistical tests
Table A.1: Average transfer per session ( treatments BN, BI, ON, and On
session BN ~ BI ~ ON ~ OI
1 0 42 ~ 1.17 ~ 1.23 ~ 1.23-------- -. - --~--------~---------~--------
2 1 42 ~ 1.35 ~ 2.37 ~ 1.68-------- - -- --~---------~--------f--------




4 0.97 ~ 1.43 ' 2.43 ~ 1.31-------- - --- -1---------~---------~--------
5 0.98 ~ 1.73 ~ 2.47 ~ 2.51-------- -- --~---------F--------f--------
6 - ~ - ~ - ~ 2.13
average 1.01 ~ 1.41 ~ 1.90 ~ 1.83
Table A.2: Average transfer per session per period (treatments BN, BI, ON, and On~~
treatment BN treatment BI treatment ON treatment OI
session
T ~~ T T ~~ T ~T ~ T ~~ T ~~ T
1------- 0.40----- ~ 0.43-~------- 1.87------ ~ 0.47--1.------- 1.11 ~ 1.93 ~ 1.34 ~ 0.53--------F~--------F-------f-------
2------- 1.53----- ~ 1.32-~------- 2.28------ ~ 0.42--~------- 2.41 ~ 2.13 ' 1.60--------~--------~------ ~ 2.13-f-------
3--.---- 1.28----- ~ 1.20--1-------- 1.63 ' 1.10-------f------- 1.08 ~ 0.53 ~ 2.27--------F-------f------ ~ 1.20-~-------
4--...-- 0.78----- ~ 1.17-~------- 2.22 ~ 0.65--------~------- 2.49 ~ 2.07 ~ 1.29-------~--------1------- ~ 1.47--E-------
5 0.93 ~ 1.03 2.50 ~ 0.97 2.64 ~ 2.00 ~ 2.63 ~ 1.80------- -------f------- -------f------- -------f-------f-------f-------
6 - '- - '- - '- ' 2.24 ~ 1.47
average 0.99 ~ 1.03 2.10 ~ 0.72 1.93 ~ 1.73 ~ 1.90 ~ 1.43
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4) T1-6 means the average transfer over periods 1 to 6
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Table A.3: Average transfer, savings and pay-off per session ( treatments OI and Sn~~
treatment OI treatment SI
session ~
transfer ' pay-off transfer
'' savings '' pay-off
1 ------ 1.23 (1-20) ---} 17.16 (9.05) ---- ---
0.68 (6.49) ---~ 2.40 ( I .21) ---~ 19.09 (6-49) --
2 ------ 1.68 (1-85) ---~ 19.97 (13-90) -- 0.22 (0-62) ---{ 2.80 (0.75) ---~ 18.54 (4-59) --
3 ------ 2.11-(1-85) .-- ' 20.80 (12-28) --- -f- ---
1.20 ( 1.20) -
---
-- ~ 2.60 (1-02)
-1-- -- --
' 19.96 (7.89) ---~-----------
4-------- 1.31 (1-27) --- ~ 18.41 (9.99) ---------- - -1~- - ------- 0.34 (0.72) --- ~
2.57 (1-05) --- ' 18.48 (5-61) --
----------- f ~
5 ------ 2.51-(1-56) ---' 21.65 (9.69) ----F- --------
0.84 (137) ---' 2.23-(132) ---~--
- ~ 18.77 (7-93)--
~- --
6 2.13 (2.00) ' 21.90 (15.14) - ' ' -
average 1.83 (1.71) ~ 19.98 (11.97) 0.66 ( 1.08) ~ 2.52 ( 1.10) ~ 18.97 (6.63)
') standazd deviations are given between parentheses
Summary of statistical tests, used in Section 6.2 (treatments BI, BN, ON and On
Comparisons within a treatment (Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks tests)
BN: T~-T2 (p-0.69)
BI: Tt ~ T2 (p-0.04)
ON: T1-6-T~ (p-0.50)
OL T1-6-T~ (p-0.12)
Comparison between two treatments ( Mann-Whitney U tests)
all transfers first transfer(s) ( Tt or T1-6 ) last transfer ( TZ or T~ )
T(BN)~T(BI) (p-0.08) T~(BN)~Tt(BI) (p-0.01) TZ(BN)~TZ(BIJ (p-0.12)
T(ON)-T(OI) (p-0.93) T~ -6 (ON)-T~ -6 (OI) (~1.00) T~ (ON)-T~ (OI) (p-0.27)
T(BN)~T(ON) (p-0.08) Tt(BN)~T1-6(ON) (pc0.08) TZ(BN)~T~(ON) (p-0.08)
T(BI)-T(OI) (~0.27) Tt(BI)-T1-6(OI) (p-0.47) TZ(BI)~T~(OI) (p-0.03)
Additional Experiments
Appendix 6B: Pay-off tables for treatment SI
Table B.1: this table only applicable if you do not save (5--0)
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Transfer to you from the Decider when you are Receiver
0: 1 2 3: 4: 5 6: 7
0 9 s 18 : 27 : 36 : 45 : 54 : 63 : 72
1:.................... 8:. ....... ...
......
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Table B.2: this table only applicable if you do save (S-3)
Transfer to you from the Decider when you are Receiver
0; I 2 3` 4 5 6' 7
Transfer from : 0 18 ~ 24 ` 30 : 36 's 42 : 48 54 : 60
you ~.................... ................:.................:.................:.................:.................;... ..............i. ........... ..........
to the 1 15 : 20 : 25 : 30 's 35 : 40 : 45 : 50
Receiver
:.................... ................i.... .............:.................:.................:.................:... ........... ........... ..........
2 12 ' 16 ~ 20 : 24 : 28 's 32 's 36 : 40
when you
:.................... ................:.... ........... ..:.................:... ..............:... ........... ........... ............ ..........
~ 3 9 ~ 12 : 15 : 18 :
~
21 : 24 : 27 : 30
Decider
:.................... ................:.... ........... ..:.................:. ......... ........... ........... ..........
4 6; 8 : 10 ` 12 : 14 : 16 : 18 : 20
Chapter 7
Summary and Evaluation
7.1 Introduction and summary
Public pension schemes have recently become under financial pressure. In the future they
will become under an even greater financial strain because of the ageing of the population.
Despite the increasing contribution rate, the Dutch old-age public pension system still
enjoys wide support from almost the entire Dutch population. Essentially, the research
presented in this thesis was motivated by this very observation. The thesis asked why and
to what extent old-age pension systems are supported. In particulaz, it tried to identify and
examine several factors that might determine or at least influence the support for the
public pension system.
The above observation suggests that not only financial motives are important, but that
social motivations like solidarity, altruism and fairness have an impact too. To investigate
this claim, these considerations aze explicitly included in the study. Put differently, in all
analyses special attention is paid to the possible impact of this kind of considerations. The
economic literature has shown an increasing interest in notions of altruism and fairness,
which may be connected to the rise of experimental economics. The main contribution of
this thesis is the (empirical) investigation of these notions in the field of pension systems.
The above-mentioned questions were empirically investigated, using data from the
Netherlands. As Chapters 1 and 2 explained, suitable data were not available, so they had
to be gathered first. Two methods for gathering information were used: a survey method,
of which the results aze presented in Part I(Chapters 3 and 4), and an experimental
method, of which the results aze presented in Part II (Chapters 5 and 6). This concluding
chapter has several aims. First, it summazises and compazes the main results from both
parts. Second, it evaluates and discusses the two data collection methods in a broader
context. Third, this chapter attempts to translate the results to real-life situations and to
derive some possible consequences and policy implications. Finally, this chapter will
mention several possible extensions and lines for further research.
Part I: The survey
The first part of the thesis discusses the results of a lazge-scale survey camed out among a
representative sample of the Dutch population. For that purpose, I developed a
questionnaire according to the Factorial Survey Approach, a method within the class of
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stated-preference methods. I distinguished three generations: the young, the middle-aged
and the old generation. One general aim of the questionnaire was to understand better
individuals' opinions concerning pension systems. By asking respondents their attitudes, I
derived that most people (and particulazly those belonging to the young or middle-aged
generation) know little about public and private pension schemes. Yet, the opinions
concerning pension contributions and pension benefits aze similaz among generations.
Overall, most people seem satisfied with the Dutch social security system, the income
positions and the public pension system. Nevertheless, most respondents consider the
public pension benefit to be low, especially for singles. The public pension contribution
rate, on the other hand, is regarded as too high rather than too low. Obviously, the latter
two findings are incompatible. However, a partial approach like this cannot be used to
examine whether people would support, for instance, an increase in the contribution rate
combined with an increase in the pension benefit.
To be able to say more about this last kind of issues, I introduced several hypothetical
pension scheme scenazios in the questionnaire. Each scenario was described by a number
of variables: the contribution rate and the (average) contributions, the pension benefits for
the generation one belongs to and for members of the other generations, and the rates of
return of the pension scheme for oneself and for the other generations. Apart from the
basic situation, four hypothetical scenazios were presented. Two hypothetical scenarios
neglected the financial consequences of the ageing process, whereas the other two
situations explicitly considered these consequences. In one scenario without ageing, both
the contribution rate and the pension benefit were reduced, while they were increased in
the other scenario of that class. The two scenarios with ageing considered just a change of
one variable: in one situation the contribution rate remained the same and the pension
benefit declined, while in the other situation the level of the pension benefit did not
change but the pension contribution increased.
Respondents were asked to evaluate the scenazios by assigning a grade to each
situation. Chapter 3 reports on a simple analysis with t-tests that was made to derive some
first impressions. Obviously, all generations favour the basic situation. In other words,
respondents evaluate all hypothetical scenarios as much worse than the existing pension
scheme. This applies in particulaz to the scenazios with lower pension benefits; the
evaluations of the situations with higher contribution rates aze ranked somewhere in
between.
Chapter 4 continues analysing the evaluations of the pension scheme scenarios by
presenting a more thorough and systematic investigation of the evaluations. For that
Summary and Evaluation 167
purpose, I developed and estimated a model, or rather a utility function, for each
generation. The model incorporates income variables, personal vaziables and variables
assumed to deal with altruism and fairness. Altruism is taken into account because not
only the respondent's own lifetime income is included but also the average lifetime
incomes of the members of the other two generations. Fairness is represented by
incorporating the individual's own rate of return on his or her public pensíon contribution
and the average rates of return for the other two generations. Appazently, the estimation
results justify the supposed impact of social feelings; for all generations both altruism and
fairness affect people's utility. Although the impact of altruism (measured by its elasticity)
is considerable for all generations, altruistic feelings seem strongest among the working
population. Fairness also determines utility, but its effect is smaller in terms of elasticities.
Furthermore, it also appeazs difficult to discriminate between altruistic feelings and
fairness motives. This can paztly be ascribed to statistical reasons, but appazently
individuals also do not or cannot make a cleaz distinction between these notions.
Consequently, the estimation results aze sometimes sensitive to including or excluding
certain vaziables representing altruism and fairness. In spite of this, robust optimal fairness
ratios can be derived for all generations. The desired ratios are mostly similaz to the actual
current rates of return.
The approach of Chapter 4 is more accurate than the simple analyses conducted in
Chapter 3, as the former is a general approach, which also includes personal variables such
as income, age, and so on. Nevertheless, a compazison of the results of both chapters
shows that the conclusions aze roughly similaz." For example, the estimated coefficients
of the utility function (Chapter 4) are consistent with the observation that people favour
the existing situation (Chapter 3). Furthenmore, the results of both types of analyses
suggest that considerations of altruism andlor fairness play a role. This finding may in part
explain the broad support for the old-age state pension system in the Netherlands.
Part II: The eaperiments
The second part of the dissertation discusses the results of several economic experiments
aimed at exploring the basic motivation and the driving force behind the establishment and
maintenance of intergenerational transfer systems, such as PAYG public pension schemes.
Eight players participate in each experimental session. The design of the experiments is
such that a system with voluntary transfers is collectively efficient (Pazeto efficient), but
" See Chapter 4 for a more detailed compazison.
168 Chapter 7
that transfers are individually irrational; the Nash solution is a zero transfer. Theoretical
considerations and other experimental findings suggest that a strong positive link exists
between the decisions of past, present and future generations. Obviously, having
information about previous decisions is necessary for the establishment of any kind of
voluntary social contract. To put it differently, the incentive of the present generation to
renege can be mitigated by the possibility of monitoring and reciprocating by the next
generation. For that purpose the information condition of the game was varied.
Chapter 5 examines the results of the basic experiment. The basic experimental design
is based on an overlapping-generations model with two periods. Further characteristics of
the experimental design can be summazised as follows. Each generation consists of only
one player. 'Young' players receive a basic endowment and a transferable endowment.
'Old' players receive only a basic endowment. The total first-period endowment is thus
much higher than the second-period endowment in order to generate incentives for
transfers. In period t a young player P, can transfer a part of his endowment to the player
who is then old, player P,.,. After that, player P, becomes old and besides the second-
period endowment he may receive a transfer from player P„~. A round is finished when all
players have taken turns. Thus, each round consists of eight periods, or rather seven
decision periods. Fifteen rounds were played in total.
The main purpose of the experiment was to examine the development of the transfers
across rounds in two (information) treatments. In one treatment, players were informed
about the transfers made by the previous players in the round, while they were not
informed in the other treatment. By compazing the results from both treatments, I was able
to derive the effects of information and the possibility of monitoring.
It was found that the level of transfers falls short of the collectively efficient level of
transfers, but also that transfers are clearly bounded away from zero. More important, the
level and the stability of the transfer system are not furthered by the possibility of
monitoring transfers of past generations. Furthermore, only weak signs of reciprocity or
trigger-like strategies are observable. The interdependence in the underlying OLG structure
may create a kind of social cohesion, which is independent of the possibility of
monitoring. It looks, moreover, as if participants aze responsive to the trade-off between
the collective efficiency of a transfer scheme and the individual temptation to defect on
such a scheme. On average, subjects seem to balance the trade-off somewhere about
halfway, with marginal adjustments in response to personal experience.
These results raised some questions regazding the experimental design in general and
the OLG structure in particulaz. Therefore, I conducted four sets of additional experiments.
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Chapter 6 presents the results. The features of the additional experiments comprise another
matching structure, the possibility of savings and structural changes (twice).
The purpose of the first additional experiment was to investigate the impact of the
matching structure. To that end, subjects were matched in bazgaining pairs instead of in a
chain of overlapping players. The pay-off structure in the resulting bilateral matching
(BM) experiment is similar to that in the basic OLG experiment. Furthermore, again two
treatments were obtained by varying the information condition of the game. In contrast
with the OLG treatments, results suggest that information has a large impact in the
treatments with a BM structure; the average transfer in the treatment with information is
significantly higher than in the treatment without information. The presumed effect of
monitoring is absent, however. On the contrazy, the effects of reciprocity aze even smaller
than in the basic OLG design. The higher level of transfers in the bilateral treatment with
information occurs merely because first-period transfers aze high. The reason for this could
be that first-period players try to conciliate second-period players by transferring a
substantial amount. Although second-period players appeaz unresponsive to these gestures,
people typically continue their behaviour until the end of the session. The transfers in the
bilateral treatment without information aze quite low; the average level of transfers is
significantly lower than in the OLG treatment without information. A similar, though not
significant, tendency is visible in the treatments with information. Clearly, this contrasts
with one's expectations.
The second additional experiment extends the basic OLG design with the possibility of
(private) savings. People can use their first-period endowment to make a transfer or to
save for second-period consumption. Savings earn a fixed but negative rate of return. In all
experimental sessions with the possibility of savings, players were informed about the
transfer made by their predecessor but not about the amount he or she saved. The design
implies that establishing a transfer system is still (Pazeto) efficient. In this experiment
subjects thus have to trade off the certain but low rate of return on savings against the
uncertain but possibly higher rate of return on transfers. The results show that the transfer
system established in the basic experiment is lazgely substituted by a system of savings
and some very low level of transfers. The introduction of a private pension scheme thus
results in the crowding out of the voluntary transfer system. Possible reasons may be that
people aze risk averse and that the support, trust or solidarity needed to establish or
maintain a voluntary transfer system is undermined by the introduction of a private system.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the possibility of savings does not yield an
improvement from an efficiency point of view; the average pay-off in the treatment with
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savings is certainly not higher than in the basic experiment. However, the income
distribution across players is more equal when savings aze possible.
The objective of the last two series of additional designs was to examine the
robustness of the results of Chapter 5 to some choices made in the baseline design. First,
under study is whether an alternative design with one long round of 120 periods instead of
15 times 8 periods would produce other results. This adjustment in the design is proven to
have only a minor impact; the average transfer in the long-round sessions is not
significantly different from the average transfer in the sessions with the basic design.
Finally, the fourth additional experiment investigated whether the weak signs of reciprocity
are due to the fact that the strategy space is too large in the basic design. Appazently,
restricting the transfers from {0, 1, ..., 7} to {0, 4} does not result in more reciprocity; it
does lead to lower transfers, however.
The results from the experimental part seem to imply that the high level of transfers in
the basic design is caused lazgely by the specific OLG structure. The social cohesion and
the confidence, possibly present in the OLG structure, seem sensitive to changes in the
structure and to the choices people can make. For instance, a collective transfer system
hardly gets off the ground when people have a more certain alternative.
7.2 Comparison and evaluation
Before comparing the results, I will first elaborate on the characteristics, advantages and
disadvantages of the survey and the experiments and also on the differences between them.
After that I try to make some overall conclusions and suggest some policy implications. I
conclude the section by mentioning several limitations and possible extensions of the
study.
Apart from various method-related distinctions, several other differences exist between
the two data collection methods. These differences include (i) the use of a representative
sample versus the use of students, (ii) a situation with no rewazds versus a situation with
monetary rewazds, (iii) an overlapping-generations model with three generations versus an
OLG model with two generations and, finally, (iv) the nature of the decisions taken by the
respondents.
The first difference is that the samples used in Part I and Part II aze not identical and,
perhaps worse, aze also not drawn from the same part of the population. Part I uses an
existing panel, which is roughly representative for the Dutch population. Among other
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things, this means that the respondents come from all parts of the Netherlands and that all
age categories aze represented. Recall, however, that only respondents older than 25 were
interviewed because younger people generally do not pay occupational pension
contributions. On the other hand, mainly (undergraduate) students participated in the
experiments of Part II. Most of them studied at Tilburg University and they were for the
most part younger than 25. The samples are thus substantially different, which might
influence the results. I can give two arguments in response. First, contrary to the survey,
where an existing panel could be used, the people for the experiments had to be recruited.
For practical reasons, I recruited people from the university campus. Furthermore, several
studies suggest that in experiments students behave (for the most part) in a similaz manner
as 'other' people. Nevertheless, it would have been better if the experimental subjects were
more representative of the Dutch population. The use of different samples may be regazded
as a limitation of the study and it may hamper a sound comparison of the results.
A second, related distinction is that people in the survey panel were not paid for their
participation, whereas the experimental subjects earned on average about f 18, of which f 5
was a mere participation payment. Apart from the familiar comment on economic
experimentation that participation payments may influence subjects' behaviour, the core of
the issue here seems again to be whether the responses evoked in the questionnaire
(without financial incentives) would be similaz to the responses evoked by the real world.
As this issue was already discussed before (see Chapter 2) and will shortly again be briefly
considered, I do not pursue it any further here.
The next two differences between the survey and the economic experiments are more
methodological in nature. A third difference is that in the survey an overlapping-
generations model with three generations underlies the questions and the analyses, whereas
the experiments are based on an OLG model with two generations.32 As I explained in
Part I, the questionnaire needed to make a distinction in three generations in order to
capture the differences among generations in the development of the public pension
system, in particular in the scenarios with ageing. As the experiments consider a much
simpler transfer system and exclude aspects of ageing, they did not need to distinguish
more than two generations. Put differently, two generations were enough to capture and
explore the basic issues of the experiments (such as the development of an
" Another, related, point here is that the generations distinguished in the survey are real generations,
while the distinction in the experiments is purely artificial. There all players are in tum young and old.
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intergenerational transfer system); the introduction of a third generation would add little to
th1S,33
A final point to note here is that the decisions people had to make in the questionnaire
and in the experiments aze different. The questionnaire presented several pension scheme
scenazios, which people had to evaluate by assigning a grade. The scenazios take into
account the mandatory elements of the public pension scheme; i.e. people have no choice
whether or not to join the scheme. In a sense, the alternative situations are variations
within the same framework of an existing compulsory pension system. This framework can
be used to derive only, and even so just to some extent, whether people aze willing to
maintain the public pension system or would rather tum to a private pension system. Thus,
only some changes in relation to the status-quo situation aze possible. In contrast, the
intergenerational transfer system in the economic experiments is totally voluntary. Here,
people have to set up a system. The experiments aze thus more concerned with the
question whether a voluntary transfer system can and will be established and less with the
maintenance of an(existing) scheme. Apart from the difference between the nature of
these decisions, the value of the decisions is an issue here. As mentioned previously, the
value of the answers and thus of the results of questionnaires aze usually uncleaz, as people
have no incentive to answer honestly. The monetazy rewazds in economic experiments
depend usually on the decisions made; players aze thus probably guided by the monetary
incentives.34 A last problem here is the possible relationship between individual decisions.
Usually, decisions (answers) of a respondent in a survey do not affect the decisions or the
behaviour of other respondents in the panel. In contrast, experimental subjects generally
meet each other several times; within a session, thus, player B may be affected by the
behaviour of player A.3s
31 Furtherrnore, because economic experiments with an OLG structure are still scarce and the addition of
a third generation would complicate matters considerably, it was better to start relatively simple. Put
differently, one should not tum to more complicated designs before one has thoroughly examined a simple
game in a simple design.
" This, howevet, does not imply that other considerations cannot play a role, too.
's This can be illustrated by an example for the baseline setting. Let us assume that two of the eight
players participating in treatment OI are in principle tit-for-tat players ( e.g., they want to cooperate by
transferring 4 if the previous player has transferred 4). As the chance that the two cooperative players meet
each other is small, these players will possibly become discouraged and they may gradually decide to transfer
nothing. Consequently, the tit-for-tat strategy may not survive. However, not all players in the experiments
were affected by the behaviour of others; several players always transferred the same amount. Furthermore,
even in later rounds, substantial transfers occurred, which suggests that altruistic or at least social motives
should be present.
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Although both methods are different, some general conclusions and remarks can be
made. First of all, both the results of the survey and the (OLG) experiments show a
support for transfer systems. This result is the more remarkable in view of the
aforementioned fact that the questionnaire starts from an existing situation and the
experiments starts from scratch.
Furthermore, social motivations play a role in both parts. The high level of transfers in
the OLG treatments might be connected to the high level of social cohesion in these
treatments. Yet, the difference between the OLG treatments and the BM treatments is
remazkable. Despite the more direct bilateral relationship in the BM treatments, transfers
aze fairly low, especíally in the treatment without information. The high level of transfers
in treatment BI almost completely comes about by the high transfers in the first period;
players in the second period transfer almost nothing. How do these results fit in in the
debate on the role of strategic versus social considerations, considered in Chapter 2? The
experimental results seem to suggest that strategic behaviour is not so important, at least
not to the extent claimed by, for instance, Binmore, Shaked and Sutton (1985).36 What
about social motivations? Although hazdly any evidence for reciprocity or reciprocal
altruism can be observed in the experiments, it looks as if the experimental subjects are
motivated by some form of altruism or a kind of social norm. In most experiments people
seem to have a kind of generic willingness to contribute to the transfer system; the fact
that transfers in treatment ON aze rather high could point at feelings in this direction.
These findings are consistent with Andreoni's claim that in public-goods experiments
about half of the contributing subjects contribute because of kindness (Andreoni, 1995).
So, non-monetary aspects seem to play a role in the experimental games. However, the
presence of altruism and fairness emerges more strongly from the survey results. On
average, all generations appeaz to be sensitive to considerations of altruism and fairness."
Another issue that deserves some further attention is the role of information. Part I
argues that it might be a good idea to inform people better about public and private
76 Of course, this only holds for the experiments discussed here. Furthermore, the behaviour of the first-
period players in treatment BI might be called strategic. However, the fact that the behaviour hardly changes
when players become more experienced and notice that their actions hardly have the desired effect is against
the strategic predictions of Binmore et o! (1985).
" In both the survey and the experiments not all individuals are motivated or influenced by these
feelings. For instance, in the experiments a minor part of the subjects consistently chose to play the Nash
solution, i.e. to transfer zero. In the survey, average coefficients of altruism and faimess were derived.
Between subjects, differences in these coefficients can exist.
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pension schemes. The reason is that while public pension systems aze regarded as
important by a majority of the population3e, yet people seem to know little about them.
The questionnaire's results show that providing information seems useful. Information is
also an important topic in the experiments of Part II. In the OLG treatments, information
has no significant effect. In other words, in the experimental world transfers aze neither
higher nor lower when information about previous transfers is provided. What would
happen in the real world if people were better informed about pensions? Of course, it is
mere speculation, but my guess is that one part of the population would accept higher
contribution rates if they truly understood that the public pension system is financed on a
PAYG basis (which implies a kind of solidarity), that its maintenance is threatened by the
ageing of the population, and that the contribution rates should be increased to keep the
same level of pension benefits.39 This pazt of the population may to some extent be
motivated by feelings of altruism, fairness andlor solidarity. Another part of the population
would probably say that the sacrifices would be too large. For the most pazt, they may
then be influenced by egoistic motives. Although it is unclear what the overall outcome
will be, the survey results strongly suggest that it will be somewhere in between.
Respondents in the sample had 'full' infotmation and considerations of altruism and
fairness proved to be important.
Furthetrnore, the experimental results of the OLG game suggest that a kind of transfer,
i.e. PAYG, system can be supported, even under uncertain future transfers and uncertain
rates of return. As the future transfers in the public pension system seem less
unpredictable, support for such a system is possible. It is relevant in this respect to
consider the reactions to the possibility of savings in both the survey and the experiments.
People evaluated the questionnaire's scenario with a lower public pension benefit and more
private savings as much worse than the basic situation. The results of the experiment with
the possibility of savings seem to constitute an appazent contrast to this. Results of that
experiment seemed to say that individuals in a sense prefer the option of savings to a
PAYG transfer system. In other words, most people save while they transfer little. As a
result, the transfer system collapses. In this connection the role of risk aversion is
1e A recent survey by a Dutch labour union (FNV) showed that about 75"~0 of all people think that the
public pension system (AOW) is the most important part of the Dutch welfare state (De Volkskrant (a Dutch
newspaper), January 9, 1996).
" Decreasing the pension benefits seems a less feasible and less probable option. The survey results
obviously show that situation EB (increasing contribution rates) is preferred to situation LB (decreasing
pensions). So, although people favour the status-quo situation, they will choose EB if they have to choose
between LB and EB.
Summary and Evaluation 175
important. Savings aze a certain alternative, compazed with the transfer system in the
experiment, whereas in the survey both alternatives aze assumed to have equal ( zero) risk.
The certainty of savings could induce risk-averse players to resort to a savings system and
to leave the transfer system. It seems thus not only useful for the govetnment to provide
information about the current and future pension system, but in addition, the government
should guazantee that the system will continue to exist in the future. The results suggest
that this will contribute to the maintenance of the system.
Looking back, now, what has this reseazch produced? First, it provides insight into
people's opinions concerning pension systems. I believe that a questionnaire is the
appropriate way to gain insights in these aspects and to examine what kind of ineasures or
adjustments to the system people would favour. The results of the survey clearly show that
social motivations should not be ignored; they contribute notably to the support for the
pension system. Second, Part II of the thesis shows that it is possible to study the
establishment of a(simplified version of a) PAYG pension system by means of economic
experiments. Although experimental methods are more abstract and less appropriate to
describe a realistic situation, the experimental results also imply that there is some scope
for social feelings and transfer systems in OLG environments. In a sense, the rather
complicated design in the questionnaire and the quite simple designs of the experiments
complement each other.
Part II demonstrates that an intergenerational PAYG system can be established without
strong enforcement rules if such a transfer system leads to consumption smoothing.40 It
looks as if the social cohesion also plays a role in this respect. Part I shows that a PAYG
pension system may be preserved by the younger generations, provided that the older
generation benefits. That is, even if the system does not favour the young from a pure
costlbenefit point of view, the relative good income position of the elderly and fair
(desired) rates of return bring about ongoing support for the system. However, the survey
results also imply that contribution rate increases in the long run could threaten the system
because the relative good position of other generations is outweighed by the loss of
income for the young generation. In other words, the young will face a decrease in their
lifetime utility in the long(er) run. The introduction of a temporary fund ( schommelfonds)
is probably a viable option in this context, as then the increase in the contribution rates
'o The government should merely organise this system. Furthermore, altemative systems (with, e.g., the
possibility of private savings) may undermine the establishment and the maintenance of the transfer system;
this erosion may eventually lead to its collapse ( according to the savings experiment of Chapter 6). The
govemment should thus handle carefully the possibility of voluntary participation in alternative systems.
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can be established more gradually. However, this measure would also imply that people
will be confronted earlier with the financial problems, whereas the reduction in the
lifetime utilities is still unavoidable (because of the ageing of the population). The support
for the PAYG system remains probably higher if the fund is not (merely) fed by additional
pension contributions, which people directly notice, but also or instead by less visible (tax)
bonuses."
The research presented in this dissertation has several limitations. The advantage of
this is that extensions aze possible. Before concluding, I would like to indicate some lines
for further reseazch. Several extensions are feasible, in particulaz regazding the
experiments. It would, for example, be interesting to vary the value of the endowments
and~or to allow for heterogeneity of the endowments or the subjects. Another interesting
extension would be to conduct an experiment with savings possibility but with an
uncertain or stochastic interest rate. Also another future reseazch topic could be to relax
the assumption that a generation consists of only one player.42 Regazding the survey, the
possible extensions seem more restricted. It would, however, be interesting to repeat the
survey in about ten to fifteen yeazs time, when the contribution rates will probably be
higher.
In conclusion, the thesis shows that besides selfish motives, considerations like
altruism and fairness affect individuals' behaviour and opinions concerning pension
systems. Moreover, the results imply that an intergenerational transfer system is supported
and probably will continue to be supported. Therefore, if Dutch politicians take into
account social feelings and inform people about the pension system and possible
adjustments in this system, they may be able to maintain the Dutch public pension system
in its existing form, even if adjustments are necessary because of the ageing of the
population.
" As the burden is still for the most part paid by the citizens, people could actually be deceived by this
somewhat cunning behaviour. Individuals with perfect foresight would realise that both ways of financing are
for the most part similar, however.
'Z The OLG experiments assumed that the (two) generations are of equal size, while in practice the
contributing generation, i.e. the working population, is much larger than the number of pensioners.
Introducing a kind of population growth, in combination with an uncertain interest rate, could be interesting.
Similarly, other exercises with the Aaron condition can be conducted.
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Samenvatting
De meeste westerse landen beschikken over oudedags- of pensioenregelingen. Binnen deze
pensioenregelingen is meestal een onderscheid te maken tussen collectieve of publieke
pensioenvoorzieningen (in Nederland de AOW) die via de overheid georganiseerd zijn en
aanvullende of private pensioenvoorzieningen die bijvoorbeeld op bedrijfstakniveau
geregeld zijn. Een ander belangrijk verschil tussen beide soorten stelsels is dat publieke
pensioenregelingen meestal gefinancierd worden via een omslagstelsel. Dit houdt in dat op
een bepaald tijdstip de pensioenuitkeringen van de 65-plussers gefinancierd worden uit de
pensioenpremies van de premiebetalers op dat moment. Bij private pensioenstelsels is
daazentegen meestal sprake van een kapitaaldekkingsstelsel: de hoogte van iemands
pensioenuitkering hangt onder andere sterk af van de eigen premie-inleg. Anders gezegd,
bij een kapitaaldekkingsstelsel spaart men min of ineer voor het eigen pensioen, terwijl dit
niet het geval is bij een omslagstelsel. Dit leidt echter vaak tot misverstanden, getuige
bijvoorbeeld de veel gehoorde uitspraak "v~ij hebben ons hele leven AOW-premie betaald,
dus hebben we ook recht op een (redelijke) AOW-uitkering".
Dit proefschrift gaat met name over collectieve, publieke pensioenvoorzieningen. Door
het omslagstelsel (en door de vergrijzing van de bevolking) zijn deze voorzieningen de
laatste tijd onder zware financiële druk komen te staan en deze druk zal in de toekomst
nog verder toenemen. Tegelijkertijd kan echter worden opgemerkt dat de Nederlandse
collectieve oudedagsvoorziening (de AOW) nog steeds een brede steun van vrijwel de
gehele Nederlandse bevolking geniet. Deze observatie heeft ten grondslag gelegen aan het
onderzoek dat gepresenteerd wordt in dit proefschrift. Eén van de kernvragen van het
onderzoek is in welke mate het publieke pensioensysteem gesteund wordt. Met name is
hierbij getracht de verschillende factoren, die deze steun (zouden kunnen) bepalen of ten
minste beïnvloeden, te identificeren en te bestuderen. Uit het bovenstaande valt al
enigszins af te leiden dat wellicht niet alleen financiële motieven een rol spelen, maar dat
sociale overwegingen zoals solidariteit, altruïsme en rechtvaardigheid mogelijk ook van
belang zijn. Immers, ook al is bijvoorbeeld bovenstaande uitspraak niet juist vanuit een
puur financieel oogpunt, het is wel begrijpelijk dat mensen wat terug willen voor het geld
dat ze in het pensioensysteem gestopt hebben. Sociale overwegingen zijn derhalve expliciet
meegenomen in de studie.
Bovenstaande vragen zijn empirisch bestudeerd met behulp van Nederlandse data. Na
een algemene inleiding wordt in Hoofdstukken 1 en 2 uiteengezet dat geschikte data niet
beschikbaar waren, zodat deze eerst verzameld moesten worden. Hiervoor zijn twee
methoden gebruikt: een enquête-methode, waarvan de resultaten gepresenteerd worden in
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Deel I(Hoofdstukken 3 en 4) en een experimentele methode, waarvan de resultaten
beschreven worden in Deel II (Hoofdstukken 5 en 6). Standaazd (revealed preference,
d.w.z, getoonde voorkeur) methoden kunnen niet toegepast worden, onder andere omdat in
het algemeen mensen geen vrije keus hebben binnen een collectief pensioenstelsel.
In deze samenvatting zal de inhoud van de zeven hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift
kort besproken worden. De nadruk zal hierbij liggen op de resultaten die verkregen zijn in
Deel I en Deel II.
Zoals gezegd zijn de eerste twee hoofdstukken hoofdzakelijk inleidend van aazd. In
Hoofdstuk 1 wordt de achtergrond van de studie kort beschreven. Daarnaast wordt enige
aandacht besteed aan het Nederlandse pensioensysteem en het vergrijzingsproces.
Hoofdstuk 2 gaat nader in op de twee dataverzamelingsmethoden die toegepast zijn.
De nadruk wordt hierbij gelegd op experimentele methoden omdat die relatief nieuw en
nog tamelijk onbekend zijn in de economische wetenschap. Daarnaast worden de begrippen
altruïsme en rechtvaazdigheid toegelicht. Vooral op grond van experimentele resultaten uit
de literatuur wordt aannemelijk gemaakt dat de invloed van deze variabelen op uitkomsten
van een (economisch) proces aanzienlijk kan zijn.
Deel I: De enquête
Deel I bespreekt de resultaten van een grootschalig onderzoek uitgevoerd onder een
representatieve steekproef van de Nederlands bevolking. In een enquête ontwikkeld
volgens de Factorial Survey Approach (een soort stated-preference methode, d.w.z een
methode waazbij preferenties aangegeven worden) is aan mensen gevraagd hun mening te
geven over bepaalde bestaande en denkbeeldige situaties.
In de enquête zijn drie generaties onderscheiden: de jonge (25-44), de middelbare (45-
65) en de oudere (65`) generatie. Een van de algemene doelen van de enquête is een beter
inzicht te krijgen in de meningen van individuen over pensioensystemen. Door de
respondenten simpelweg naaz hun mening te vragen bleek onder andere dat de meeste
mensen (en met name diegenen die behoren tot de jonge of middelbaze generatie) weinig
weten over publieke en private pensioenvoorzieningen. De meningen over de hoogten van
de pensioenpremies en -uitkeringen verschillen nochtans weinig tussen de generaties.
Mensen blijken in het algemeen tevreden te zijn over het Nederlandse sociale
zekerheidsstelsel, de inkomensposities en de AOW. Niettemin vinden veel respondenten de
AOW-uitkering laag; dit geldt met name voor de AOW-uitkering voor alleenstaanden. De
pensioenpremie daazentegen wordt eerder te hoog dan te laag gevonden. Duidelijk is dat
deze twee meningen niet met elkaaz stroken. Een partiële benadering zoals deze, waazbij
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mensen hun mening geven over afzonderlijke elementen, kan echter niet gebnukt worden
om te bekijken of inensen bijvoorbeeld een stijging van de premie gecombineerd met een
stijging van de AOW-uitkering zouden steunen.
Om meer te kunnen zeggen over dit soort kwesties zijn verschillende (hypothetische)
pensioenstelsel scenario's geïntroduceerd in de enquête. Elk scenazio wordt beschreven
door en aantal vaziabelen: het AOW-premiepercentage en de (gemiddeld) te betalen AOW-
premie, de AOW-uitkering voor de generatie waartoe de respondent behoort en voor de
leden van de andere twee generaties, de opbrengstvoet van het pensioensysteem voor de
respondent en voor de andere generaties. Naast de basissituatie (lees de huidige situatie),
zijn vier hypothetische scenario's gepresenteerd. Twee hypothetische scenario's nemen de
financiële consequenties van de vergrijzing niet in beschouwing (afgekort zonder
vergrijzing), terwijl de ander twee hypothetische scenario's deze gevolgen expliciet
meenemen (met vergrijzing). In één scenazio zonder vergrijzing zijn de pensioenpremie en
de -uitkering verlaagd, terwijl deze juist verhoogd zijn in de andere situatie zonder
vergrijzing. In de twee scenazio's met vergrijzing verandert slechts één vaziabele ten
opzichte van de huidige situatie: in één situatie blijft het premiepercentage gelijk en daalt
de AOW-uitkering, terwijl in de laatste situatie de hoogte van de AOW-uitkering gelijk
blijft maar de premie toeneemt.
De respondenten is gevraagd de scenario's te evalueren door een (rapport) cijfer toe te
kennen aan elk scenario. In Hoofdstuk 3 blijkt uit een simpele statistische analyse dat alle
generaties duidelijk de basissituatie prefereren. Met andere woorden, de respondenten
beoordelen alle pensioenstelsels geschetst in de hypothetische scenario's slechter dan de
huidige pensioenregeling. Dit geldt met name voor de scenario's met lagere
pensioenuitkeringen; de oordelen over de situaties met de hogere premies nemen een
tussenpositie in.
Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert de evaluaties van de pensioenstelsel-scenazio's nader en op een
meer systematische wijze. Hiertoe wordt voor iedere generatie een model, of beter gezegd
een nutsfunctie, ontwikkeld en geschat. Het model bevat inkomensvaziabelen,
achtergrondkenmerken en variabelen die verondersteld worden altruïsme en
rechtvaardigheid te vertegenwoordigen. Altruïsme wordt meegenomen door niet alleen het
levensduurinkomen van de respondent zelf op te nemen, maar ook het gemiddelde
levensduurinkomen van leden van de andere twee generaties. Rechtvaardigheid wordt
beschouwd door de opbrengstvoet van de pensioenpremies van het individu zelf en de
gemiddelde opbrengstvoet voor de andere twee generaties op te nemen. De opbrengstvoet
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is hierbij gedefinieerd als de verdisconteerde som van alle pensioenuitkeringen gedeeld
door de verdisconteerde som van alle premiebetalingen.
De schattingsresultaten rechtvaardigen de veronderstelde invloed van sociale
overwegingen; bij alle generaties zijn altruïsme en rechtvaazdigheid van invloed op
iemands nut. Hoewel de invloed van altruïsme in termen van elasticiteiten aanzienlijk is
voor alle generaties lijken altruïstische gevoelens het sterkst bij de premiebetalers, dus bij
de jongste twee generaties. Bij alle generaties bepaalt rechtvaardigheid ook voor een deel
het nut, maar het effect is kleiner in termen van elasticiteiten. Verder blijkt het vaak
moeilijk te zijn om een onderscheid te maken tussen altruïstische gevoelens en
rechtvaardigheidsoverwegingen. Voor een deel valt dit toe te schrijven aan statistische
oorzaken, maar individuen maken zelf ook geen scherp onderscheid tussen beide begrippen
- of ze kunnen het niet. Gevolg hiervan is dat de schattingsresultaten soms gevoelig zijn
voor het al dan niet opnemen van bepaalde variabelen die altruïsme en rechtvaardigheid
weergeven. Desondanks kunnen voor alle generaties robuuste optimale, of gewenste,
opbrengstvoeten (fairness ratio's) afgeleid worden. De gewenste fairness ratio's zijn
vergelijkbaar met de bestaande opbrengstvoeten.
Deel II: De experimenten
Het tweede deel van de dissertatie bespreekt de resultaten van verschillende, gerelateerde
economische experimenten. Het belangrijkste doel van de experimenten is inzicht te
krijgen in de vraag waarom overdrachtssystemen, zoals een via een omslagstelsel
gefinancierd pensioenstelsel, tot stand komen en gehandhaafd blijven.
Het ontwerp van de experimenten is zodanig dat een systeem met vrijwillige
overdrachten (transfers) collectief gezien doelmatig is (Pareto efficiënt) maar dat transfers
individueel gezien irrationeel zijn; de Nash uitkomst is een overdracht van nul.
Theoretische overwegingen en andere experimentele resultaten suggereren echter dat er een
sterke positieve link kan bestaan tussen de beslissingen van vorige, huidige en toekomstige
generaties. Het moge duidelijk zijn dat de totstandkoming van elk type vrijwillig sociaal
contact vereist dat infonmatie over vorige beslissingen beschikbaar is. Anders gezegd, de
prikkel voor de huidige generatie om te verzaken kan verminderd worden door de
mogelijkheid om de vorige generatie te observeren (controleren) en te reciproceren (d.w.z.
te belonen en te straffen). Om dit aspect nader te kunnen bestuderen is de
informatieconditie, dus de hoeveelheid informatie die mensen krijgen, van het spel
gevarieerd.
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Hoofdstuk 5 bediscussieert de resultaten van het basisexperiment. Het experimentele
basisontwerp (design) is gebaseerd op een overlappende-generatie (OLG) model met twee
perioden. In alle experimentele sessies participeren acht spelers. Elke generatie bestaat uit
slechts één speler. Spelers in de eerste periode ("jonge" spelers) en spelers in de tweede
periode ("oude" spelers) ontvangen een bezit. Het bezit in de eerste periode is veel hoger
dan in de tweede periode om een stimulans voor overdrachten te genereren. In periode t
kan een jonge speler P, een deel van zijn bezit overdragen aan de speler die dan oud is,
speler Pt.2. Daarna wordt speler P, oud en kan hij naast zijn bezit van de tweede periode
een overdracht ontvangen van speler P,,,. De uitbetaling (pay-off) van een speler is het
produkt van het eindbezit in de eerste periode (bezit van de eerste periode min eventuele
overdracht) en het eindbezit in de tweede periode (bezit van de tweede periode plus
eventueel ontvangen overdracht). Elke experimentele sessie bestaat uit meerdere ronden
(15). Een ronde is beëindigd wanneer alle acht deelnemende spelers aan de beurt zijn
geweest. Elke ronde bestaat dus uit acht perioden, of beter gezegd uit zeven
beslissingsperioden (door de OLG structuur).
Het belangrijkste doel van het basisexperiment is de bestudering van de ontwikkeling
van de overdrachten over de ronden in twee ( infonnatie) treatments (een treatment is een
verzameling sessies met dezelfde karakteristieken en procedures). In één treatment (zes
sessies) werden spelers geïnfonneerd over de overdrachten van de vorige spelers in de
ronde terwijl ze niet geïnformeerd werden in de andere treatment (vijf sessies). Door de
resultaten van beide treatments te vergelijken, kunnen de effecten van informatie en de
daaraan verbonden controlemogelijkheid afgeleid worden.
Het blijkt dat in het basisexperiment het niveau van de overdrachten lager is dan het
collectief efficiënte niveau, maar tegelijkertijd dat overdrachten duidelijk positief zijn (en
dat, ondanks een daling, ook blijven in latere rondes). Belangrijker nog blijkt dat het
niveau en de stabiliteit van het overdrachtssysteem niet bevorderd worden door de
controlemogelijkheid; gemiddeld genomen zijn de overdrachten in beide treatments vrijwel
gelijk. Verder zijn slechts zeer zwakke tekenen van reciprociteit (wederkerigheid) en
andere 'trigger'-achtige strategieën ( strategieën die gebaseerd zeer op belonen en straffen)
zichtbaar. Een mogelijke verklaring hiervoor is dat de OLG structuur een soort van sociale
cohesie veroorzaakt die onafhankelijk is van de controlemogelijkheid. Daarnaast lijkt het
erop dat de deelnemers een afweging maken tussen de collectieve doelmatigheid van een
overdrachtssysteem en de individuele verleiding om van zo'n systeem af te wijken.
Gemiddeld genomen lijken individuen de afweging ergens in het midden te plaatsen, met
marginale aanpassingen naar aanleiding van persoonlijke ervaringen.
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Hoofdstuk 6 presenteert de resultaten van vier extra series experimenten. Deze
additionele experimenten kenmerken zich respectievelijk door een andere matching
structuur (koppelingsstructuur), de mogelijkheid tot besparingen en een tweetal structurele
veranderingen.
Het eerste additionele experiment (tien sessies) had tot doel de invloed van de
matching structuur te onderzoeken. Daartoe zijn de (acht) deelnemers gekoppeld in (vier)
onderhandelingspazen in plaats van in een reeks van overlappende spelers. De
uitbetalingsstructuur in het resulterende bilaterale matching (BM) experiment is gelijk aan
die in het basis OLG experiment. Verder zijn wederom twee treatments géintroduceerd
door de informatieconditie van het spel te variëren. De toekenning van de spelers aan de
paren is iedere ronde op basis van toeval bepaald, evenals de volgorde waazin de spelers
van een paaz handelen, dat wil zeggen of ze in de eerste of in de tweede periode een
overdrachtbeslissing moeten nemen.
In tegenstelling tot de OLG resultaten suggereren de resultaten van het BM experiment
dat informatie veel invloed heeft in de treatments met een BM structuur; de gemiddelde
overdracht in de treatment met informatie is significant hoger dan in de treatment zonder
informatie. Het veronderstelde (sterkere) effect van reciprociteit blijkt echter niet aanwezig.
Integendeel, tekenen van reciprociteit zijn zelfs kleiner dan in het basis OLG design. De
hogere overdrachten in de bilaterale treatment met informatie is louter te danken aan de
hoge overdrachten in de eerste periode. Een reden hiervoor zou kunnen zijn dat eerste-
periode spelers proberen de tweede-periode spelers gunstig te stemmen door een
aazizienlijk bedrag over te dragen. Hoewel de tweede spelers niet gevoelig blijken te zijn
voor deze gebazen blijven de eerste spelers dit gedrag vertonen tot en met de laatste ronde.
Hierbij dient opgemerkt te worden dat het gaat om dezelfde spelers, die op willekeurige
wijze als eerste of tweede aan de beurt komen.
De overdrachten in de bilaterale treatment zonder informatie zijn laag; het gemiddelde
niveau is significant lager dan in de OLG treatment zonder informatie. Een soortgelijke,
doch op sessieniveau niet significante tendens is zichtbaar in de treatments met informatie.
De resultaten van het bilaterale experiment zijn dus in duidelijke tegenspraak met wat men
zou verwachten.
Het tweede additionele experiment breidt het basis OLG design uit met de
mogelijkheid tot (private) bespazingen. Individuen kunnen nu hun bezit in de eerste
periode gebruiken om een overdracht te geven of om te spazen voor consumptie in de
tweede periode. Besparingen hebben een vaste maaz negatieve opbrengstvoet. In alle (vijf)
experimentele sessies met de spaazoptie zijn de spelers geïnformeerd over de overdracht
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van hun voorganger(s) maaz niet over hun bespazingen. Het design is zodanig dat het nog
steeds collectief doelmatig is om een overdrachtssysteem op te zetten. In dit experiment
moeten spelers dus een afweging maken tussen een zekere maar relatief lage opbrengstvoet
op besparingen en een onzekere maaz mogelijkerwijs hogere opbrengstvoet op
overdrachten.
De resultaten tonen aan dat het overdrachtssysteem dat tot stand komt in het
basisexperiment grotendeels vervangen wordt door een systeem met bespazingen plus een
zeer laag niveau van overdrachten. De introductie van een soort private pensioenregeling
lijkt dus een verdringing van het vrijwillige overdrachtssysteem te veroorzaken. Mogelijke
verklaringen hiervoor kunnen zijn dat mensen risico mijdend zijn of dat de steun, het
vertrouwen of de solidaziteit die wellicht nodig is om een vrijwillig overdrachtssysteem op
te zetten en te handhaven ondennijnd wordt door de mogelijkheid van private besparingen.
Niettemin blijkt de spaazoptie geen verbetering op te leveren vanuit het oogpunt van
doelmatigheid: de gemiddelde uitbetaling in de treatment met bespazingen is zeker niet
hoger dan in het basisexperiment. Het inkomen is echter gelijkmatiger verdeeld over de
spelers wanneer bespazingen mogelijk zijn.
Het doel van de laatste twee experimenten is het nagaan van de robuustheid van de
resultaten van Hoofdstuk 5 voor veranderingen van keuzen gemaakt in het basisdesign.
Ten eerste is bekeken of een alternatief design (met informatie) bestaande uit een lange
ronde van 120 perioden in plaats van 15 maal 8 perioden andere resultaten zou opleveren.
Deze aanpassing in het design blijkt echter slechts van kleine invloed te zijn; de
gemiddelde overdracht in de (vijf) lange-ronde sessies is niet significant verschillend van
de gemiddelde overdracht in de (zes) sessies van het basisdesign met informatie.
Tot slot is bekeken of de zwakke tekenen van wederkerigheid het gevolg zijn van het
feit dat de strategieruimte te groot is in het basisexperiment. De bevindingen van de (vier)
sessies waarin de overdrachtsmogelijkheden beperkt worden van {0,1,...,7} tot {0,4} tonen
aan dat deze beperking niet resulteert in meer reciprociteit; het leidt echter wel tot
significant lagere overdrachten.
Het doel van het afsluitende Hoofdstuk 7 is meervoudig. Ten eerste zijn de belangrijkste
resultaten van beide delen besproken en vergeleken. Daarnaast zijn de twee gebruikte
dataverzamelingsmethoden in een wat bredere context bediscussieerd. Ten derde is getracht
de resultaten naaz de praktijk te vertalen en enige mogelijke consequenties en
beleidsimplicaties af te leiden. Tenslotte zijn verschillende mogelijke uitbreidingen
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genoemd alsmede mogelijke richtingen voor toekomstig onderzoek. De belangrijkste
conclusies worden hieronder kort samengevat.
Terugkijkend, wat heeft dit onderzoek nu opgeleverd? In de eerste plaats geeft Deel I
inzicht in de meningen van mensen over pensioenvoorzieningen. De resultaten van de
enquête geven duidelijk aan dat sociale overwegingen niet verwaarloosd zouden moeten
worden; zij leveren een aanzienlijke bijdrage aan de steun voor het pensioenstelsel. Verder
suggereren de resultaten van Deel I dat een pensioenstelsel gehandhaafd zou kunnen
worden door de jongere generaties mits de oudere generatie hiervan profiteert. Dat wil
zeggen, zelfs als de pensioenvoorziening vanuit financieel oogpunt niet gunstig is voor de
jongere generaties, kunnen de relatief goede inkomenspositie van de gepensioneerden en de
rechtvaardige (gewenste) opbrengstvoeten een voortdurende steun voor de voorziening
teweegbrengen. De enquête-resultaten impliceren echter ook dat op lange termijn de
toename van de pensioenpremie het stelsel zou kunnen bedreigen omdat het
inkomensverlies van de jonge generatie dan zwaarder weegt dan de relatief goede positie
van de andere generaties. Met andere woorden, de jongeren zullen dan op den duur
geconfronteerd worden met een daling van hun levensduurnut.
Deel II van het proefschrift toont aan dat het mogelijk is om de totstandkoming van
een (vereenvoudigde versie van een) pensioenvoorziening, gefinancierd via een
omslagstelsel, te bestuderen met behulp van economische experimenten. De experimentele
resultaten suggereren dat er (in een overlappende-generatie omgeving) ruimte bestaat voor
sociale gevoelens en een overdrachtssysteem. Het blijkt dat een omslagstelsel met een
redelijk overdrachtsniveau tot stand kan komen zonder sterke dwangmaatregelen als zo'n
overdrachtssysteem leidt tot consumptiespreiding. Hierbij lijken de sociale cohesie en de
specifieke OLG structuur een rol te spelen.
Afsluitend, het proefschrift geeft aan dat naast egoïstische motieven overwegingen
zoals altruïsme en rechtvaardigheid van invloed zijn op het gedrag van individuen en hun
meningen ten aanzien van pensioenvoorzieningen. Daarnaast suggereren de resultaten dat,
mede hierdoor, een intergenerationeel overdrachtssysteem gesteund wordt en voorlopig
waarschijnlijk gesteund zal blijven. Als de Nederlands politici rekening houden met deze
sociale overwegingen en als ze de burgers voldoende informatie geven over de
pensioenregelingen en de mogelijke aanpassingen daarin, kan het Nederlandse AOW-stelsel
wellicht gehandhaafd blijven, zelfs als aanpassingen nodig zijn vanwege de vergrijzende
bevolking.
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